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The Genesis and Scope of the Inquiry 
Although in recent years there has been renewed interest in 
the notion of property, it is apparent that discussions 
regarding the concepts of property and ownership — concepts 
which we may for the moment conveniently take together^ — 
have had little impact on either contemporary commerce or 
theories of distributive welfare. Some have claimed that it 
is even misguided to analyse property and property rights 
because the notion of property is too fragmented to allow for 
a general theory. 
My original intention was to attempt to vindicate the idea 
of property, or more particularly of private property, 
arguing that legitimately acquired private property could be 
represented as a set of fixed points that limits the morally 
permissible scope of the public welfare or other 
redistributive policies of government — a view within a 
tradition that has been defended most notably in recent times 
by Robert Nozick in "Anarchy, State and Utopia".^ 
Although it may be said that "property" is anything to which 
value attaches and endures, whereas "ownership" is the 
placement of these features with a particular person (or 
persons). F.A.Harper "Property and its Primary Form" in 
S.L.Blumenfeld (Ed.) "Property in a Humane Economy" (Open 
Court, Lasalle, Illinois, 1974) pp.17-18. 
^ R.Nozick "Anarchy, State and Utopia" (Basic Books, 1974) 
However, it became increasingly apparent that the concept of 
property itself is even more slippery than commonly supposed, 
so much so that the task of vindication as I had originally 
understood it seemed not only daunting but impossible. 
I had intended to explore the traditional philosophical 
problem of property, that is, to analyse and evaluate various 
justifications for the right to private property, which have 
ranged through the utilitarian, to do with efficient use of 
resources; the psychological, such as the supposed human need 
for unique external attachments; the religious, including Old 
Testament and other supposed scriptual mandates for private 
property; and the most famous of all, namely, that associated 
with Locke, which itself includes elements of utilitarian, 
religious, psychological and even, arguably, independent and 
additional moral desert justifications. What all these 
purported justifications have in common is that they assert 
our right to private property is ultimately grounded in 
something natural, in a broad sense of the term; in other 
words, that our right to private property (though not all 
would be comfortable with the language of rights) has a basis 
which is "pre-legal". That is to say, private property is 
not ultimately a creature of law as Thomas Hobbes^ most 
famously maintained, but is something which is intelligible 
^ See T.Hobbes "Leviathan" Ch. XXVI (1651. William Collins 
ed., 1976.) 
and defensible in abstraction from the particularities of any 
legal system, or of law in general. It is natural in the 
sense in which the natural is contrasted with the artificial, 
positive law being an artefact, or human creation, and thus 
artificial. 
Yet what I discovered was that although the concept of 
property appears to be fundamentally involved in our ordinary 
life and speech, (I say "appears" for good reason, as will 
be clear below) , and that various usages of the term 
"property" are found in law, jurisprudence and in economics, 
as well as in popular speech, little analysis had been done 
on the concept itself. Further, limited analysis appears to 
have been done on the clearly jusisprudential problem of 
whether the modern regulatory State has eroded private 
property rights, although we still talk of "property." 
In my discussion of the concept of property I will be 
dealing, therefore, primarily with the question of what 
calling something my private property really implies. In 
other words, what is property? I will be looking at the 
justification of private property only insofar as this 
analytical inquiry requires such a venture. 
Discussions of property typically begin with a consideration 
of property in a political/legal State or organised society 
with a legal system. A useful starting point for such a 
discussion may be the following definition of property, 
tentatively proposed by Charles Donahue: "Property may be 
said to be the law of the relation of persons to things".* 
However, as Donahue himself has pointed out, this, like many 
sweeping definitions falls short of being wholely 
satisfactory,® although any study of property must at least 
involve a general study of the rights of people, moral and/or 
legal in relation to things in the broadest sense. 
The variety of conclusions reached in discussions regarding 
the nature of property — of whether property can be seen as 
things that are owned by persons or as consisting of various 
rights which constitute ownership' — reflects the current 
divergent views on the concept of property. The concept has, 
in an analytical sense, become the very locus of the problem 
of property both legally and morally. 
It would seem appropriate, then, to assume that one can only 
find the true sense in which property can be defined through 
an examination of its natural characteristics. 
C.Donahue, T.E.Kauper and P.W.Martin "Property: An 
Introduction to the Concept and the Institution - Cases and 
Materials" (West Publishing, 1983) p.XXII. 
® Ibid. 
' See for example R.L.Rariden "The Right to Property" 
(University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
USA, 1985.) 
Property has been central to Western law, as much of the 
legal systems have been taken up with the protection of 
property, resolving conflicts about property, and securing 
its orderly exchange and redistribution, while the concept 
of property has also been "central in the development of 
European society"' in the sense that it has been a principal 
force in social and political thought, and a building block 
of a significant number of political theories. In addition, 
concerns about property underlie every aspect of economic 
affairs as economics, by definition, deals with all things 
that are desired and, arguably, scarce. It deals, therefore, 
with all things that are of worth and all its associated 
phenomena in society. Every item of property must be owned 
by someone (or group) and "value cannot exist without an 
owner"'- it is because we value things that we aquire them 
as property. 
As Harper claims, it is difficult therefore to understand 
why, despite furious and bloody quarrels about who owns what, 
the concept of property has been so much (until perhaps more 
' A.E.S.Tay "Property and Law in the Society of Mass 
Production, Mass Consumption and Mass Allocation" in 
C.Wellman (Ed.) "Equality and Freedom: Past, Present and 
Future" (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977) p.88 
' F.A.Harper "Property and its Primary Form" in S.L.Blumenfeld 
(Ed.) "Property in a Humane Economy" (Open Court, LaSalle, 
Illinois, 1974) p.6 
recent times ) ignored throughout the history of philosophic 
and economic thought. Similarly, Grunebaum argues that little 
attempt appears to have been made to discover the necessary 
internal structure of the concept of property and the 
possible range of property rights that are common in the many 
forms of property, and how the different forms of property 
can be classified to facilitate comparison with one 
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another. Property underlies, arguably, every aspect of 
human liberty, because it is only by depriving us of 
ownership of things "that it makes it possible for one person 
to tresspass upon the liberty of another. The right to 
private property can be seen as a particular application of 
the general right to freedom, while the acquisition and 
disposition of proprietal interests are manifestations of the 
economic dimension of freedom. For example, as Mill 
maintained, property exemplifies freedom and one must have 
freedom to appropriate and dispose of things as one sees fit, 
or as Hegel argued, property is necessary not because it 
helps to satisfy human needs, but because a person must 
translate his freedom into an external sphere in order that 
' See A.M.Honoré "Ownership" in A.G.Guest (Ed.) "Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
J.0.Grunebaum "Property Rules and Property Rights" in 
Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, Vol.61, 1980, p.422. 
^̂  F.A.Harper op. cit. 
he must realise his ideal existence/^ - property is the 
first embodiment of freedom and so is itself a substantial 
end. 
Although the concept of property appears to have been 
neglected, the idea of property has certainly loomed large 
in history, being entrenched in various forms; as stated in 
the French declaration of 1789, translated by Thomas Paine 
as the "Rights of Man" XVII: "The right to property being 
inviolable and sacred, no-one ought to be deprived of it, 
except in cases of evident public necessity, legally 
ascertained and on condition of a previous just 
indemnity.The United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948 also included the right to property -
that everyone has the right to own property alone as well as 
in association with others (Article 17) and that no-one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his property (Article 17(2)).^^ 
Yet what is meant by the term "property" and what defines 
"ownership"? To what does "property" refer, and can we give 
" G.W.F.Hegel "The Philosophy of Right" (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1941 ed.) 
" T.Paine "The Rights of Man" (1791) reprinted E.K.Bramsted 
and K.J.Melhuish (Ed.) "Western Liberalism"(Longman,1978) 
^̂  Although the UNESCO Committee of Experts reporting on Human 
Rights in 1949 limited the fundamental rights of proprerty 
to what is "necessary for (man's) personal use and the use 
of his family: no other form of property is itself a 
f undamenta1 r i ght". 
an adequate non-stipulative definition of "property"? These 
are not just verbal quibbles. Confusion appears to be 
prevalent over the nature of property itself. For example, 
property may be concerned with the right to call upon an 
organised society to prevent unauthorised persons from 
enjoying certain commodities. However, the specific rights 
or titles which are protected by this appear to be viewed 
differently by jurists, philosophers, historians and 
sociologists. 
At the outset I wish to point out that there are several 
approaches one may take to property, but it is clear that any 
discussion or analysis must be precise in its definition of 
property. I highlight this point due to my concern with the 
manner in which many analysts, including philosophers, appear 
to have generated a running confusion. As Lloyd argues, the 
use of the word "property" has introduced some confusion and 
it is "necessary to distinguish between the right of 
ownership and the subject matter of that right". A review 
of the literature suggests they have under-estimated the need 
for conceptual clarification of property and ownership. 
Particularly notable is the extent to which analytical and 
See P.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social Relations" 
(Heinemann, London, 1982). 
" D.Lloyd "The Idea of Law" (Penguin, 1976) p.319. 
justificatory issues have been intertwined/' often not 
being clearly distinguished, let alone dealt with separately. 
(I acknowledge however that analytical and justificatory 
issues, though separable, cannot always and necessarily be 
dealt with independently.) For example, normative issues of 
justification are raised by the talk of what moral or other 
relationships between people and things would support a 
particular distribution of wealth. At an increasingly "meta" 
level there are questions to do with justification for 
property allocations in general, while claims of 
justification inevitably lead back to what are really 
analytical questions to do with the meaningfulness or 
otherwise of talking of the ownership of oneself and, in one 
great theoretical tradition, of one's labour. Rawls, for 
example, argues that goods come into the legally regulated 
world unowned and await distribution on the basis of a 
conception of justice^®, whereas Nozick^' holds that things 
may be already (pre-legally) owned and thus only a minimal 
State, minimally disruptive of authentic proprietary 
relationships, and which protects the individual's property, 
is justified. 
See for example J.Locke "Two Treatise on Government" Second 
Treatise, Ch.5 "Of Property" (Reprinted Scientia Verlaag 
Aalen, 1963) 
J.Rawls "A Theory of Justice" (Oxford University Press, 
1971) . 
R.Nozick "Anarchy, State and Utopia" op. cit. 
Questions of both justification and conceptual issues are 
raised in particular by the issue of when property begins. 
For example, is it a natural phenomenon; as rights, are these 
natural in any sense - can we talk of a general right to 
property in a natural sense of right, that is, in a pre-legal 
sense - or are property and property rights merely 
conventional, more specifically, are they particular legal 
rules? For example, what might justify the statement "A owns 
x"? Putting it another way, how could we prove the statement 
" X is mine (yours, ours, his, theirs)". "What, at minimum, 
can we expect if it is indeed true that someone owns 
2 0 
something?" Some may argue that if something belongs to a 
person, he will have the say about its use or disposal, while 
others will not. He, not others, "ought to (be the one who 
will) have that say".^^ 
Donahue, for example, states that "defining property and 
justifying property are closely interconnected"," but does 
not tell us why and how. In another example, Becker and 
Kipnis" do not even attempt to separate the issues, merely 
T.R. Machan "Human Rights and Human Liberties" (Nelson Hall, 
1975) p.125 
" Ibid. 
" C.Donahue, T.E.Kauper and P.W.Martin "Property: An 
Introduction to the Concept and Institution - Cases and 
Materials" op. cit. p.176 
L.C.Becker and K.Kipnis "Property: Cases, Concepts and 
Critiques" (Prentiss Hall 1984) p.XI 
posing both conceptual and justificatory questions together, 
as is evident in the following passage: "Should 
individuals be able to hold land as private property? 
Should they be able to own the means of production? 
Should they be able to accumulate wealth without limit? 
Should they be able to pass their wealth to their 
children? How much property can the State tax or take 
away? What counts as property? Who owns the air, the 
sea, the moon?" 
Regarding labour, in particular, justificatory discussion is 
usually centred on the questioning of the value of one's 
labour, and the implications of various answers for one's 
relationship to full or partial products of that labour, its 
alienability, and the normative judgements we can make about 
the desirability of the proprietary outcomes purportedly 
generated in this manner. Yet as things "owned", one's 
person, one's body, and one's labour were rarely, until 
relatively recently,^^ analytically compared with other 
possessions one may call property, and certainly such 
analyses as there are go little way towards a full analysis 
of either the concept of property or that of ownership. 
I acknowledge that, as J.L. Austin has pointed out, a clear 
See for example R.Scott "The Body as Property" (Allen Lane, 
1981). 
delineation between analytical and justificatory issues may 
not always be possible, where possible may not always be 
useful, and where useful may not always be desired. ̂^ Yet 
failure to identify which question one is addressing, or by 
the same token to declare whether they are being treated as 
inseparable questions, and if so, why, can only cause 
confusion. Such confusion can easily occur when property is 
simply equated with a "bundle of rights" (and duties and 
liabilities). Some argue that property or ownership is not 
a right, but is in fact a bundle of rights.^' As we shall 
see, however, it is not always clear whether all or some of 
these rights are derived analytically from the concept of 
property or whether they are corollaries of whatever 
justificatory process is supposed to legitimate a particular 
claim to property, or to property in general. 
There are, then, at least two separable "problems of 
property". The first is the moral problem of justification 
of private ownership - why should anyone own anything? Why 
should particular people who own land, houses, stocks and 
shares go on doing so? What, if anything, would be wrong if 
the State expropriated all the current owners of such things 
" J.L.Austin "Are There A Priori Concepts?" in "Philosophical 
Papers "(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1961) 
" See C.C.Ryan "Yours, Mine and Ours: Property Rights and 
Individual Liberty" in Ethics Vol.87, 1976-1977, p.140 
and took them into public ownership?^^ Entangled in such 
questions are numerous conceptual questions about the nature 
of ownership or property and its difference from other 
rights. To expand slightly on a distinction which has already 
been laboured, it is possible to distinguish, at least in 
principle, between an analysis of the concept of private 
property, or of the ownership relation, which is that which 
links us to what we call our private property, on the one 
hand, and on the other, a justification of that degree of 
virtually impervious exclusivity, which is for critics the 
morally most troublesome feature of the notion of private 
property. However, the qualification "in principle" is 
necessary, most notably in the case of Locke where issues of 
analysis and justification will be shown to be inextricably 
woven together.*' This inseparability will be true, 
moreover, for any theory which analyses private property in 
terms of a nexus that is a consequence of a particular type 
of lineage, which results in the current tie between the 
property in question and its putative owner. 
See A.Ryan "Property" (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 
1987) p.l 
Or as C.B. Macpherson, for example, interprets the concept 
of property: in a wide a sense as possible to bring the 
support given by society to the protection of proprty to 
bear on achieving new rights that ought to be recognised. 
Property, for Macpherson, should include even rights to 
political power and to participation in a satisfying set of 
social relations. See V. Held "Rights and Goods" (The Free 
Press, 1984) p.184 
We need to understand what is meant by "property" and 
property rights before justificatory issues can be tackled. 
As Machan argues, many who have been concerned with issues 
of property have, for example, tried to show that nothing of 
the sort exists, that is, that individuals should not be free 
to own goods and services, only collective bodies or States 
should, and that the institution of private property is 
thought of as "evil"." From hard core Marxists to 
so-called non-ideological welfare-State liberals - even 
including some modern conservatives — many intellectuals 
consider the institution of private property to be a weapon 
of class warfare, a provisional and limited legal device 
established by governments, or at best a crude means by which 
individual greed might be exploited for the benefit of social 
welfare. Property rights, in turn., some argue, are 
acknowledged via full legal recognition and protection "only 
here and there in the world". Those who American 
commentators typically call "classical liberals" assert that 
the only role of the State is to protect certain rights, in 
particular rights of personal liberty and private property, 
whereas "modern liberals" hold that the State ought also to 
concern itself with issues such as poverty, lack of housing. 
29 T.R.Machan "Human Rights and Human Liberties" op.cit, p. 122 
" Ibid.p.122. 
ill health, lack of education and the like.̂ ^ 
Yet what is clear is that the institution of private property 
is arguably one of the main things that, as Eastman claims, 
"has given persons that limited amount of freedom and 
equalness that Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing 
the institution."^^ We may even be tempted to conceive of 
property as whatever is morally immune from government taking 
without compensation. This of course leads to constitutional 
and political questions about balance of power and rights 
between the individual and the State. Alternatively, we may 
view property as an entitlement that should promote a 
particular type of efficiency in the use of resources, 
especially in non-renewable resorces. This in turn leads to 
questions of the role of efficiency and justice in a general 
theory of property, whereas to "see property as including 
public-law entitlements - say, to minimum level of income -
raises deep issues of equality and the significance of 
property to personal development."" 
Theories of property and ownership, as Ryan points out. 
" See C.Chandras and P.Pettit "Rawls - A Theory of Justice and 
its Critics" (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990) p.74 
" Reprinted in F.A.Harper "Property and its Primary Form" op. 
cit. pp. 6-7. 
" S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) p.35 
tackle two questions above all: the first is the question 
of how we obtain a title to whatever sorts of property are 
at issue; the second is the question of what rig'hts we 
obtain and over what varieties of entities — how extensive 
our rights over property are, and over what things we can 
have such rights. ̂^ Is property "natural", is it 
conventional, is it necessary, is it just, what determines 
the legal title to property, what determines the proper size 
of property and what is the function of property, is it the 
source of livelihood, of wealth, power, sovereignty or 
freedom? 
The attraction of the natural rights theories such as that 
proposed by John Locke whereby the origin of property is 
based on the idea of self-ownership, is that they answer both 
sorts of questions simultaneously — by starting with an a 
prioristic commitment to self-ownership, and then by 
deductive extension to our owning certain things external to 
us (by, for example, having mixed our labour with the 
otherwise unowned external thing). Thereafter the rights 
pass on by, and arise from, morally permissible forms of 
contract, gift, sale, exchange, bequest, etc. 
Instrumental, particularly utilitarian justifications of 
A.Ryan "Public and Private Property" in S.I.Benn and G.F. 
Gauss (Ed.) "Public and Private in Social Life" (London: 
Croon Helm, 1983) p.230. 
property rights may, arguably, be said to have generally been 
"conjoined with a (Hobbesian) positivist approach" to the 
definition of property". That is, "A owns x" is held to be 
elliptical, meaning "A owns x according to the legal or 
quasi-legal rules of community 0". Whether somebody actually 
does or does not own the thing is in the final analysis a 
factual question about his relationship to a particular legal 
or quasi-legal system. It is positivistic in the sense that 
ultimately there can be no meaningful talk of property rights 
except relative to a relevant legal system. The moral 
justification of a particular property right is a matter of 
showing what good would be done by the existence of such a 
relationship, and thus belongs to a Benthamite critical or 
censorious, as opposed to analytical or descriptive, 
jurisprudence. 
Interest, my own included, in the subject of private property 
has been dramatically increased by debates, first in the West 
and now in the formerly communist States of Eastern Europe 
and the former elements of the Soviet Union about what should 
be the appropriate levels of government regulation, 
particularly over matters regarding "the environment". To 
take a recent Western example first, the Canadian government 
tabled its Constitutional Reform package on 24 September 1991 
in which part of the very first proposal is that "the 
" A.Ryan ibid. p.224. 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms be amended to 
guarantee property rights" - the rationale reportedly being 
that guaranteeing the right to own and enjoy property is one 
of the fundamental protections needed for human rights, and 
that thi s would ensure that governments cannot expropriate 
private property. Further, rights we enjoy regarding our 
property - which some consider in economic terms as "economic 
rights" - have in recent years once again "become a lively 
topic" of constitutional debate in the United States,^' 
whereas they had been virtually a settled issue for the past 
fifty years. 
The transformati on of Eastern Europe, and now proposed 
changes to the former Soviet Union, from State socialism to 
a market economy, has resulted in factors of production, 
including rural production and land, being assigned to 
private hands, in ways that plainly contradict the 
Marxist-Leninist economic theories on which these States had 
previously been based. For example, in September 1990, former 
President Mikhail Gorbachev announced his national economic 
plan for the Soviet Union - the "500 Day Plan"." Although 
events in the now "Commonwealth of Independent States" have 
overtaken the implementation of this plan, it is worth noting 
E.Frankel Paul and H.Dickman (Eds.) "Liberty, Property and 
the Future of Constitutional Development" (State University 
of New York Press, 1990) p.3 
" See for example "Time Magazine", 24 September 1990. 
that this radical plan envisages that 80% of the Soviet 
economy will eventually be put in private hands. Large 
enterprises would be turned into stockholding companies, and 
small businesses, shops and restaurants sold to individuals. 
Farmers would be allowed to withdraw from the collective 
farms and receive an allotment of land and assets. Such 
developments have reportedly triggering debates within the 
new Commonwealth about the principles that should govern the 
transition to privatisation. How do we determine the new 
"first owner"? To what extent, if at all, is it relevant to 
consider the claims of those who purport to trace their title 
to ownership that preceded communist expropriation, and 
indeed, those who claim ownership prior to Soviet annexation 
of republics?^' 
In addition, the interest of any philosopher concerned with 
the relationship between political liberty and moral freedom 
should be sparked by the new boom in administrative 
regulations by the State and its agencies, which increasingly 
limit and, some would argue, therefore seriously infringe on 
the individual's ability to deal with items we customarily 
These questions are being considered particularly in Estonia 
and Latvia under their new land reform. For example, the 
Republic of Estonia Ownership Reform Act (Eesti 
Vabariigi Omandireformi Aluste Seadus) has, as its 
objective, the reorganisation of ownership relations, the 
inviolability and restoration of free enterprise, and the 
return of property or compensation as a result of 
"injustice in violation of property rights". 
call our property, in accordance with the individual's own 
considered judgement. To complicate matters further, there 
appears to be no agreement in law as to what, even for the 
technical purposes of the law, is to be deemed property. I 
will discuss this in Chapter 2. 
The lack of clarity and confusion over what we term 
"property" may of course be due to real variations in our 
pre-theoretical background understandings of property. There 
are also the tacit influences of a growing volume of 
empirical work, and quasi-empirical work in social theory, 
aimed at understanding the feelings of attachment we have to 
what we recognise as our property. 
From the viewpoint of psychology and personality theory, for 
example, the acquisitive behaviour of human beings has been 
well documented. Feelings regarding property appear to be 
easily nurtured in human personality, and we have many 
symbolic, as well as direct ways of declaring "this is mine". 
Beaglehole, for example, suggests that property objects — 
objects regarded as one's property — assist the development 
of self-consciousness and integration of the personality into 
an ordered system.^' 
E.Beaglehole "Property: A Study in Social Psychology" 
(New York, Macmillan, 1932) p.295. 
Certainly this acquisitive impulse or instinct seems to be 
very deeply rooted, and the reality of the phenomenon of what 
we might call "felt ownership" is a powerful challenge to the 
Hobbesian view — still very widely held on both the left and 
right of the political system — that property rights are 
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conventional or purely legal. Even among animals we find 
this recognition of "mine" and "yours", not only towards 
individuals of their own species, as for the young of a 
family, but also towards inanimate things. The bird may 
claim the nest and even the whole tree as its own and the dog 
guards its territory. In certain cases, as the squirrel 
stores its food, this also extends to the provision for 
future needs, whereas some birds, such as magpies, also 
appropriate and claim useless objects as their own. 
In children this impulse develops quite early. Although this 
may also be instinctive, it is arguable that it may be 
entirely the result of social example. I must say that the 
latter alternative seems quite implausible, however this is 
essentially an empirical question, and beyond the scope of 
this thesis to answer. 
40 It is evident even in the works of Marx that there are 
innate feelings of property. For example, workers 
feel or believe that they have been defrauded by the 
employer. As Silver points out, Marx seems to have 
recognised "property" as the object of feelings triggered 
by productive activity, arguing that "property means no 
more than man's attitude to his natural conditions of 
production as belonging to him". M.Silver "Foundations of 
Economic Justice" (Basil Blackwell, 1989). 
From a psychological point of view, property has been argued 
to be a complex set of, presumably distinctive, "feelings of 
approval"*^ with regard to an object - "object" being not 
only physical things, animate or inanimate, but incorporeal 
objects such as leisure, effort, information, ideas, liberty 
and reputation. As a result, for something to be considered 
as our property, we have a feeling of legitimate entitlement 
(or possession approval) with regard to that thing, and 
others must feel that our entitlement is legitimate. That is, 
property can only be property if it is respected - whatever 
word is used - or even if no specialised terminology is 
available, property is known in a particular society if 
members experience feelings of approval for possession. 
Certainly by using the word "right" with property we engender 
a feeling of approval with regard to an object, and some 
argue that to cope with the problem of economic justice it 
is essential to define property and property rights in a 
manner explicitly recognising their emotive content. ̂^ But 
it would, of course, be fallacious to pass from the 
proposition that there are, if this view is correct, 
distinctive feelings associated with something's being 
recognised by me as property, to the conclusion that property 
just is these feelings. 
See M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" ibid, 
p.13 
See M.Silver ibid. p.168 
Property may also be seen in expressive terms. By saying 
that something is my property, I may be expressing a feeling 
or attitude towards that thing or when I am at pains to point 
out that something is definitely not my property. That is, 
much has been made of the emotional investment in owning 
things, however equally it may be said that we may want to 
disown things; for example, one may not want the 
responsibility for the dog which has just bitten the postman. 
There is plainly room here for a serious phenomenological 
study of the experience of ownership which would take into 
account both an individual's feelings towards a thing as well 
as those of other people towards that thing. Thus when we 
speak of property, there is both a relational as well as 
social dimension. 
Most discussions regarding property and ownership consider 
them in the light of particular rights which are assigned 
people in relation to a thing. A.M.Honoré's account of those 
rights is no doubt the most comprehensive of the sorts of 
rights we commonly consider to be involved in our modern, 
legal understanding of property and may be seen as a paradigm 
of the concept of ownership.^^ 
However, there appear to be three possible alternatives 
A.M.Honoré "Ownership" in A.G.Guest (Ed.) "Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence" op. cit. 
concerning the analysis of the concept of property if we are 
to consider the particular rights. They are that: 
(1) The concept of property is a relatively stable cluster 
concept, consisting of various rights which may vary in 
number and combination fom one thing owned to another. 
(2) The concept of property is an unstable cluster concept, 
generally changing towards a very weak cluster; the 
holding of even a very limited and variable set of 
rights over a thing is all ownership of that thing 
amounts to. 
(3) The concept of property has not in fact changed - that 
is, property consists of a very narrow set of necessary 
and sufficient rights - however, people's relationship 
to things has changed, in a way that has overtaken both 
linguistic practice and popular reflective judgement. 
It is this third alternative which I maintain is correct. 
Ultimately I shall argue that property or ownership is what 
I will call an absolute concept, intuitively plausible 
counter-examples notwithstanding. That is, I will argue that 
a single core right, derived from a core set of rights, all 
of which boil down to control, is necessary for there to be 
genuine ownership. This puts me in conflict with the variable 
"cluster" or "bundle of rights" approach, such as that 
associated with Honoré, to be considered further below. My 
misconceived, although some of the particular rights or 
"incidents", to use Honoré's terminology, within the bundle 
or cluster are necessary for ownership. In claiming it is 
absolute, I shall argue that there is more truth than may 
appear in the familiar rhetorical exclamation — "It's mine, 
so I can do what I like with it". 
Interestingly, even critics of the idea of absolute ownership 
are usually willing to concede that we do have some examples 
of absolute ownership in the form of some relatively 
insignificant things including personal possessions such as 
my watch, clothes, etc,^^- if it really is my hat, then I 
can even destroy it if I want to - while others affirm that 
self-ownership is absolute,^' even using this to morally 
justify suicide, and to explain how one could maintain both 
that murder is a most heinous crime, but that suicide - which 
may equally be deliberate destruction of an innocent human 
being - is no crime at all. Moreover, the classical liberal 
notion of the liberal State rests on the idea of absolute 
property rights over oneself and parts of the world. It 
embodies what is generally regarded as the Lockean view of 
rights, as inalienable and absolute by definition, and 
" See for example D.Miller "Justice and Property" in 
RATIO Vol. XXII, 1980. 
See for example A.Levine "Capitalist Persons" in E.Frankel 
Paul, F.D.Miller, J.Paul and J.Ahrens (Eds.) "Capitalism" 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 
essentially negative in character, not subject to majority 
vote or social policy. Yet as Wolff among others has pointed 
out, those rights themselves are are often "given little by 
way of defence".*^ 
I will argue, further, that our practices with regard to what 
we call ownership and property, particularly as they have 
evolved in Western post-industrial society are, in many 
respects, indistinguishable from those of stewardship. The 
tradition of stewardship, never dominant, but certainly 
persistent, dates back to post-Platonic philosophers of the 
Roman Empire and especially to the teachings of lamblichus 
in the 3rd century A.D. There certainly are particular 
duties placed upon us which appear to be stewardly — one is 
often called upon to exercise responsible care over 
possessions, often requiring us to maintain, protect and 
account for the condition of things we own — from the pet 
dog, to one's land, and their relations to "the environment". 
A steward and an owner are, of course, fundamentally 
different - a steward generally is responsible for the thing 
entrusted to him by the owner, whereas an owner cannot 
coherently entrust something to himself. 
J.Wolff "Robert Nozick - Property, Justice and the 
Minimal State" (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991) p.140 
J.Passmore "Man's Responsibility For Nature" 
(Duckworth, 2nd. ed. 1980) p.28 
However, it appears that historically the concepts have often 
been carelessly thrown together, particularly when talking 
of land. That is, there appears often to be behind talk of 
ownership and property an idea that is really stewardly. For 
example, one theological line has been that God is the real 
owner of all the riches of the universe, including the human 
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body. The human being therefore must so use and/or protect 
the divinely entrusted resources so as to further God's 
intentions - that is, act in a stewardly way vis-a-vis the 
thing on God's behalf. This really denies the reality of 
human ownership in favour of the notion of mere stewardship. 
While discourse about the notion of stewardship generally 
appears to have been abandoned in recent times, certainly in 
popular political and social discourse, what is evident and 
implicit in our practices and expectations regarding property 
today, and particularly property regarded as significant, is 
strictly speaking better characterised as a new form of 
stewardship. In other words, I would suggest that 
stewardship has effectively superseded ownership as the 
fundamental relationship between the so-called property and 
the owner, but that our linguistic practices have not caught 
This is not only a Christian concept. In Islamic legal 
theory, for example, all property belongs ultimately 
to God, and that He grants men only the right of 
possession. M.M.Khadduri "Property: Its Relation to 
Equality and Freedom in Accordance with Islamic Law" 
in C.Wellman (Ed.) "Equality and Freedom: Past, 
Present and Future" op. cit, p. 177 
up with this really quite remarkable transformation. 
Of course, it may be argued that the concept of stewardship 
makes no sense without a "true" owner who entrusts us with 
things. To this there appears to be three possible responses, 
either: 
(1) a secular answer, to the effect that there is a one true 
"owner" but that ownership is a collective ownership of 
present, past, and future generations. In this ultimate 
form of collectivism, no individual human being or sub-
group of humans can ever really be an owner. This idea 
is rarely put forward; and even those environmentalists 
whose declarations seem to imply it do not explicitly 
advocate this view, although it would provide a 
foundation for their rhetoric about our obligations to 
future generations; 
(2) a theological answer, that is, that God is the one true 
owner; 
3) a rejection of the pre-supposition, in other words, 
stewardship does not need a true owner. 
The views of Rawls and Reich may be regarded as glosses on 
the first, collectivist, alternative. As Schwartzenbach^" 
has suggested, to appreciate that our practices regarding 
r A 
S.Schwartzenbach "Locke's Two Conceptions of Property" 
in Social Theory and Practice Vol.14, 1988, p.16. 
what we deem to be ours are indeed a form of stewardship, one 
merely needs to take Rawls' example that individual 
fundamental rights may be interpreted as "gifts" — a 
recognised given from a reasonable community - or as Reich^^ 
has suggested, a form of government largesse, that is, that 
government provides public "assistance", such as health 
benefits, unemployment assistance and the like — that all 
property has always been, in a sense, government gift or 
donation, possibly with strings attached. 
In sum, if we accept the reality of growing restrictions on 
what we call our property, it appears that we are left with 
two broad alternatives: 
1) due to the amount of government intervention that is 
apparent, all we really have is stewardship of those 
things which the government allows us to enjoy; that 
private property is simply disappearing; or 
2) while there is a movement toward a form of stewardship, 
these government interventions are really violations of 
one's property. We must reaffirm our rights to private 
property, allowing restrictions to be rigorously applied 
only so long as, and so far as, certain ways of 
exercising our property rights may be harmful to other 
innocent people. Otherwise, there is no justification 
^̂  C.Reich "The New Property" in "Yale Law Journal", 
Vol.73, 1964, reprinted in L.C.Becker and K.Kipnis 
"Property: Cases, Concepts,Critiques." op, cit. 
for restrictions - our rights are trumps. 
Property ca.n be viewed in many ways, so in the next chapter 
I will expand on the various perceptions we have of property 
and include some points of clarification. 
CMf Til 1 
PERCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY-
ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 
1. Property and Society 
Generally, in any society, but certainly within a society 
sufficiently complex to have a legal framework, consideration 
must be given to how that system is to deal with things 
already seen as property, and further, how to include into 
the general category "property" things barely conceivable at 
a previous time,^ but which have now come to be regarded as 
of. significant commercial, cultural or personal value. 
The varieties of things which are regarded as of value and, 
hence, are worth acquiring as property, also differ between 
individuals, groups and sub-communities, even within the same 
broad community, as well as differing over time. For example, 
the discarded aluminium drink can become an unowned thing 
from the point of view of the well-to-do consumer, but 
becomes a valuable resource which may be reclaimed as his 
own, for the child seeking pocket money. A particular set 
of stones may be sought by a tribal hunter because of the 
magical powers he believes they give, though to a sceptic 
they are just worthless rubble. 
Further, considerations of value may also vary from the 
For example, one could imagine even new living 
creations resulting from genetic engineering which may 
be the subject of ownership in the sense of patent. 
See J.0.Grunebaum "Private Ownership" (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987) p. 7 
aesthetic to the sentimental, to functional and, more 
broadly, to market values. The reasons why a person may want 
to own something are correspondingly various. And what seems 
a perfectly good reason for owning something to one person, 
may seem hopelessly irrational, even a sign of madness to 
another. 
In all, the variety of things people may seek to own, and the 
variety of motivation that may induce them to seek to acquire 
or defend ownership, are so wide-ranging, that we may be 
tempted to be sceptical as to whether there really could be 
a single all-embracing notion which corresponds to the 
relevant uses of the word "property". Yet at the same time, 
this may be thought to be obviously wrong. Plainly we use 
the term "property" and its cognates constantly, usually 
without hesitation, and seemingly consistently. 
For those who would equate meaning with use, as many do in 
consequence of a simple reading of the later Wittgenstein's^ 
di scussions of language, meaningfulness is guaranteed by the 
very fact that such use is an undeniable social reality. 
However, it is surely arguable that a word or phrase may have 
a customary social use which survives only so long as a 
number of difficult issues which are actually ignored or 
^ Ludwig Wittgenstein "The Blue and Brown Books" and 
"Philosophical Investigations". 
avoided through that use are not brought to the surface. 
For example, Galen Strawson^ has argued this very thesis with 
regard to our everyday use of "freedom" and free", while 
others have argued that everyday terms such as "mind" and 
"colour" survive only as a cloak over realities to which in 
the end they have no application. If we take "colour" to mean 
a property or a range of properties (red, blue, yellow, 
green, etc.) possessed by surfaces and volumes ordinarily 
perceived as coloured — which is the nucleus of one possible 
common sense view — then it is open to question whether there 
really are any colours, and whether anything is really 
coloured. The reason is, or is claimed to be, that the 
physical explanation of why we see things as coloured does 
not require us to posit any such property, or range of 
properties, for no properties posited by contemporary physics 
correspond even roughly to the colour differentiations made 
by the unaided human eye. 
While not necessarily agreeing with these claims about 
"freedom" and "colour", they serve to illustrate how it may 
be coherently argued that a word can have a regular and 
easily grasped use in everyday discourse, while a 
combination of philosophical analysis and empirical research 
^ G. Strawson "freedom and Belief" (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986) Ch.l 
shows that its use is predicated on assumptions which are 
empirically false. 
2. Ordinary Language Usage of Property and Ownership. 
In most of its ordinary occurrences the use of the word 
"property" creates no mystery, needs no explanation and needs 
no justification. For example, for most values of x, one 
understands quite clearly what is meant by "x is my property" 
and "I own x". Moreover, we continue to understand by 
"property" something over which one has exclusive control — 
something one can use, destroy, sell, give away, or even 
wantonly destroy, without it being anyone else's business. 
However, the legal reality is that virtually nothing today 
is owned in this sense. Given legal complexity, there are few 
areas in which all these powers are enjoyed in full purity. 
For example, if I abandon something or throw it away, I could 
be accused of littering, and even how we dispose of things 
such as rubbish leads to public concern and legal 
obligations. Yet it is this idea of exclusive use, which is 
not subject to externally accountable justification, that 
goes to the core of what we might call our "primitive" 
understanding of property. It is summed up in the 
rhetorically forceful, but rarely legally correct 
declamation: "It's mine, so I can do anything I like with 
it." 
Against this, we have to recognise that our modern use of the 
word "property" to encompass so many different types of 
items, objects, things, and to underpin a huge variety of 
rights, obligations, liabilities and interests, must leave 
us in confusion not only over what we really do own in some 
cases, but as to how we could even apply the words "property" 
and "ownership" as tokens of univocal and universal concepts. 
Conventional dictionary definitions of property generally, 
of course, link it analytically with ownership^ and it 
"Property" : ownership, the thing owned, 
possessions. (Australian Universal 
Dictionary). 
: that which one owns, the possessions 
of a particular owner. 
(Macquarie Dictionary) 
:(a)something that is or may be owned or 
possessed 
(b)the exclusive right to possess, enjoy 
and dispose of a thing, a 
valuable right or interest primarily 
a source or element of wealth -
ownership 
(c)something to which a person has legal 
title; an estate in tangible assets 
(as lands, goods, money) or intangible 
rights (as copyrights, patents) in 
which or to which a person has a 
right protected by law. 
( Webs ter's Dictionary) 
: l)the condition of being owned by or 
belonging to some person or persons; 
hence the fact of owning a thing; the 
holding of something as one's own; the 
right (esp. the exclusive right) to 
possession, use or disposition of 
anything (usually a tangible 
therefore appears that in ordinary language usage the subject 
matters of "property" and "ownership'^ are synonymous and 
virtually interchangeable.® Certainly they may be seen to be 
complimentary concepts in the sense that all property is 
owned and what is capable of being owned is property. As 
Snare' has pointëd out, when people talk about property and 
ownership, in many cases a contemporary statement about 
ownership can be translated into a statement about property, 
and vice versa, without confusion. That is, "I own that car" 
and "that car is my property" today convey the same 
information, and are readily understood as conveying the same 
information. 
In a legal context, however, property and ownership are not 
necessarily interchangeable terms. "Property" appears often 
material thing); ownership, 
proprietorship = propriety. 
2)that which one owns; a thing or things 
belonging to or owned by some person 
or persons; a possession (usually 
m aterial) or possessions collectively; 
(one's) wealth or goods. 
(Oxford English Dictionary) 
: That which is capable of being owned 
(Concise Law Dictionary) 
: Whatever can be thought or claimed to 
be owned. 
(Dictionary of Philosophy) 
® Perhaps, however, "proprietorship" would be a more 
appropriate term in this analogy. 
' F.Snare "The Concept of Property" in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1972. 
to be used in a loose way to refer either to the thing' 
itself or to the rights in that thing, whereas the concept 
of ownership appears to be quite distinct from any tangible 
or intangible things to which it may relate. As some have 
argued, ownership is no more than "the expression of a legal 
relationship resulting from a set of legal norms"®. 
In a legal sense, a distinction is made between the right of 
ownership in relation to a certain subject matter, and the 
subject matter of that right. This distinction is well 
illustrated by the many types of property in modern law which 
have as yet no tangible identifiable subject matter at all 
to which they must relate, for example, certain classes of 
future interests, patent rights and copyright.' These 
represent the present right of a potential future possessor 
or of the first inventor or author, whereas the ownership in 
any actual product to which these present rights relate in 
a quasi-intentional way would be a separate matter. I may 
own a copy of a particular book and therefore possess certain 
rights regarding it as an object that I have (rightfully) 
acquired by, say, purchase, but the content, the plot, the 
' Here I use "thing" in a generic sense which includes 
all interests. 
' D.Lloyd "The Idea of Law" (Pengruin, 1976) p. 319 
Although, of course, it may be said that at some stage 
there exists a tangible object to which the copyright 
and patent relates. 
ideas within the book, film or magnetic tape, remain by 
copyright the property of the author or publisher. 
"Ownership" is used legally as the term which denotes 
separable legal rights, and it is this idea which pervades 
discussions of property as consisting of a "bundle of 
rights". I will, however, treat property and ownership as 
synonymous, and, subject to grammatical constraints, as 
interchangeable words, realising that they do not have 
equivalent status as legal terms. The grammatical 
qualification is that "property" can be used only as a 
substanti ve, whereas "ownership" and its variants, which may 
take verb and adjectival forms, may also be used as a 
relational term.^° 
"Property" comes either directly or through French 
"propriété" from Latin "proprietas", which means the peculiar 
nature or quality of a thing and (in post-Augustan writing) 
"ownership". ̂^ There is a common thread in terms of our 
references to whât is proper to, or appropriate to something. 
To steal is to misappropriate, while the State that seizes 
the property of citizens without benefits of law or without 
See also R.L.Rariden "The Rigrht to Property" (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 1985) p.8 
^̂  C.Donahue "The Future of the Concept of Property 
Predicated from its Past" in J.R.Pennock and 
J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII "Property", (New York 
University Press, 1980) p.31. 
just compensation, is said to expropriate it. In 
philosophical discussions of things and their properties, 
even the word "ownership" is used; thus P.F. Strawson, for 
example, distinguishes ownership and no-ownership theories 
of the relationship between persons and their bodies. ̂ ^ 
I will, however, be concerned only with property as it 
relates to the things which people meaningfully claim, 
dispute, deny, etc. ownership. Although it may only be a 
metaphor, and Strawson would no doubt argue a philosophically 
misleading one, that in the former sense the apple "owns" the 
redness of the skin, there is nothing metaphorical about the 
claim that the orchardist owns the apple. 
3. Owning Property and Ownincr in General. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in looking at the 
ordinary language usage of the word "property", the 
relationship between people and possible possessions is 
clearly distinct from other things we may cite as falling 
within the denotation of the word "property" — all the 
properties of the table I am sitting at or all the properties 
of this piece of paper, for example. When we speak of the 
^̂  P.F Strawson "Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive 
Metaphysics" (London: Methuen, 1959) Ch.3 "Persons". 
properties of people, we can speak of them having two eyes, 
and having two houses, although to do so in the same breath 
would seem like a bad joke. The properties of people, such 
as skin colour, height and so on, clearly do not count as 
examples of the sorts of property, things possessed, or 
thi ngs owned, that have been the subjects of political and 
jurisprudential discourse about possessory rights, although 
they are relevant to discourse about prejudice, opportunity, 
and other civil and political rights. 
There has never been any overt confusion between the cluster 
of jurisprudential problems about property and the classical 
metaphysical problem of the relationship between a thing and 
its properties. This may therefore tempt us to say that the 
word "property" is simply ambiguous in suggesting both the 
qualities or characteristics of something and the things 
owned. "Rupert Murdoch has properties" could in some contexts 
be ambiguous, it not being clear to others whether the 
statement is intended to mean that he has certain coloured 
eyes and hair — as perhaps would be said in a philosophy 
tutorial — or that he owns farms and newspapers. However, to 
say that "property" is merely ambiguous may be too hasty. 
That is, there are analogies between properties of the two 
sorts. It is not the same sort of ambiguity as, say, the 
word "bank" has in meaning either the sides of a river or a 
place where money is held - it is an etymological accident 
that "bank" has at least two distinct meanings, but this 
cannot be said for "property". 
As a point of clarification, so far we have assumed that 
property and ownership are synonymous, but is it true that 
everything we own is an item of property? Take, for example, 
the phrase "my pain". Can I correctly say that I "own" the 
pain or that the pain is my property? Ownership and property 
generally suggest disposability or alienability,^^ that one 
can, for example, sell, dispose of, destroy or bequeath one's 
house or car. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that 
one could dispose of, in the same sense, one's pain. Pain 
is inalienable, as opposed to property or ownership which I 
suggest cannot be inherently inalienable.^^ After all, 
something is property only if it is logically capable of 
being stolen. It is only because the link between a person 
and that person's property is a severable one that the link 
cries out for justification in the first place. Perhaps the 
correct view is that the sense of "owns" which applies to our 
bodily sensations — a use, incidentally, which is confined 
virtually exclusively to philosophical literature — is at 
best a metaphorical sense. 
^̂  Some may argue,however that labour can be termed as 
property and that labour is inalienable. 
^̂  Those of course who take the view that one's life is 
one's property and therefore is inalienable are 
putting forward a moral restriction and not a logical 
one. 
To take another example, whenever I say "x is mine" is it 
always true that "x is my property"? For example, the 
statement "the decision is mine" cannot be interpreted as 
"the decision is my property". (Although there is a strong 
analogy given that what is intended is that the decision is 
within my exclusive control.) Not only is this a linguistic 
or grammatical issue, but one relating to the question of 
whether one can own something that is impossible to transfer 
to another. A power to make a decision is not always 
transferable to another, particularly if it is a power one 
has pursuant to a delegation. 
It is important to note that the concept of property 
understood as ownership can be distinguished from the sense 
of things or persons having properties. Looking at the 
etymological background of the term "property", Minogue has 
suggested that property is the concept by which we find order 
in things. We may take as an example the greeness of grass. 
"The world is a bundle of things and things are recognised 
in terms of their attributes or properties", and this works 
both at the social and epistemological levels.^® Minogue 
suggests that we extend this order into social situations to 
discover ways of behaving that are "appropriate" to 
K.Minogue "The Concept of Property and its 
Contemporary Significance." in J.R.Pennock and 
J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII "Property" op. cit. 
p.11. 
situations^' such as respect being the "proper" response to 
the elderly. Certainly the history of the word "property" 
is closely related to "proper" as belonging to oneself or 
itself, or owned as property/' and although now obsolete, 
"proper" has meant that which one owns.^' Further, it should 
be noted that property is also related to the verbs 
"appropriate" and to "misappropriate", apart from appropriate 
in the sense of correct behaviour or appropriate - time, so 
that this usage has the same core as property. 
The major difference, however, between personal properties 
or natural properties, such as having blue eyes and fair 
skin, and property such as my car, of course, is that the 
latter is inevitably relational. Moreover, only ah entity 
capable of having an express will (including corporations, 
to which a will can quite properly be imputed) are capable 
of owning property. (Although of course one could acquire 
something without ones own action — for example, if something 
is left by will. Further, it could be argued that one could 
continue to have blue eyes due to inaction if, say, there was 
in existence a surgical procedure by which the colour of 
one's eyes could be changed.) 
Ibid. p. 11 
Oxford Dictionary 
Ibid. 
Yet there is, in another sense, a distinct connection between 
property seen as what is owned and properties such as 
physical characteristics. For example, the owner of a 
particular house which is rented out may be seen as the owner 
of productive capital. This ownership, communists may argue, 
allows the owner to have a source of power and to exploit 
others, whereas characteristics such as blue eyes would not 
be seen as such. 
However, if we delineate properties into active and 
19 
dormant, the distinction between ownership of property and 
those physical properties which are personal characteristics 
is no longer clear. That is, one's property of blue eyes 
could, for example, be actively managed to entice someone, 
to manipulate them, thus using a source of power with which 
to exploit others. This point of course has serious 
implicati ons, particularly for the communist position which 
states that peoples' property should be equalised. In the 
above sense there would, as a result, be few things that 
could not become "active" property.^" 
19 See K.Minogue "The Concept of Property and its 
Contemporary Significance" op. cit, p.16 
A further delineation is often made between "passive" 
property and "active" property. That is, passive 
property is owned as consumer goods for consumption, 
whereas active property is owned for the means of 
production. See L.Kohr "Property and Freedom" in 
S.L.Blumenfeld (Ed.) "Property in a Humane Economy" 
op. cit, 
4. What is Property? 
It can be argued that almost everything in the world may be 
identified as someone's property. For example, personal 
things such as one's land, car, house or clothes are 
indisputibly called one's property.^^ We may even say that 
public facilities are "owned" or are the property of the 
given public, say, residents of a particular municipality, 
state, province or country, and that public sector 
corporations are the property of the residents of the 
relevant political unit. We could even venture so far as to 
suggest that wilderness areas are "owned" by a particular 
government or even the people whose government it is. This 
is particularly so when some calamity befalls the wild, and 
we look to the government within whose territory these events 
occurred to take responsibility for its repair. Further, one 
may even say that the air we breathe while on our own land 
is owned by us. This is apparent by our ability to sue in 
tort if others pollute the air around our house. I am not 
suggesting that all such claims of ownership are correct -
only that we can make sense of all these contentions being 
argued as cases of ownership. 
Under the law, almost anything can be owned except a 
human corpse. D.P.Derham, F.K.H.Maher and P.L.Waller 
(Ed.) "An Introduction to Law" (The Law Book Company, 
1977) p.29 
There are also many items whose existence or significance is 
open to discovery, leading to questions of how one might come 
to own them and presenting us with the need for ongoing 
application of the concept of property and of property 
rights. The discovery, for example, of the electromagnetic 
spectrum opened up a new variety of things capable of being 
owned. As no-one had previously known that such items as 
frequencies existed in nature, it had not been forseen how 
someone might own .(rent, buy, sell, steal) this or that 
frequency." The concept of property is not, then, confined 
in its applicability to a fixed number of kinds of things. 
5. The Objects of Ownership. 
Our claims to own things - using "things" in the most generic 
of its senses — cover things of almost every conceivable 
type. People assert ownership claims in relation to 
buildings, land, cattle, packets of food, broadcasting 
licences, works of art, automobiles, copyrights, patents, 
rights of way, companies, shares, intellectual property and 
equitable interests, just to mention some - not that 
everything is agreed to be capable of being owned, at least 
in principle. Among the more contentious putative objects 
" See T.R.Machan "Human Riqhts and Human Liberties" 
op.cit. p.184 
of ownership are, for example, human beings (by ourselves, 
or by others as in some forms of slavery), children by their 
parents, one's own body and its constituent organs and others 
parts, and one's self - if indeed there is any such entity. 
As my aim is analytical, I will endeavour to be as neutral 
as possible in relation to these more contentious objects of 
ownership, and not use any particular assumptions about them 
to arbitrate between rival analyses. 
It is apparent that not only is there a variety of potential 
objects of ownership, but there is a variety of rights, or 
more precisely, interests, which are generally thought to be 
less fullsome than ownership, which may nevertheless be 
claimed in relation to things capable of being owned. But 
how that distinction should be drawn, and whether it should 
be drawn in terms of a sharp cut-off, or as a matter of 
degree - and degree of what? - are questions that go to the 
detail of any analytical enquiry. 
6. What is Not Property. 
Leaving aside any religious argument which might suggest that 
everything is owned by God or held in trust for God, one 
could argue that, even if we granted all the cases above as 
cases of ownership, there would still be examples of unowned 
things." For example, the high seas, that is, those areas 
of the oceans which are beyond the territorial limits of any 
country may be said to be unowned. This is so despite the 
fact that they are widely used for commercial purposes, from 
navigation to fishing; yet there is no direct control by any 
one country of those waters. However, this is of course only 
a matter of fact, not of logical necessity. Countries in the 
past have extended their territorial limits to include areas 
which they find useful or valuable (for example as the result 
of oil discoveries on the sea bed). A case in point is the 
discovery of oil in Bass Strait which separates the 
Austral ian continent from Tasmania, and the extension of 
Australian territorial limits to include the adjacent oil 
bearing area. Similarly, the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf in effect converted the North Sea into 
owned property by dividing among the countries bordering the 
North Sea some of the commonly held attributes of the sea, 
such as fish and the sub-oceanic minerals, and allowing for 
the extension of territorial rights. ̂^ The factors which led 
to this agreement were the declining cost of underwater 
drilling and indications that the region bore gas and oil. 
As a result, the bordering countries^^ gained ownership of 
" Although some unowned things are used. 
Y.Barzel "Economic Analysis of Property Rights" 
(Cambridge University Press, 1989). pp.72-73 
^̂  Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Norway, 
United Kingdom and (West)Germany. 
segments of the sea. 
In addition to apparently unowned things that appear never 
to have been owned, there are some things which are unowned 
due to, for example, having been abandoned. These include 
discarded personal possessions, unwanted pets, buildings and 
equipment of no commercial value, even for scrap, and tracts 
of land. Some of them are quite vast, but no longer thought 
worth working or guarding. 
Abandonment is not, however, without difficulty. One may 
renounce one's rights, but it is conceivable that obligations 
with liabilities for their breach, such as requirements 
regarding safety, would continue to be in force. Renunciation 
of ownership and ceremonies of abandonment are neither 
logically nor, in general, legally sufficient to guarantee 
non-ownership. Whatever the legal position, one could argue 
that moral obligations, particularly duties to strangers who 
might stumble across the abandoned property, continue well 
beyond the moment of purported abandonment. 
A further case of th ings which are not owned are wild 
animals. Although game and fish in a wild state often have 
been described as the property of the State, an examination 
of legal cases demonstrates that the interest of the State 
appears not to be of an owner but as a sovereign.^' That 
is, the State's interests and obligations are insufficient 
to make the relevant rights property rights in wild animals, 
but do give it the power to regulate the living conditions 
of the animals, for example, through licensing hunting and 
providing protective care for the animals. In this sense the 
exercise of sovereignty does not require the assertion of 
ownership — sovereignty may be said to be a broader and 
looser "framework" type of control. 
7. More Difficult Cases. 
Although it may be said to be a fiction, the airspace above 
one's home has in the past also been considered to be one's 
property. Of course, until the invention of aeroplanes no 
question of traversing or trespassing on another's property 
purely via airspace ever arose, and perhaps even today any 
unauthorised penetration of a country's airspace should be 
treated not as trespass of property; rather it should be 
accepted that countries control access to, and possibly 
through, their airspace due to considerations of safety and 
as expressions of national sovereignty, quite independently 
of any property considerations. 
C.Donahue, T.E.Kauper and P.W.Martin (Ed.) "Property: 
An Introduction to the Concept and the Institution" 
op. cit, p.49 
A further case of non-ownership is that which is incapable 
of control. An uncontrollable thing, or something which is 
too unstable such as, say, a cloud or a rainbow, cannot be 
said to be owned. As a matter of logic, it is absured to 
talk of ownership in such cases, particularly if its identity 
conditions are loose — that is, what makes a cloud I see 
today the same as the one I saw yesterday, through what 
combination through other clouds may it enter before it loses 
its identity? It is impossible to make sense of claiming 
something as one's own which is constantly changing, depends 
for its existence on the subject's point of view and/or 
dissolves in an amorphous way into its background. 
8. Sorts of Property. 
One could delineate property into a variety of groups. For 
example, one delineation proposed by Feibleman^^ divides 
property into artifacts which are material objects altered 
through human agency for human use and the human individuals 
themselves, so that property varies from the physical (for 
example, hills), chemical (salt mines, oil wells, etc.), 
biological (cattle, pets), to the psychological (items in 
minds or brains, that is, property not in the legal sense. 
J.K.Feibleman "Justice, Law and Culture" (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1985) p.157 
but to the extent that one person adopts the ideas of 
another) and cultural (musical compositions, copyrights, 
patents, etc.). Although this may be a questionable 
classification of the sorts of things we call property, it 
does hint towards the variety of possible classifications 
which have been suggested by many writers. The variable 
classification of the sorts of things known as property is 
particularly evident in law. In relatively recent times, for 
example, the law recognised property both as that which is 
movable, such as equipment, furniture, clothing etc., and 
property which is immovable, that is, land itself, and 
fixtures attached to the land. Today non-physical things are 
also considered as property. 
The development of the law in recognising non-physical, 
incorporeal things — many of which cannot be easily 
classified as movable or immovables — in more recent times 
is not, of course, a totally new idea. For example. Warren 
and Brandéis argued in 1890 that the common law constantly 
changes to accommodate the demands of society, usually moving 
from recognising something physical to recognising something 
non-physical in its wake. This evolutionary model of law was 
the basis on which they predicted, wrongly as it turned out, 
28 the emergence of a tort of violation of privacy. 
^'"Political, social and economic changes entail the 
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal 
youth, grows to meet the demands of society. Thus in very 
9. Attempts in Definincr Property. 
What we generally agree about property is that it is what is 
capable of being owned by persons. However, many writers 
have argued that beyond this trivial observation, it is 
impossible to define "property", that is, that the concept 
itself defies explication in terms of a closed set of 
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necessary and/or sufficient conditions. Therefore 
analytical discussion often appears to be hampered by 
scepticism as to the very possibility of any acceptable 
definitional analysis of property. In law, in particular, 
even the "most refined and subtle legal analysis has failed 
early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical 
interference with life and property, for trespass vi et 
armis. Then the "right to life" served only to protect the 
subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant 
freedom from actual restraint; and the right to 
propertysecured to the individual his lands and his cattle. 
Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the scope of 
these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has 
come to mean the right to enjoy life - the right to be let 
alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive 
civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to 
comprise every form of possession - intangible, as well as 
tangible...From corporeal property arose the incorporeal 
rights issuing out of it; and then there opened the wide 
realm of intangible property, in the products and processes 
of the mind, as works of literature and art, goodwill, trade 
secrets, and trade marks." 
(S.D.Warren and L.D.Brandéis "The Right to Privacy" Harvard 
Law Review, Vol.IV, no.5, 1890). 
See for example J. Waldron "What is Private Property" 
in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.5, 1985 
p.313. 
to yield any clearly established criteria by which ownership 
may be identified".^" 
This lack of a universal definition appears to be 
particularly due to the fact that neither the denotation nor 
the connotation of the word "property" have been constant, 
in either historic or geographic respects. Although property 
is an important category politically and economically, 
discussions regarding property often appear to have done 
little to illuminate what may be termed "property". As Grey 
rather gloomily points out, in less than two centuries we 
have gone from a world in which property was a central idea 
mirroring what was regarded as a clearly understood 
institution, to one in which it may well no longer be a 
coherent or crucial category in our conceptual scheme.^^ 
Grey's contention seems to be based on the idea that there 
has been a transition of a conception of property from 
material things people own, to a conception of property as 
a bundle of rights, thus incorporating intangibles as 
property. Further, Grey argues that there has been a 
proliferation of specialised conceptions, that is, that 
specialists use "property" in different and conflicting 
30 D.Lloyd "The Idea of Law" (Penguin, 1976) p.319 
^̂  T.C.Grey "The Disintegration of Property" in 
J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII 
"Property" op.cit, p.74 
ways. ̂ ^ 
Whether or not this is true, it may be observed that, for 
example, around the end of the 18th Century the idea of 
private property stood at the centre of the conceptual scheme 
of lawyers and political theorists. As Blackstone wrote: 
"There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, 
and engages the affections of mankind as the right of 
property".^^ Most telling in this respect was the fact that 
between the enthronement of Charles II in 1660 and the middle 
of George I V s reign in 1819, 187 new capital statutes became 
law - nearly six times as many as had been enacted in the 
previous three hundred years. "Nearly all were drafted to 
protect property, rather than human life."^* English law for 
centuries even treated a man's rights over his servants as 
a branch of property law, and treated "conjugal 
affections"^® as part of a man's property. This was not just 
a feature of English legal and political development -
property was also seen as the right of enjoying and disposing 
of things in the most absolute manner, as defined by the 
" Ibid. pp.71-73 
" Ibid. p.73 
^̂  R.Hughes "The Fatal Shore" (Collins, 1987) p.29 
A.Ryan "Property" op. cit.p.2 
French Civil Code.^' 
This 18th Century conception of property (and perhaps our 
"ordinary"^' conception which views property as ownership 
of material things), not only mirrored the economic reality 
of the times, that is, that wealth was essentially centred 
in land, and to a lesser extent houses, shops, etc., but that 
property also served as an attack on feudalism. Further, 
viewing property as ownership of things by individuals fitted 
the principal justifications for treating property as a 
natural right, in which property was some form of emanation 
from the productive individual will. For example, the 
dominant theory of 18th Century England, espoused by John 
L o c k e , w a s that property resulted from the mixing of an 
individual's labour with the natural environment. This 
natural right to property implies that when we acquire 
something over which others have no prior right of ownership, 
we get an outright freehold on it. This is intuitively 
plausible - if I pick up a nugget of gold, whose is it, if 
The French Civil Code had as its "grand and principal 
object" to "regulate the principles and the rights 
of property". R.Schlatter "Private Property - The 
History of an Idea" (Rutgers University Press, N.J. 
1951) p.232 
S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" op. cit. p. 32. 
J.Locke "Two Treatises of Government" Second Treatise. 
Chapter 5 "Of Property" op.cit. 
not mine? It was nobody's before I got there. (This is a 
theory to which we will return later). 
The historical changes, particularly in more recent times, 
have therefore had an impact on the general perception of 
property. For example, many have refused to use the word 
"property" with its focus on the thincrs that are owned, and 
have turned instead to the proprietary relationship. In other 
words, they prefer to speak in terms of ownership relations 
expressed as a particular set of rights and obligations 
usually granted some sort of social recognition, thus relying 
on "ownership" instead.^" 
This change in focus, I believe, is arguably related in 
particular to the changes in the nature of objects classified 
as property. For example, although we still speak of property 
usually in terms of physical things or objects such as one's 
house or car, the application of the term "property", 
particularly in the legal system, has had most of its growth 
in relatively recent times in relation to non-physical things 
such as intellectual property. Consider, for example, the 
property bases underlying the applications of the legal rules 
of copyright and patent. Of course, the application of the 
See A.Ryan "Property" op. cit. p. 65 
See for example J.0.Grunebaum "Private Ownership" op. 
cit. 
term "property" to non-physical things has a long and 
significant history, such as in the institution of trusts, 
particularly since the mid-16th Century. However, it is 
important to note that the various equitable interests in 
real estate, though themselves intangible, were interests in 
something itself tangible, namely land. 
One could argue that in the case of copyright and patent 
also, there is also a nexus between the rights and the 
physical object. For example, in a patent for a type of 
tractor there is still a relationship with the physical 
product. Similarly, in the case of a copyright of a musical 
score, there is still a relation with a particular 
performance, a spatio-temporal event, or with the item of 
software which will facilitate its reproduction. But the 
patent's existence and value are not contingent upon the 
physical process or product patented ever in fact itself 
coming into existence; and copyright is not an interest in 
paper, ink, magnetic tape, or celluloid, but only in these 
things qua vehicles of a certain propositional or perceptible 
content. 
10. Can We Define Property? 
Statements of the form "I own x" and "x is my property" 
cannot be then assumed to be intelligible for all values of 
X. To formulate a coherent set of restrictions on the 
possible values, is to put forward a theory about what can 
be property. There can be no satisfactory definition of 
property without an agreed resolution. Suffice it to say that 
if an adequate definition of property is to be proposed, then 
the following questions must be answered. That is, threê ^ 
general issues can be identified as main areas of concern 
which arise in trying to define property and ownership, given 
the sorts of objects or "things" - always in the most generic 
sense our subject will permit - that we call property. These 
are : 
1. What is the relationship between owner and property when 
it is true that the owner in question owns the property 
in question? The relationship between a person and a 
thing which a lay person calls "ownership" is not a 
simple relationship and may be said to involve a complex 
bundle of relations which differ considerably in their 
character and effect. For example, a person has rights, 
liberties and duties in relation to a thing, but legal 
relations can be changed so that it is evident that the 
bundle of rights does not remain constant. For example, 
until relatively recently one could have driven one's 
own car in New South Wales seated in an unrestrained way 
(so long as the public and other motorists were not 
See for example J.Waldron "The Riqht to Private 
Property" (Clarendon Press, 1988). 
jeopardised by a posture that was tantamount to 
dangerous driving). This right has now been curtailed 
with the mandatory requirement to wear a seat-belt, 
applicable to all drivers, whether or not owners. The 
liberties of the owners, in relation to the vehicle, 
thus have been reduced. Has ownership in some sense 
then also been diminished? 
2. Is the concept of ownership univocal, within and across 
cultures? There appear to be different concepts of 
ownership, for example, reflected in different countries 
by their respective laws. The terms "ownership" or 
"property" do not appear to convey any determinate idea 
as to what' particular legal relations there are, only 
that there are "some legal relations".*^ In each case 
we might look at the particular legal relations, so that 
what can be owned is limited by local convention. 
In modern law it is the function of the courts, or, in 
other words, the judicial branch of the State, to 
determine what property rights individuals possess, 
against a background of increasingly complex legislation 
and administrative regulation. In countries operating 
under common law, court rulings are either based on 
" J.Waldron "What is Private Property" in Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies" Vol.5, 1985. p.316. 
previous rulings and/or serve as precedents for future 
rulings. Often the courts, however, are working within 
a legislative framework which purports to establish 
property relations, rather than merely safeguarding 
rights that individuals have independent of State 
decision and legislation. For example, in some 
countries married women are clearly not permitted to be 
owners,*^ while in South Africa, under the (recently 
repealed) "Group Areas Act", segregation was enforced 
whereby blacks were not permitted to own houses in 
certain areas. Generally, children and the handicapped 
are also excluded from certain kinds of ownership. 
Further, under Roman law coastal lands lying between 
high and low tide lines may be unownable, while in parts 
of Canada, for example, "those lands may be owned by 
those who own the adjacent lands. Another better known 
example is the difference in ownership of water running 
through the banks of a stream"*^ - the content of the 
ownership relationship here varies from country to 
country. 
Generally, then, it appears that there is no logical 
necessity or even any empirical universality requiring 
" J.O.Grunebam "Private Ownership" op. cit. p.5 
J.0.Grunebaum ibid. p. 5 
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that laws or rules assign any particular set of rights 
or provide any particular way in which ownership rights 
can be acquired, transferred or alienated. 
3. Do the types of entities that can be owned, and the 
types of entities that can be owners, constitute a 
manageable diversity, within a single conceptual 
approach? The objects of ownership differ so radically 
that it might be argued that the "same concept of 
ownership and property could hardly be applied to them 
all"*^- for example, to physical objects, interests, 
shares, ideas, copyright or reputation. There is also 
a variety of different types of owner, for example, a 
natural person, varieties of corporations, a voluntary 
association, or the State (and on some interpretations, 
God) . 
One could argue that this diversity of objects of ownership 
or things that we call property, and of the types of owner, 
is so vast that the concept of ownership or property is 
bereft of all content. That is, one could argue that, 
analogous to using the word "thing", no inference can be 
drawn of what the "thing" may be, nor of the limits of what 
may bê  termed "thing". Similarly, it may be said that the 
terms "ownership" and "property" are empty of any particular 
See J.Waldron op. cit. p. 316 
content. 
Despite these issues which emphasise variety, diversity, and 
plurality among the "hard data" to which any account of 
property must apply, it will be argued that an analysis of 
ownership and property which is comprehensive, univocal and 
non-trivial can be provided. 
11. Property as an Essentially Contested Concept. 
An alternate argument, of course, is to suggest that the 
terms "property" and "ownership" are essentially contested 
concepts.*^ As described by W. Gallie,^' the proper use of 
some concepts "involves endless disputes about their proper 
uses on the part of their users". By this idea one can 
consistently believe that there is one concept of X and that 
there are rival "conceptions" of X or uses of the concept of 
X. For example, "democracy" and "art" may be held to be such 
Essentially contested concepts are distinct from 
C.L.Stevenson's "persuasive definitions" {Mind, 47, 
1938. p.331) by which we may say that a term such as 
"property" is an emotively loaded term. By this, it 
is intended that the direction of peoples' interest 
is altered by covert manipulation of the connection 
between descriptive and emotive meaning. 
^̂  See W.E.Connolly '*The Terms of Political Discourse" 
(Heath and Co., 1974) p.10 
Ibid. p. 10. 
concepts. Not only do these concepts admit of a variety of 
"interpretations" or uses, but that the proper use of the 
concept is disputable. The "inevitability" and "endlessness" 
of contests about the proper use of the concepts is due both 
to the human psyche to continue to press one's view, and that 
these are features of the concept itself — features which 
render contest incapable of being rationally settled. This 
4 9 is the feature of essential contestedness. 
Although this theory may offer an explanation of why it is 
so difficult to define property and ownership, it is 
questionable whether terms, including "property" and 
"ownership", really are essentially contested concepts at 
all. For example, arguing over certain concepts such as 
"democracy", "art", "liberty" or "property" presupposes, 
arguably, definite uses of other related concepts (such as 
the related concepts of use and possession of property) which 
are themselves identifiable in a given society. Gray, for 
example, suggests that essentially contested concepts find 
their characteristic uses within conceptual frameworks which 
already have endorsed functions in respect of definite forms 
of social life.̂ ** That is, an essentially contested concept 
C.Swanton "On the Essential Contestedness of Political 
Concepts" Ethics, Vol.95, 1984-1985, p.813. 
J.N.Gray "On the Contestabi1ity of Social and 
Political Concepts" in Political Theory, Vol.5, 1977. 
p. 332. 
is a concept such that any use of it in a social or political 
context already presupposes a specific understanding of a 
whole range of other, contextually related concepts (whose 
proper uses may be no less disputed) which lock together so 
as to compose a single, identifiable conceptual framework. 
Thus, we may say that in a given society one may argue over, 
say, the concept of property and may also disagree over the 
related concepts such as when or how one has a right to 
possess an object, but that overall there is already a 
framework within which we may argue the points. That is, if 
the argument makes sense, there must be some background 
understanding of property. Hence, given the acknowledged 
related distinguishable concepts, which may be diverse, we 
can say that there is also an acknowledged framework and 
that, therefore, the concept is not logically "essentially 
contested". There may be some interesting parallels here, 
for example, with an ontological argument regarding the 
concept of God, but the reader will be pleased to know that 
this issue will not be pursued here. 
Further, as Gray points out, not all societies possess 
essentially contested concepts. We are acquainted with many 
primitive, closed, or traditional social orders in which 
definist and descriptive claims might legitimately be made 
for a wide variety of concepts. ̂̂  In other words, there are 
societies in which a term acquires its meaning and the 
conditions under which it is used correctly are all but 
identical. 
Generally, it could be argued that any concept acquires a 
contested character along with social changes. In fact, it 
could be argued that concepts are not essentially contested 
at all, but are merely confused. Therefore, I would argue 
that the category of essentially contested concepts is 
suspect and not a safe one to pursue particularly given the 
controversy over this theory. More importantly, however, I 
would argue that we do usually have an idea of property which 
generally seems to correspond to others' ideas of property 
— it is usually merely the examples over which we disagree. 
As Hume pointed out, property rules do display a generic 
similarity everywhere, regardless of the apparent historical 
variability of property." 
Ibid. p.336. 
" See F.G.Whelan "Property as Artifice: Hume and 
Blackstone" in J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Eds.) 
NOMOS XXII "Property" op. cit. p. 110 
12. Property as a Definable Concept. 
In considering property as a concept, we can say that we have 
some agreed denotation, and we regularly and effectively 
converse about property, so long as we agree on the examples. 
But problems regularly arise, particularly over things that 
are not standard, and this may lead to radical disagreements 
of understanding. 
Words, of course, have those meanings which we as social 
beings have given their and we give them meanings by 
explaining their use.̂ ^ However, by trying to define 
"property", for example, one may draw on Wittgenstein's 
distinction between "criteria" and "symptom" to show the 
inherent problems involved, particularly if one were to 
identify a particular object as property. As an example, 
Wittgenstein gives the defining criterion of angina as thè 
finding of the bacillus so-and-so in a patient's blood. His 
example is that the criterion of angina can be given by 
answering the question: "why do you say that this man has 
angina?" The answer is: "I have found the bacillus so-and-so 
in his blood". By this we have given the defining criterion 
of angina. 
" L.Wittgenstein "The Brown Book" in "the Blue and Brown 
Books" (Harper Colophon Books, 1965 ed.) p.130. 
If, however, the answer was "His throat is inflamed", 
Wittgenstein points out that this would merely be a symptom, 
that is, a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that 
it coincides, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which 
is our defining criterion. Then, to say "A man has angina 
if this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology, or at least 
it is a loose way of stating the definition of "angina". But 
to say "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat" 
is to make a hypothesis/* 
While acknowledging there are several controversies regarding 
Wittgenstein's concept of a criterion, we may apply the 
criterion-symptom distinction as follows. Given that property 
involves or consists, in some sense, of rights, then we could 
say that if we have a criterion of property and ask the 
question "why do you say that this man has (particular) 
property?", the answer may well be: "I have found he has the 
right to use, to possess, to dispose of, x". However, if the 
answer to this question is "he is using x, he is selling 
(disposing of) x" then perhaps we may only have a symptom of 
property, but certainly not a defining criterion - after all, 
even thieves, who have no legitimate title to the things they 
have stolen, may use them, sell them, dispose of them etc. 
What has this analogy then shown of the concept of property? 
L.Wittgenstein "The Blue Book", ibid. p.25. 
Certainly we are constantly faced with "symptoms" of 
property, but the question remains of whether we can give a 
defining criterion of property. In the context of ideological 
conflict, property looms large and it is important, if such 
conflict is to be conducted rationally, to solve the problem 
of what it means to have property. Given the diversity of 
what is counted as property, and acknowledging that the 
nature of economically significant property is constantly 
changing, it is essential to address this issue both morally 
and politically. 
13. Property as "Worse" Than Indefinable 
I will argue however, that the concept of property, whether 
or not the word "property" may be ultimately definable, is 
worse than indefinable - it may no longer have any literal 
application, except for the most trivial of things. That is, 
although it may turn out that we can define property, it has 
very little application apart from trivial cases. Today 
legislation, various regulations, and even the common law, 
so override and overcloud the discretionary use of what we 
call our property, that they have steadily and radically 
diminished our right to determine the use and disposal of the 
things we call our property, with the result that we are 
hardly better than stewards of what we say we own. 
In other words, it is at least arguable that the limitations 
are now so great and so common that few if any of the things 
we conventionally say we own really are, strictly speaking, 
our property. Instead, acquiring and retaining property 
means acquiring and retaining a host of increasingly 
burdensome publicly imposed obligations. The consequences 
are perhaps, inevitably, due to the closeness of living, 
increasing mobility and the increasing acceptability of 
appeals to the public interest with its correlative increase 
in liabilities and responsibilities. 
But where does this leave the concept of property? This 
issue is not just whether we can define property; rather, it 
is whether the concept of property has now outlived its 
usefulness. Earlier in the chapter I pointed to the diversity 
of the sorts of things we call property. The greater the 
diversity, the less content there will be to the concept of 
property; so much so that it might even be bereft of 
virtually all content, and be little more than a purely 
formal concept as can similarly be argued of the common noun, 
adjective, and transitive verb, respectively, "thing","real" 
or "exist". That is, it may be argued that the greater the 
diversity, the less likelihood that there will be that a 
common factor to all the things we call "property". The 
generality and diversity should make us wary that we can find 
common and peculiar factors to all things we call "property". 
Like Wittgenstein, we should not assume that there are such 
factors, and we should instead look at all things we call 
"property". At the same time, the growth in the regulatory 
powers of the administrative State means that even this 
highly general and formalistic concept, property, seldom has 
literal application. 
In what follows, before pronouncing on the issue of its 
continued relevance, I will examine some analytical issues 
in law and political theory as they relate to the concept of 
property, indicating the current divergent views, together 
with those elements of the concept which appear to be 
indicative of property and ownership. In particular, I will 
consider the rights people hold in relation to property. 
I will argue that although it may no longer have much in the 
way of literal application, the concept of property may still 
be regarded as a unitary concept which is neither vague nor 
ambiguous. Rather, the objects which may be called property 
are diverse in the extreme, but the concept of property need 
not vary, and in particular it does not vary in sympathy with 
variations in the categories of things owned. I will also 
argue that the concept of property involves essential 
reference to the right to control. Moreover, I will argue 
that strictly speaking property rights cannot be overridden 
by any other rights, without thereby not merely qualifying, 
but strictly speaking, contradicting the assertion of 
property rights. I acknowledge that this claim may seem 
extraordinary, however, much of what follows will be devoted 
to rebutting what I consider are unsuccessful objections to 
this view. 
PROPERTY AS A PRE-LEGAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT 
• SOME ANALYTIC ISSUES. 
Property - An Artefact of Law or Naturally Created? 
The concept of property raises many issues, for example, 
property may be seen as entirely a creature of law as Thomas 
Hobbes indeed viewed it: an artefact dependent on the legal 
system, not just for its enforcement, but for the very 
meaningfulness of property talk; or it can be seen as 
something which can exist pre-legally or even extra-legally, 
generated by some sort of "natural" activity or process, as 
John Locke conceived it, trusting to a legal system only for 
its recognition, enforcement, and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. Certainly the idea of property is more readily 
understood within a legal framework. However, when it comes 
to the moral justification of the institution of property, 
the idea of pre-legal, extra-legal or "natural" property is 
typically a critical plank to such a justification. 
It is worth noting here that the disagreement between Hobbes 
and Locke as to whether the sovereign had an obligation to 
respect the property rights of the subjects, was connected 
to the issue of whether property could be meaningfully said 
to exist within a state of nature, where, by hypothesis, 
there is no legal system. Many philosophers have, however, 
attempted to justify claims to private property by recourse 
to the decisions of the sovereign or the community as a 
whole. In such cases, property rights must be considered to 
be parasitic upon the legitimacy of the sovereign authority 
or, at the very least, its right to promulgate property 
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laws. As Hobbes argues, in the absense of a sovereign 
there could be no secure possession of any kind. The 
sovereign provides security and enables a person to reap the 
benefit of his own activity: without the sovereign, 
"property" would be "too unstable to deserve the name".^ 
Hence, in the absence of a sovereign, there could be no 
property on this account. 
However, I will not pursue these arguments regarding 
sovereignty because, as Carter has stated, the problem shifts 
from an analysis of property de jure to that of assessing the 
right of the sovereign body over individuals.^ The 
"validation" of property rights is the outcome of prior 
arguments concerning authority, and property rights stand or 
fall with the justification of the authority which 
promulgates them. In any case, it may be totally misleading 
to support the traditional division between what may be 
considered public and private, that is, between a division 
which may be seen to be between "sovereignty" and (private) 
^ A.Carter "The Philosophical Foundations of Property 
Ricfhts" (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1988) p. 8. 
^ T.Hobbes "Leviathan" op. cit. 
^ A.Reeve "Property" (Macmillan Education, 1986) p.120. 
^ Ibid. 
"property".® Of course, it is easier to justify claims that 
rulers have an obligation to respect something if it can be 
proved that the thing in question would have existed, and 
justifiably so, without the rulers or indeed any rulers, 
having been in authority. 
In any case, for the purpose of this thesis, it is not 
necessary to come to a conclusion concerning the issue. 
Indeed, if much of what I have to argue is correct, it may 
be irresolvable. It may be that our common understanding of 
the concept of property, such as it is, is simply too muddled 
or too vague to sustain the debate as to whether it is 
applicable only to certain sorts of creatures of law, or is 
also, and perhaps more fundamentally, applicable within a 
pre-legal or extra-legal domain. 
There is much to be said, nevertheless, for the view, as 
Hoffman and Fisher have argued, that no fully adequate theory 
of justification of property acquisition has yet been 
achieved in modern Western social philosophy, where fully 
adequate means: 
a) a theory which does not simply equate ownership with 
effective possession, that is, that equates having a 
justified claim to something with having the power to 
® See V.Held "Rights and Goods" op, cit. p. 168 
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enforce that claim, and 
b) a theory which is reasonably congruent with social 
assumptions about what are, and are not, possible and 
legitimate objects of ownership.' 
In other words, a fully adequate theory of justification of 
property acqisition must be neither a mere rationalisation 
of the status quo, nor its revisionist overturning. 
Now I stress I have not proved and will not attempt to prove, 
this claim about the absence of a fully adequate theory of 
justification, it having already been declared out of bounds 
so far as the scope of this thesis is concerned. But the 
recognition that such a view may be an arguable one, helps 
to focus why I have elected to concentrate on the analytical 
issue. The lack of an adequate theory of justification of 
property may indeed be due to a lack of clarity concerning 
analyses of property. That is, it may be argued that attempts 
to justify ownership have been unconvincing due to the lack 
of a clear conceptual exposition of property. 
Given the presumed absence of a fully adequate theory of 
' W.M.Hoffman and J.V.Fisher "Corporate Responsibility -
Property and Liability" in L.C.Becker and K.Kipnis 
(Eds.) "Property: Cases, Concepts, Critiques" op. cit, 
p.213. 
property, I believe that an examination of the notion of 
property itself is a far more fundamental issue which has yet 
to be resolved. Unless we get it right, there will only be 
continuing confusion and difficulty in justification, if 
indeed that task can really be completed. 
2. Ownership and Political Theory. 
A consistent theme in political theory is that societies 
require consensus on the evaluation of property. Explanatory 
and normative theories about property both need to consider 
what property is, and normative theories have to discuss what 
it should be or why the existing arrangements are defective. 
As Hollowell points out, there appear to be three general 
areas which interest political philosophers and are of 
particular interest in the search for a feasible concept of 
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property . These are firstly, the economic meanings of our 
classifications of property, for example the importance of 
land or industrial capital. That is, some argue that 
ownership of these are a source of political power. Secondly, 
there are concerns regarding the moral entitlements 
consequent on ownership of such things as land and industrial 
capital. That is, questions arise regarding distribution and 
^ P.Hollowell "On the Operationalisation of Property" in 
P.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social Relations" 
(Heinemann, London, 1982) p.13. 
perhaps the balance of power. Thirdly, there are the 
questions about the justification of such ownership, both in 
general and in the individual case. 
In all of the above three areas, assumptions are made 
concerning the concept of property. For example, Macpherson's 
definition of property focuses directly on the need for a 
justification of the institution.' Macpherson's focus 
highlights historical changes in the concept of property 
which have great bearing on both conceptual difficulties at 
present and on justificatory issues. Macpherson,' for 
example, suggests four major changes which are worth 
considering. 
1) Macpherson suggests that as late as the 17th Century it 
was quite usual for writers to use the word in what may 
seem to be an extraordinarily wide sense. For example, 
Locke defined men's properties as their lives, liberties 
and estates. For Hobbes, the things in which a man had 
property included his own "life and limb, and in the 
next degree those that concern conjugal affection, and 
after them riches and the means of living". Thus one's 
own person, one's capacities, one's rights and liberties 
' See C.B.Macpherson "Property - Mainstream and Critical 
Positions" (Basil Blackwell, 1978). 
' C.B.Macpherson "Human Rights as Property Rights". 
Dissent Vol.24, 1977. pp.72-77. 
were regarded as individual property and they were more 
important than material tilings and revenues. This broad 
meaning has been lost according to Macpherson, due to 
the emergence of the market society, that is, property 
came to have a narrower meaning, relating to material 
things and revenues. We may ask, however, whether 
Macpherson is correct in making this observation. It 
-is certainly not evident that property has narrowed its 
meaning, but rather it could be interpreted that things 
we cannot market are of less interest to us now. 
2) The second major change was the narrowing of the concept 
of material property. That is, according to Macpherson 
from the time of Aristotle to the 17th Century, property 
was seen to include two kinds of individual rights — an 
individual right to exclude others from some use or 
enjoyment of some thing, and an individual right not to 
be excluded from the use or enjoyment of things the 
society had declared for common use — common lands, 
parks, roads, waters. However, according to Macpherson, 
in modern times the idea of property has been generally 
narrower and includes only the first right — the right 
to exclude others, and although we have such things as 
national parks, Macpherson contends that every citizen's 
right to use the park is not thought of in the context 
of the citizen's individual property, so that the modern 
concept of property is pretty well confined to the right 
of an individual or corporation (a natural or artificial 
person) to exclude others from some use or enjoyment of 
some thing. 
3) The third change in the concept of property in 
Macpherson's analysis is the .further narrowing from 
property as an exclusive right merely to use and enjoy 
some thing, to property as an exclusive right both to 
use and to dispose of a thing — a right to sell it to 
someone else, or to alienate it. 
4) A fourth change in the concept of property is the change 
from property as a right to a revenue, to property as 
a right to things (including the things that produce 
revenue). 
Macpherson thus contends that we are left with a modern 
concept of property as an exclusive individual right to use 
and dispose of material things. As Macpherson^" states 
elsewhere, these changes in the concept of property are 
associated with the rise of capitalism and are generally 
changes which denote shifts from (pre-capitalist) property 
C.B.Macpherson "Capitalism and the Changing Concept 
of Property" in E.Kamenka and R.S.Neale (Eds.) 
"Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond" (A.N.U. Press, 
1975) pp.105-106. 
which was understood to comprise common, as well as private 
property, and now is essentially private property. A further 
shift has occurred from the right to revenue to a right to 
(or in) the thing itself, together with a shift in the 
rationale or justification of private property. That is, 
according to Macpherson, prior to capitalism, various ethical 
and theological grounds had been offered, but with the rise 
of capitalism the rationale came to be mainly that property 
was a necessary incentive to the labour required by the 
society. 
By Macpherson's historical analysis it is claimed that 
private property, as it is known today, is a claim to total 
dominion over a thing to the exclusion of others, and that 
this phenomenon is only a particular time-bound definition 
of property. Thus he calls for some further change to make 
our "narrow concept of property consistent with a democratic 
society". ̂^ Further, as Tay has pointed out, by this 
Macpherson makes a plea for the return of an alleged 
pre-capitalist conception of property as social and as 
including rights to access and to a revenue - that is, in 
modern terms, as including and allowing for claims to such 
things as employment, social insurance, community action. 
^^ Ibid. 
participation and state largesse. ̂^ 
However, contrary to Macpherson's claim that the concept of 
property, which essentially entails total dominion or control 
over a thing, is a reflection of a "modern" context, and is 
"the" modern concept of property, I would contend that this 
observation is neither accurate nor appropriate. Clearly 
Macpherson's account has normative uses. However, it is 
instead, as Karl Renner has argued, the social function^^ of 
the concept of property that has changed as the nature of the 
things we call property have changed ̂ ^ - the concept of 
property is relatively stable. Indeed, others have also 
examined the historical changes in the conception of property 
and have suggested quite different conclusions than that 
proposed by Macpherson - even to the point of denying the 
importance of property as a category in legal and political 
theory.^^ It can be argued, further, that traditional 
A.E.S.Tay "Property and Law in the Society of Mass 
Production, Mass Consumption and Mass Allocation" in 
C.Wellman (Ed.) "Equality and Freedom, Past Present 
and Future" op. cit. p.88 
^̂  J.Brigham "Property and the Politics of Entitlement" 
op, cit. p. 20 
^̂  See also C.Donahue "The Future of the Concept of 
Property Predicted from its Past" in J.R.Pennock and 
J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII "Property" op. cit. 
p.55 
See T.C.Grey "The Disintegration of Property" in 
J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII 
"Property" op. cit, 
Marxism bases its condemnation of property on a conception 
that equally views property as ownership of material things. 
I would contend that it is not the case that the concept of 
property itself has changed, rather it is the types of things 
that we call property that have changed, and this is evident 
from decisions of the courts which reflect shifts in the 
objects of legal conflict. Moreover, we do think of property 
more widely than the exclusive use of material things, and 
have done so for some time - this is not a recent phenomenon. 
If we accept that property, or more precisely ownership, is 
equivalent to, or at least entails certain rights, then we 
must accept that there are correlative duties placed on other 
people which come on to play, although as indicated elswhere, 
these duties may be as Nozick argues, entirely negative. 
Further, we have long thought of property as consisting of 
rights which persons hold with regard to a thing and thus 
intangibles have correspondingly been long considered as 
property (although intangible property arguably has become 
increasingly important). I do, however, acknowledge that the 
idea of rights is, arguably, a relatively recent phenomenon. 
As Golding has pointed out, Greeks and other ancients did not 
employ the terminology of rights in either their 
philosophical or moral discourse. "How surprised would one 
of the Ancients have been if a contemporary had said not 
merely 'That (thing) is mine; give it back!' but rather 'I 
have a right to that thing: give it to me!"' ̂^ 
3. The Legal Framework of Property. 
In a sense, property only exists because there is law. Law 
is thus vital for an understanding of the institution of 
property. Whether or not one holds the view that property is 
a creature of the State, or the creation of law/' many 
discussions of property begin with a consideration of 
property in a State or organised society, within a legal 
system as defined by the legal system.̂ ® 
Generally, we are faced with what we might call, not 
altogether happily, the jurisprudential aspects of the 
problem of ownership; this is the area within which the law 
itself creates new and increasingly obtruse forms of 
proprietary interests. These developments suggest one's 
understanding of what it is to own something or to have 
M.P.Golding "The Significance of Rights Language" in 
Philosophical Topics Vol.18 No.l, 1990 
^̂  Waldron argues that it "would be a mistake to restrict 
all talk of property to contexts where something 
recognisable as a State with institutions of positive 
laws exist". J.Waldron "What is Private Property" op. 
cit. p.319. 
See for example J.Chandler "A Reconsideration of the 
Concept of Property" in C.Wellman (Ed.) "Equality and 
Freedom: Past, Present and Future" op, cit, p.147 
property, may interact with one's ability to participate in 
one's society — the range of the attachments we can have to 
the objects of ownership, and hence our capacity to use our 
own property, are determined by the legal framework within 
our society, itself a product in its particular law of 
property, of the intended and unintended consequences of the 
increasingly subtle ways in which we wish to deal with the 
resources to which we lay claim. 
From a jurisprudential point of view, it is the types of 
property objects that are dealt with, together with the 
holder-object relationship(s), the varieties of lawful and 
unlawful acquisitive action, and property law as defining a 
legal and social system, that are the principal areas of 
interest. An enumeration and critical comparison of legally 
recognised justifications of property, and the "felt" or 
subjective side of property may also figure in a 
19 comprehensive jurisprudential treatment. 
The diversity of property is frequently acknowledged. In 
particular, Roman and common law have long recognised that 
property may be corporeal^^ or incorporeal, and include 
19* 
See P.Hollowell "On the Operationalisation of 
Property" in P.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social 
Relations'* (Heinemann, London, 1982) p. 16 
In legal terms,property which has a physical existence 
such as land or goods. 
economically potent assets such as patents, copyrights and 
trade marks. The French Patent Law of 1791, for example, 
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explicitly affirmed that individuals owned ideas. 
Incorporeal proprietary interests also include a number of 
different kinds of rights over the property of others, for 
example, leases, tenancies, servitudes (easements), 
securities and trusts. 
The types of holder-object relationships are also diverse 
under the major legal codes. They range from what some may 
call the "fullest" form of ownership, where there is 
indisputibility of ownership and entailing a large number of 
rights, including the right to use and destroy, the right to 
possess, that is, rights to occupy, control and exclude, and 
the right to transfer, that is to donate, sell or bequeath, 
to other types of relationships or weaker forms of 
attachment, such as permissive possession, the rights of 
detention and custody, all of which carry potentially 
burdensome obligations with them. 
Although property typically comes to us by transfer from 
previous owners, all property, however, traces its existence 
(as property) to appropriation of previously unowned 
^̂  M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op. cit, 
p.29 
goods. ̂^ People thus acquire property by various methods, 
for example, by original ownership, that is, by one creating 
something, by occupation, or by accession of a hitherto 
unowned or abandoned thing. One can also acquire property 
by derivation, that is, by sale, gift or even statute, or by 
succession, that is, by bequest. There are, of course, 
illegal methods of acquisition such as conquest, by forcible 
occupation, squatting, forcible seizing, and the many forms 
of theft and fraud. If successful, they yield de facto many 
of the powers of ownership, although not the moral or 
(usually) the legal rights. ̂^ That is, thieves lack legal 
rights over what they steal yet they are able to consume it, 
exclude others from it, derive income from it, and dispose 
of it - many of the activities or rights we generally 
associate with ownership. 
Within the general framework of law there exists also a 
general justification of property rules. Granted that it is 
accepted that the law exists to facilitate and make secure 
the fundamental elements of interactive human life, and hence 
must protect interests and preserve social order against 
threats to the security of human life, then — given the 
^̂  See D.Schmidtz "When is Original Appropriation 
Required?" in The Monist Vol.73, 1990, p. 504 
^̂  Although it should be noted that even those who aquire 
things illegally may have some title against others 
with no better right. 
natural acquisitiveness of human beings — a rational and 
enforceable system of resource allocation is an inevitable 
feature. A legal framework facilitates the orderly 
acquisition, use and disposal of property both for the 
individual and generally to the benefit of the society at 
large. Even an unjust or inefficient property law is, as 
Hobbes said when comparing civil society with the state of 
nature, better than no law at all. 
Further, it could be argued that legal views of property 
throw some light on the key elements of property. For 
example, both philosophers and jurists have addressed the 
issue of the importance of intention, some arguing that it 
is decisive in possession cases. Others have given control 
the paramount role. 
A further aspect in the analytical approaches to property 
appears to be associated with sociology, or, more precisely, 
social anthropology. Examples are often given to illustrate 
both the sheer number of differing legal systems and the 
varieties of society types which, despite differences, 
nonetheless uphold property in some form or other. Indeed, 
as H.L.A. Hart^^ has pointed out, any viable society will 
have some sort of system of property, or as Hume argued, any 
H.L.A.Hart "The Concept of Law" (Oxford University 
Press, 1961). 
society must have some rules of property.^^ 
Discourse about property, however, has fragmented into many 
different usages and this is most evident when enumerating 
the various usages within a legal context. In fact, it may 
be said that the term "property" is often used imprecisely, 
even in legal wri.ting,^' and in many ways these usages no 
longer reflect the common conception of property. Four 
recent legal cases in Australia, for example, have raised in 
various guises the vexed question of what property is. It 
appears, however, that the decisions of the cases do little 
more than illustrate that "there is no ready response to this 
question".^' 
For example, in Milirrpum v Nabalco Ptv Ltd (Gove Island 
Rights) representatives of Aboriginal clans claimed 
entitlement to certain areas of the Gove Peninsula in 
Arnhemland. One of the questions specifically raised in the 
pleadings was whether the clans' relationship to the land was 
a recognisable proprietary interest. Blackburn J. of the 
^̂  F.G.Whelan "Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone" 
in J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII 
"Property" op. cit. p.110 
^̂  See J.Brigham "Property and the Politics of 
Entitlement" (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1990) p.22 
^̂  M.Crommelin "Economic Analysis of Property" in 
D.J.Galligan (Ed.) "Essays in Leqal Theory" 
(Melbourne University Press, 1984) p.74 
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory found a proved 
relationship of the clans to defined areas of land, a 
relationship which in the eyes of the members of the clans 
was supported by a system of law. However he decided that 
this relationship was not a recognisable proprietary interest 
within the framework of the Australian law. "I think that 
property, in its many forms generally implies the right to 
use or enjoy, the right to exclude others, and the right to 
alienate. I do not say that all these rights must co-exist 
before there can be a proprietary interest, or deny that each 
of them may be subject to qualifications. But by this 
standard I do not think that I can characterise the 
2 8 relationship of the clan as to the land as proprietary." 
In Dormán v Rocrers, Murphy J. (in dissent) addressed the 
question of whether the right to practice medicine was 
proprietary. Justice Murphy held that the right to practice 
medicine was proprietary, and in so doing he espoused perhaps 
the broadest possible definition of property: "The limits 
or property are the interfaces between accepted and 
unaccepted social claims.. .In modern legal systems 'property' 
embraces every possible interest recognised by law which a 
person can have in anything and includes practically all 
valuable rights."^' Thus it appears that Murphy held the 
M.Crommelin, ibid, p. 75 
CLR (1982) p.365. 
view that property consists of all possible rights that one 
considers to be of value. 
In addition, in Re Toohev; Ex Parte Menelincr Station Ptv Ltd 
the issue of whether a grazing licence was an "estate or 
interest in land" was raised, that is, whether the licence 
was an estate or interest of a proprietary nature in the 
land. It was decided that the licence was not an interest 
in the land. "Before a right or an interest can be admitted 
into the category of property or of a right affecting 
property, it must be definable, identifiable by third 
parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third 
parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability".^'' 
The grazing licence failed to meet these criteria. 
Generally the law of property is concerned ;̂ ith the relations 
of persons to things, that is, relations between persons with 
respect to things. However, what distinguishes proprietary 
relations from other relations between persons appears to be 
the scope of the enforcement of rights with respect to 
things. That is, contractual relations, for example, give 
rise to particular rights which are enforceable merely 
between the parties to the contract, whereas proprietary 
relations involve rights enforceable against the society at 
large. This distinction is identified as rights in rem 
57 ALJR (1982) p.59. 
(rights good against the world) as opposed to rights in 
personam (rights good against determinate persons). This 
issue is discussed below. 
Further, T.C. Grey has enumerated several legal usages which 
are useful in indicating the divergent notions of property 
within the law.̂ ^ These are: 
1. The body of law concerned with the use of land such as 
estates in land, title registration and transfer, the 
financing of real estate transactions, the law of 
landlord and tenant, public regulation of land use, and 
public subsidy and provision of low-income housing. In 
general these are concerned with real estate. 
2. Property as a purposive account which includes among 
property rights all and only those entitlements whose 
purpose (in some sense) is to advance allocative 
efficiency by allowing individuals to reap the benefits 
and requiring them to bear the costs generated by their 
activities. 
3. The purpose of property to protect security and 
independence. 
T.C.Grey "The Disintegration of Property" in 
J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII 
"Property" op.cit, pp.71-72. 
4. The prohibition against "taking"^^ private property 
except for a public purpose and upon the payment of just 
compensation. 
5. The use of "property" rules as opposed to liability 
rules according to the nature of the sanctions imposed 
upon their violation. For example, a person's ownership 
of his car is protected by both liability rules (tort 
doctrines of conversion and liability for negligent 
damage to property) and property rules (criminal laws 
against theft). 
If we were to push all of the above to their limits at the 
same time, the result would almost certainly be 
contradictory. While the law may well be intended to protect 
each person, his rights, and hence by extension his property, 
it will inevitably do this by intruding on the "individual's 
right to be free of constraint". ̂^ One obvious example 
arises in respect to Eminent Domain, the government's right 
to take private property for public purpose, and a 
government's power that ranges from appropriation or 
^̂  See also R.A.Epstein "Takings - Private Property and 
the Power of Eminent Domain" (Harvard University 
Press, 1985) 
^̂  K.Mason "How Change (Reform?) Occurs and How to 
Block It" in K.Mason "Constancy and Change" (The 
Federation Press, 1990) p.87 
aquisition of land from private hands to the various modes 
of regulation and taxation which are levied in the modern 
State. 
In addition, property, as I have already indicated, entails 
the logical possibility of theft. Theft and property may 
then be seen as co-relative terms in the sense that neither 
is conceivable without the other. Although it may be argued 
that property can be defined without reference to theft, it 
may equally be argued that a society without theft is a 
society in which private property is not possible. Property 
brings with it the possibility of theft - neither is possible 
in the absense of the other. In a legal sense, theft can only 
occur in respect of a specific item of property, that is, 
theft presupposes the institution of property. As Silver 
points out, theft deliberately violates property rights as 
a thief deliberately employs coercion to obtain power over 
^̂  Not as Proudhon stated, that property is theft. 
[P. J.Proudhon "What is Property? An Enquiry into the 
Principles of Right and of Government" (tr. 
B.R.Tucker, N.Y.Dover 1970 ed.)p.ll] This is merely 
an indication of Proudhon's confusion, however much 
others may adhere to his view. The paradox is as much 
moral as legal or logical. As Smith argues, Proudhon 
clearly intends a moral re-evaluation of the 
practice, but since the practice itself provides the 
only available terms for criticism, he resorts to 
paradox, that is, literal nonsense to make the point. 
J.M.Smith "The Scope of Property Rights" in 
S.L.Blumenfeld (Ed.) "Property in a Humane Economy" 
op. cit. p.233. 
an object by means of physical force or deception^^ 
(although not all acts of coercion are acts of theft.) Can 
it be said, conversely, that that which cannot be stolen is 
not deemed to be "property"? Certainly this is not the case 
with objects that cannot be stolen due to physical 
constraints - I cannot steal, run away with, for example, Mr 
Trump's Tower in New York, yet if property is by definition 
constitutive of certain rights, then it may be possible to 
" s t e a l t h o s e rights from Mr Trump by deception. In any 
case, if we emphasise the logical possibility of theft, then 
the tower itself could be whisked away. 
This of course still suggests that the concept of property 
as equated with control or dominion over something, that is, 
what is it to steal Mr Trump's rights, but to have control. 
If property belongs to no one, it cannot be stolen, and if 
property is abandoned, there cannot be any theft of it. Such 
property can be appropriated, but not, prior to such 
^̂  M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op, cit, 
p.19 
^̂  Under the actus reus of theft, theft can only be 
committed in respect of a specific item of property 
and it is essential that the property belongs to 
another. "Belonging to another", however, is widely 
defined to include almost any legally recognised 
interest in property and since the law protects all 
interests in property, a person with a greater 
interest can be guilty of theft from a person with 
a lesser interest in the same chattel. See 
D.P.Derham, F.K.H.Maher and P.L.Waller (Eds.)"i4i2 
Introduction to Law" op. cit. pp.29-31. 
appropriation, misappropriated. 
4. Property. Rights, and Relations. 
What at least is apparent in all the examples of property and 
ownership so far considered is that the owner of an object 
is put into a privileged position of having certain rights^^ 
over and above the rights of other people in relation to that 
object. These rights would include, for example, the right 
to use, to possess and to manage something - it is not merely 
a relation between a person and a thing, but a relationship 
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between people in relation to a thing. After all, no 
distinction would be drawn by saying that "I own X" if, say, 
I was the last sentient being in the universe. I would not 
need to assert that "X is my property" and that therefore I 
may use it, destroy it etc.; I would merely do as I please. 
As Donahue has eloquently put it, "There is no property on 
the philosopher's desert island ... Robinson Crusoe did not 
) 7 
For a full analysis of rights and the common features 
of ownership as suggested by A.M.Honoré, see Ch.3 
This does not, however, necessarily detract from my 
relationship with, for example, the environment. We 
need not exhaust discussion of what we do in relation 
to nature by talking only of property - we may still 
have moral limitations not connected with property 
rights. My relationship with the environment may have 
nothing to do with other people, so that perhaps we 
should not necessarily use the concept of property 
to explain all things external to ourselves. 
need property until Friday arrived."^' In the world of 
Rob inson Crusoe property rig'hts play no role. Property 
rights are an instrument of society and derive their 
significance from the fact that they help a man form those 
expectations that he can reasonably hold in his dealings with 
others. 
Similarly, I would agree with Ayn Rand that "all wealth is 
produced by somebody and belongs to somebody" and "all 
property and all forms of wealth are produced by man's mind 
and labour". By this I mean that the value put on things 
by people, and hence which they consider to be worth 
acquiring as property, is something which is not inherent 
within the thing, but which is contrived or attributed by 
people. I therefore disagree with Mavrodes that this can be 
countered by such statements as "there is plenty of standing 
timber, lands, mineral deposits and so on, which was never 
produced by any human being at all. And plenty of that 
wealth is i n h e r i t e d . T h i s entirely misses the point of 
property. That is, property and wealth are conceptually only 
C.Donahue "Property - An Introduction to the Concept 
and the Institution", op.cit. p.XXIV. 
H.Demsetz "Ownership, Control and the Firm" (Basil 
Blackwell, 1988) p.104. 
A.Rand "Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal" (New York: 
Signet Books, 1967) p.14 
See G.Mavrodes "Property" in Persoijaiist, Vol. 53, 
1972. p.256. 
creations of people — although mineral deposits, forests and 
land need not be created by people, certainly the value and 
the use to which these can be put, particularly by acquiring 
them as one's property, are undoubtedly determined by people, 
and specifically will be determined by the particular society 
in which they live. 
Here I wish to reiterate the point that property and 
ownership involve relations between people; they are the 
relationships generated in respect of designated rights, 
liberties and perhaps duties. These are not necessarily 
related to a need for order due to limited resources - it is 
simply not necessarily true that property exists only because 
of competition or conflict over limited resources, unless, 
that is, one trivialises the scarcity thesis by representing 
every whimsical preference a person may have for one 
particular thing, rather than another just as good, as a 
scarcity factor. 
These rights may be viewed as purely conventional, and on a 
broader view, it could be said that property and ownership 
may be seen in terms of a social contract, that is, that 
property exists due to a metaphorical pact which is made with 
the State, and is expressed in the form of State recognition 
and enforcement of contracts respecting the relations with 
things.*^ As Hobbes argues, society and political authority 
proceeds from consent - individuals transfer their rights to 
a sovereign to whom all claims to ownership have been 
transferred. A p.articul ar society or legal system may 
determine its own criterion or criteria of ownership or 
property. Those formal relations or legal relations are 
arrangements between individuals, or between groups, 
respecting both each other and those objects which, according 
to the society and its laws, are known as property. How the 
rights or legal relations are applied, however, or how they 
are constituent of what is known as property still remains 
central to the problem of attempting to define property and 
ownership. 
Rights must be assigned on some basis, but there appear to 
be many possible criteria for doing this. For example, 
differing political, legal and/or moral views, as well as a 
variety of ideologies, may be taken into consideration by 
various governments in determining the sorts of things which 
may be allowed as property; consider, for example, 
controversies over subterranean minerals, gold, and wild 
animals. We can, of course, say that there are certain 
logical requirements which property or ownership relations 
must contain. That is, there must be a method of application 
^̂  See J.K.Fieblemann "Justice, Law and Culture" op, cit. 
Although I accept that some hold the view that 
contract cannot be equated with property. 
of rights, for determining how rights are assigned, and how 
disputes to be resolved, and, further, how and why the 
particular rights an individual is assigned over what a 
person owns/^ 
A specific distinction which arises in law, and which may be 
applied to our relationship to property, is the distinction 
drawn between rights in rem and rights in personam, . Of 
course all talk of rights carries implications of relations 
between people, however in rem refers to rights existing 
because of a relation between a person and a thing, whereas 
in personam refers to rights conceived primarily as existing 
because of a relation between persons. An example of rights 
in rem would be a contractual debt or claim for damages in 
tort against a particular person, whereas rights in personam 
would, for example, entail a proprietary right such as 
ownership against the whole world. This distinction appears 
to reflect the general contrast which is often made between 
general and particular rights. For example, a general right 
against everyone may be my right not to be murdered. This 
means that everyone capable of murdering me must refrain from 
doing so (although we may disagree or have different 
interpretations of who "everyone" is). Particular rights, 
however, are those rights we have over particular people to 
do certain specific actions such as those arising as a result 


























subject to the same qualifications about not leaving it idle. 
This suggests the rights of others to under-utilised 
resources. Similarly, under common law, an easement may be 
attained by an owner's acquiescing to a person traversing his 
land - what begins as a violation of ownership, and therefore 
a wrong, can turn into a right, given sufficient 
acquiescence. 
All these considerations, then, indicate that there is, in 
practice, scant respect for any idea that genuine ownership 
is absolute ownership. Notice, however, that it does not 
follow from the fact that absolute ownership is rarely 
acknowledged, that ownership cannot be understood 
fundamentally in absolute terms. Indeed, I will argue below 
that ownership should be understood in absolute terms, and 
that examples such as those just listed have been 
misconstrued by Donahue and others as implying the 
non-existence of absolute ownership. 
Even if the exampl es I have offered may appear tendentious, 
it should be noted that absolute ownership does not imply 
that you can do anything with a thing just because it is 
yours. The issue is whether the restrictions to which owners 
are often rightly subjected means their's is really a limited 
or relative sort of ownership, or that it means, rather, that 
ownership carries with it an obligation to "seal off" one's 
use of what one owns, so that others are not hurt or harmed 
in the process. These issues will be addressed below. 
There is an important and often overlooked non sequitur in 
concluding that because ownership in an absolute sense is 
virtually non-existent in practice, all ownership is really 
limited or qualified. For example, as I shall argue 
subsequently, some apparent restrictions on ownership are not 
strictly restrictions on ownership at all, but arise from the 
recognition that what an owner does, may in fact have 
"spill-over" consequences for others. Because these 
spill-over consequences are practically inseparable from the 
activity that produces them, the activity itself is limited 
— an apparent limitation on ownership. If it were to become 
possible, however, to "detach" the original activity and the 
spill-over consequences, that is, to conduct the activity 
without producing those consequences, then the case for 
restricting such activities by owners would be 
correspondingly diminished. 
If indeed there is no sense to ownership in an absolute 
sense, then there arises a very real question as to how much 
coherence there is in a concept of some sort of limited 
ownership. Of what, precisely, is it a "limited" version? 
What can we make of this idea? In its various forms 
commentators often elude to different degrees and sorts^^ of 
ownership, meaning the amount of interest one has in a thing, 
or the number or types of rights one may say to have with 
respect to a thing. For example, it has been suggested that 
the idea of temporary, limited ownership may be applied in 
many areas^^- I may own a house, have a right to paint it 
green, a right to remodel the bathroom, a right to live in 
it, to sell it, to rent it, or to bequeath it to my heirs. 
Yet there seems to be no reason in logic or in the essential 
nature of people or houses for supposing that these rights 
must always go together. That is, one may have a right to 
live in it, but not to rent it out, or a right to rent it but 
not to bequeath it to one's son. Certainly in some 
Australian cities one may own a house, live in it, paint it 
any colour, rent it out etc., but not be permitted to erect 
a fence in front of the house, while in some suburbs one may 
not remodel the exterior except in brick. And one may not 
carry on a trade or business from one's house in many areas. 
How can all these qualifications and distinctions make sense, 
except against a background of an "unlimited" form of 
ownership, on which these are various sorts of limitation? 
Of course one may say that ownership itself may ultimately 
See for example J.0.Grunebaum "Private Ownership" op. 
cit. 
^̂  G.Mavrodes "Property" in Personalist op, cit. p.261. 
come down to a decision merely of who has a better claim to 
a thing in deciding who is the proper owner. But in the case, 
for example, of one's fence-free house, there is at a 
common-sense level no doubt who is the proper owner - yet 
restrictions still apply. 
The formal possibilities for property and ownership appear 
to be as follows: 
(1) Ownership really is always absolute, but since this is 
in fact rarely honoured, then the concept of ownership 
actually has little, if any, genuine application. 
(2) Ownership permits of degrees, that is, most, if not all 
ownership is to some greater or lesser degree limited 
or qualified ownership, that is, ownership is a concept 
with a rich application, though describing a 
relationship as ownership leaves many questions about 
the owner's rightful powers wide open. 
It is the first option that appears to be correct. If 
ownership admits of degrees, as the second alternative 
requires, then the question arises: of what is it they are 
degrees? The answer appears to be degrees of permissibility 
on the part of the owner, that is, degrees of freedom of the 
owner to do things by, with, or to, the putative property 
without the consent of any other person. This may be 
interpreted as degrees of "interest" an individual has in a 
thing, but this cannot be equated with property or ownership. 
For convenience, we may represent degrees of permissibility 
as the extent of the scope to engage in activities vis-a-vis 
the property as of right. Thus the degree of one's ownership 
of an item of property would be measured, to put.it crudely, 
by the size of the "bundle of rights" one enjoys in relation 
to that property — it is none other than the essence of A.M. 
6 7 Honoré's seminal "bundle of rights" theory of property. 
On this theory, or theories of this type, it may be said that 
property is nothing but a complex bundle of rights. But if 
that bundle always contained the same elements, there would 
be no problem in understanding property — it would be a 
relatively simple matter of definition. In other words, if 
the bundle remained constant for all or most of the cases 
that we want to describe as property, the bundle as a whole 
could be defined in terms of its contents. However, as many 
have stated, it does not remain constant, and that is where 
68 the difficulties begin. 
^̂  A.M.Honoré "Ownership" in A.G. Guest (Ed.) "Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence" op.cit. 
See for example J.Waldron "What is Private Property" 
op. cit. p.315. 
However, instead of persisting with the metaphor of a bundle, 
we should perhaps adopt the semi-technical term "cluster" to 
characterise the concept of property understood in this way. 
The concept of property would accordingly be a concept to be 
understood in terms of a cluster of rights. Such a cluster 
may be understood in one of three possible ways: 
(1) Analogous to Wittgenstein's idea of Family Resemblance, 
that is, that there may be overlaps of the various 
rights associated with things called property — we may 
hold certain rights with respect to a thing, but the 
same rights might not be present in all cases of 
property, and there may be no single right common and 
peculiar to all cases of property; 
(2) as comprising a core sub-set of rights which are 
necessary when speaking of property, together with a 
variable set of further rights, some of which, but no 
single one of which, must necessarily be present; 
(3) as comprising a certain set of rights which are singly 
necessary and jointly sufficient to constitute property. 
As stated above, the first option, following Wittgenstein's 
model of "family resemblance", cannot represent an adequate 
method by which we can attempt understand property. I will, 
however, examine (2) and (3) in the following chapters, 
initially examining Honoré's "bundle of rights" account of 
ownership. 
PROPERTY AS A BUNDLE OF RIGHTS 
HONORg AND BECKER 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine the bundle of rights analysis 
of property and ownership as proposed by A.M.Honoré and 
L.C.Becker. Before doing so, however, I will make some 
preliminary remarks on various approaches to property and 
rights. 
Property denotes certain rights possessed by an "owner" with 
implications for other persons in relation to a given thing. 
Certainly, to consider property as (a set of) rights seems 
to be the most satisfactory description of its nature and its 
application. As C.B. Macpherson has stated, as soon as any 
society, by custom or convention or law makes a distinction 
j^etween property and mere physical possession, it has in 
effect defined property as a right. ̂  In this sense, to have 
property is to have a right by way of an enforceable claim 
to some use or benefit of something. As stated in the 
previous chapter, however, we distinguish between property 
as a right and the particular rights which constitute 
property or one's ownership of a thing. As Morris Silver 
points out, "a property right is visualised as a vector of 
2 distinct rights over an object". 
^ C.B.Macpherson "Property - Mainstream and Critical 
Positions" (University of Toronto Press, 1978) p.3. 
^ M. Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" (Basil 
Blackwell, 1989) p.17 
To recapitulate, we can say that there are four distinct uses 
of the word "property". These yield: 
1) that property is the set of things (in the broadest 
sense) that are items of property — indeed any thing of 
any sort that is the object of an ownership relation, 
or is even capable of being owned; 
2) that property is a rights relation — a set of ordered 
pairs with owners as first members and things owned as 
second members; 
3) a property is a quality or a relation, that is, property 
represents a fundamental ontological category; 
4) that property is a socio-economic category; indeed a way 
of looking at the actually or potentially productive 
elements of the universe that give rise to the problem 
of property, conceived as a search for the best way of 
relating humans to the productive resources of the 
world. 
Certainly under (1) we may say that the things we know as 
property vary so much that we arfe unable to determine what 
property is in terms of a common factor uniquely shared by 
all, and only these things that are items of property, while 
and insofar as they are items of property — especially given 
that something's being, or ceasing to be, an item of property 
requires no inherent change in the item. 
(3) merely leads to confusion if considered in this context. 
As stated earlier, we may be forced to say that in all cases 
of property there must be an owner; for example, that the 
apple "owns" its redness. We should, however, resist the 
temptation to offer an analysis of property so comprehensive 
it will follow through into this category of ontology — an 
infrastructure which, while it may lie behind the 
subject-predicate grammar of Indo-European languages, has 
little, if anything, to do with people and their possessions. 
(4) is essentially a creature of a particular set of 
intellectual traditions, and though perhaps a useful way of 
focusing thought in economic or sociological theory, is 
unhelpful to one engaged in the analytic enterprise. 
(2) then emerges as the focus of this inquiry, without 
prejudice to what we may want to say in relation to these 
other areas. 
/ 
Undoubtedly, as ordinary speech goes, A.M. Honoré is surely 
correct in pointing out that we can identify ownership as 
closely connected to the thing owned, that is, that the term 
"property" is often used to speak of both the relation of 
rights one has with respect to a thing and also of the thing 
itself, which is the object of the relation.^ 
Of course it may be correct to say that a lay person would 
typically refer to a physical object as property, as is the 
case with ordinary language usage,^ or what we may consider 
to be a "popular" conception of property as things. However 
in law it may not always be the case. That is, property^ is 
often used in speaking of the rights relating to the object. 
Although some may argue^ that there are two distinct senses 
of property, that is, that property can be understood either 
as an object or set of objects that are the putative objects 
of ownership, or that property can be understood as that 
rights relation, whatever it is, that is constitutive of 
ownership, I would argue that there are not really two senses 
— that underlying both idioms is a more or less implicit or 
explicit reference to that relation. It is merely the object 
^ A.M.Honoré "Ownership" in A.G.Guest ed. "Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) p.128. 
^ See F.Snare op. cit. "The Concept of Property" 
^ Perhaps the use of the word "property" in this sense is 
similar to our application of the word "uncle" - that is, it 
may refer to a particular person, the type of person, or to 
the relationship between people. 
^ See for example R.Rariden "The Rigrht to Property" 
(University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
1985) 
of ownership that varies, that is, it may be a physical 
object such as a car or it may be an rntangible thing such 
as a share, copyright or a lease. All of these involve 
r i g h t s , (and, I would argue, the same rights). As Munzer 
points o u t , to think of property as involving relations among 
persons or other entities with regard to things is the 
"sophisticated" conception of property. 
By considering property as a rights relation we are able to 
allow for a broader interpretation of the objects of the 
r i g h t , although of course we may say that physical property, 
or a physical object is still more easily identifiable as 
something which is owned. In law for example, what is known 
as a chattel — à tangible, movable article of property — can 
easily be understood as someone's property. Physical 
property may be seen here as more central, in the sense of 
being readily understood as property - as being owned - while 
other types of property are epistemologically parasitic. 
This suggests that these other types of property, that is, 
other sorts of "things" such as intellectual property, are 
logically or conceptually, or at least "pedagogically", 
^ The "popular" conception views property as things. 
S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" (Cambridge University 
P r e s s , 1990) p.16 
® See for example P.F.Strawson "Individuals: An Essay in 
Descriptive Metaphysics" (London:Methuen 1959) Ch.3 
dependent upon the physical objects - pedagogically, in the 
sense that one would not be able to grasp a concept of 
property if it were taught initially in relation to 
intellectual property. Consider, as an analogy, the command 
concept in law. To answer the recurrent question of "What is 
law?", it has often been suggested that the key to the 
understanding of the law is to be found in the simple notion 
of an "order backed by threats." This idea of imperatives 
and obedience is obviously the easiest to comprehend when 
explaining law to a person who is unfamiliar with it. From 
examples such as a policeman ordering a particular motorist 
to stop, or ordering a beggar to move on, we can then explain 
other, more complicated cases. That is, when explaining the 
idea of a legal system we can explain it, in its simplest 
terms, as some persons or body of persons issuing general 
orders backed by threats which are generally obeyed, and it 
must be generally believed that these threats are likely to 
be implemented in the event of disobedience.^" This would 
be to suggest that command-type laws are pedagogically 
fundamental, but would leave open whether they enjoyed any 
other type of genuine logical or conceptual characteristic 
or attribute. 
' H.L.A.Hart "The Concept of Law" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1961) p.16 
^̂  H.L.A.Hart ibid, p.25 
This description of law is more readily understood if one 
were to give it as an explication specifically, say, of 
criminal law, but certainly would not be the full story when 
attempting to explain the intricacies and complexities of 
commercial law. Although this may be put down merely to 
contingencies of human understanding, that is, that 
command-law is pedagogically prior, I would agree with Hart 
that there is a deeper logical priority, misunderstood — as 
Hart rightly points out — by the classical positivists. 
Similarly, that logical link between our understanding of 
physical objects as property and other sorts of things, such 
as intellectual property, as property, is dependent upon the 
fact that property is a rights relation in all cases and can 
be explained as such. 
To accept property as a rights relation (which necessarily 
brings with it other immediate and/or consequential incidents 
such as liabilities and duties) allows for a broader 
interpretation of the objects of property, and also of 
people's claims to particular things. This relation then 
requires that there be a person involved for there to be 
issues regarding ownership and claims to property. That is, 
it is logically necessary that at some stage there be a 
person involved - there is a person, at some stage, who owns 
the car, the share in a company, or who has patented the 
design of a new machine. 
The problem remains, however, that there appears to be no one 
definition of property or ownership which has been offered 
as a standard definition, even when we accept that property 
and ownership entail rights. The aim, of course, of having 
a grand formula for property would be to settle once and for 
all our understanding of property. I will endeavour to 
suggest a possible solution in the next chapter. 
2. Ownership as Ricrhts and Obi icrations . 
A.M. Honoré's^^ account of ownership may be characterised 
in the light of particular rights which are assigned people 
in relation to a thing. His is no doubt a comprehensive 
account of the sorts of rights we commonly consider to be 
involved in our modern, legal understanding of property. 
Certainly many philosophers justify property rights following 
Honoré's idea of "full liberal ownership",^^ and certainly 
the list of rights^^ proposed by Honoré is useful in 
^̂  A.M.Honoré "Ownership" in A.G.Guest (Ed.) "Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 
^̂  A.Carter "The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights" 
(Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) p.132 
^̂  I will/ however, for brevity refer to only rights rather 
than to both rights and obligations, although Honoré 
defines ownership in terms of rights and obligations. 
demonstrating the sorts of features we would expect to find 
in standard cases of ownership, and shows us that the notion 
of property or ownership is internally complex. 
According to Honoré, one can define ownership^^ (and 
property) as the greatest possible interest in a thing which 
a mature system of law recognises. That is, one could 
identify an owner as the person who possesses the most rights 
in relation to a thing or object. Honoré thus sets out his 
eleven common features or "standard incidents" of the full 
liberal concept of ownership in ordinary "uncomplicated" 
cases. His analysis of "full ownership" and private 
property rights presents us with a bundle of rights or 
cluster concept and illustrates the wide range of rights and 
obligations which can constitute legally recognised 
ownership. 
According to Honoré, ownership comprises 11 distinct legal 
relations, most of them separable rights: 
1) the right to possess (to have exclusive physical control 
of a thing, that is, the claim right to be put in 
exclusive control of a thing and the right to remain in 
control); 
^̂  Honoré specifically uses the term "ownership" rather than 
"property". 
2) the right to use (the owner's personal use and enjoyment 
of the thing owned); 
3) the right to manage (the right to decide how and by whom 
the thing owned shall be used); 
4) the right to the income (a benefit derived from forgoing 
personal use of a thing and allowing others to use it); 
5) the right to the capital (the power to alienate the 
thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the 
whole or part of it); 
6) the right to security (an immunity from expropriation); 
7) the incident of transmissibi1ity (the power to bequeath 
or devise) ; 
8) the incident of absence of term (the indeterminate 
length of one's ownership rights); 
9) the prohibition of harmful use (the duty to forbear from 
using the thing in certain ways harmful to others); 
10) liability to execution (liability of the owner's 
interest to be taken away from him for debt, either by 
execution of a judgement debt or insolvency); 
11) residuary character (the existence of rules governing 
the reversion of lapsed ownership rights). 
Looking at Honoré's list of "incidents", owners would have 
the right to use and manage what they own as they please, and 
this does not only entail physical control or alteration, but 
conditions under which others may use the owned object such 
as your car, or when others may, for example, enter your 
land. 
Further, owners would have the right to the income or capital 
of what is owned, not only the rights which are to the rent 
or lease of the object, but also the right to sell at a 
profit (or conceivably also at a loss) or to even destroy 
that which one owns. Thus owners of resources may sell on the 
market or may even withhold the sale in order to raise the 
pricè of the resource. One would also have the right to 
bequeath what is owned, or indeed any part of it, to whomever 
the owner pleased and with whatever conditions they please. 
Note that Honoré quite correctly does not express (7)-(ll) 
inclusive directly in the language of rights. Rather, all, 
in this formulation, whether or not rights, are called 
"incidents". In discussing Honoré's set, referring to the 
typical characteristics in an analysis of ownership, it 
certainly is useful if we think of them as "incidents", 
although we often commonly continue to refer to this set of 
"incidents" or similar groupings as a "bundle of rights" 
theory. I would suggest here that our loose way of talking 
of a "bundle of rights" is inadequate for a formulation such 
as Honoré ' s. That is, even if we enumerate all the rights 
commonly associated with ownership, it is evident that there 
is more to ownership than simply these. For example, 
liabilities are also associated with one's ownership of 
something, and while these liabilities are consequent on the 
ways in which the rights have been exercised, it is a serious 
omission if they are not included in a descriptive list such 
as this. Liabilities are also consequent on one's ownership 
and may not depend in all cases on one's employment or 
exercise of one's rights. For example, owners of houses and 
land are liable for the payment of the legal liability of 
rates or property taxes, while some liabilities may be 
consequent on the exercise of one's rights. The payment of 
gift duties for example, may flow from the exercise of my 
right to dispose of a thing and to give it away as a gift. 
Certainly there are also liabilities, apart from legal 
liabilities, which may also flow from one's ownership of a 
thing; for example, I may be morally required to compensate 
another who I have morally wronged through my actions, so 
that we may say that there are "moral liabilities" apart from 
legal liabilities. 
Thus, although we commonly consider property to consist of 
various rights, such as the right to use or dispose of an 
object, property rights may be narrower in scope than what 
we may term property. For example, property rights may be 
said to involve only advantageous incidents, such as the 
right to use, the right to dispose, etc., while it is evident 
that property also involves disadvantageous incidents. ̂^ For 
example, a person may own a house and thereby possess various 
rights such as the right to use and to dispose of it, yet 
disadvantageous incidents may also exist in the form of 
various duties not to infringe on the rights of others, which 
may be directed by, for example, government zoning 
regulations. I may not be permitted to build, say, a certain 
type of building in a residential area or use my rural land 
for industrial purposes. One could even conceive of 
liabilities such as those which are attached to the ownership 
of a house whereby courts can hand down judgements which 
demand the sale of the house as payment as a result of the 
loss of a civil action. 
Certainly in general terms the increase in responsibilities 
^̂  See S.R.Munzer "Property, Incorporation and Projection" in 
Nous, Vol. 23, 1989, p.292 
within a civil society with a legal system has led both to 
greater (negative) restrictions on the overall use of the 
things one calls one's own and also positive responsibilities 
which can also be interpreted as restrictions, so that we may 
say that we have both rights and liabilities with respect to 
a thing. 
The law in. particular views property as relations among 
persons to things, and as a starting point of which relations 
are involved may be seen in what some writers have refered 
to as as the Hohfeldian analysis of property. This classic 
analytical topology of legal rights, which appears to have 
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been used by Honoré and Becker is that proposed by 
18 
W.Hohfeld. While not necessarily agreeing with Hohfeld's 
analysis, particularly as he considers that all legal 
relations are rights, and further, he does not analyse his 
conceptions but merely organises them into tables of 
opposites (contradictories) and correlatives (equivalents), 
his scheme is nevertheless acknowledged as a fundamental 
analysis of rights and is useful as a guide to legal analysis 
A.M.Honoré "Ownership" in A.G.Guest (Ed.) "Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence" op.cit. 
^̂  L.Becker "The Moral Basis of Property Rights" in J.R.Pennock 
and J.W.Chapman (Ed.) "Property" NOMÔS XII, 1980 op. cit. 
and "Property Riqhts" (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) 
W.Hohfeld "Fundamental Leçal Conceptions as Applied in Legal 
Reasoning" (1919. Reprinted Greenwood Press, 1978) 
and judicial reasoning. Certainly by distinguishing four 
sorts of rights, Hohfeld indicates to us that there is no 
simple answer to the question "what is a right?". The Hohfeld 
scheme appears to consider what is on the "other side of a 
right". That is, if you have a right of some sort, what does 
that mean for my; situation? 
Understanding property along the lines suggested by Honoré 
and Hohfeld has the salient advantage of cross-cultural 
application, that is, this idea of property (though perhaps 
not a moral and political theory of property) applies to all 
or almost all societies.^" Further, this also sheds light on 
moral relations among individuals - the analysis starts from 
a central truth that property involves relations among 
persons with respect to things and enables one to clarify 
these relations in widely different social settings, so that 
starting from Hohfeld's analysis of legal rights, we can 
expand and look at all rights within any conventional rule 
system, legal or non-legal. 
According to Hohfeld, a legal right may be either a claim, 
a liberty, a power, or an immunity, and on this analysis the 
traditional right and corresponding duty involves a 
See L.W.Sumner "The Moral Foundation of Rights" (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987) p.18 
S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" op. cit. pp. 25-26 
constellation consisting of elements, their correlatives and 
opposites. This reads: 
1) claim - right — duty 
2) privilege (liberty) — no right - duty 
3) power — liability - disability (no power) 
4) immunity — disability - liability 
In other words, property rights consist in a complex of 
relations, that is, all aspects of property rights which 
pertain to an individual are accompanied by correlatives 
which pertain to others - it shows the multiplicity of 
social relations which the notion encompasses. 
Under (1), Hohfeld's notion of a correlative involves two-way 
entailment. Claim-rights correspond to duties so that if I 
have a right, then you have a corresponding duty. That is, 
the right-duty correlatives should, by this analysis, only 
be used in situations in which one person is entitled by 
legal process to compel another person to act in a certain 
way. For example, as in the case of A enforcing payment of 
a debt from B - A has a right to $100 from B, and B has a 
duty to pay A $100. The statement that A has a claim-right 
to $100 from B entails that, and is entailed by, the 
statement that B has a duty to pay $100 to A. 
By (2), the privilege or legal liberty involves no 
correlative duty but the absense of a right on someone else's 
part to interfere. ̂^ For example, one may say that an owner 
has the right to walk on his land and everyone else has 
"no-right" to interfere. Hence the "liberty — no-right" 
dichotomy. 
According to (3), a person, has a legal power when, by some 
act, he can alter his legal position or that of someone else. 
For example, he may have the right to make a will controlling 
the succession of his estate, so that in effect this is a 
legal power to produce a change in the legal relationships 
of others who are "liable" to have their legal relationships 
changed. The "liability" then is a susceptibility to having 
one's legal position altered (But this liability need not be 
disadvantageous) . Thus there is a power-liability correlative 
set. 
By (4), an immunity is a lack of susceptibility to having 
one's legal position altered by someone else. We may say, for 
example, that a person enjoys freedom from having a given 
legal relationship altered by the act of another, such as in 
the case of a statement given under parliamentary privilege 
which is immune from a defamation suit being brought against 
that person. 
^̂  S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" op. cit, p. 18 
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The point of Hohfeld's analysis appears to be that rights are 
often compounds of two or more of the above types, but until 
these elements are identified, that is which elements in a 
particular case, one cannot proceed with moral arguments. 
3. Honoré, Becker and Ricrhts 
Honoré presents us with a "bundle of rights" account of 
ownership which is in many ways inconsistent. For example, 
Honoré argues that none of the incidents or rights he 
enumerates are individually necessary, though they may be 
together sufficient conditions for "a person of inheritance" 
to be designated "owner" of a particular thing in a 
particular system. The analysis thus suggests that property 
and ownership consist in (a bundle of) rights/incidents, none 
of which are essential. It could be argued, then, that some 
or all of these rights can be the basis for ownership claims. 
That is, in Honoré's view ownership may be present although 
some of the incidents are absent. None of the incidents or 
features, that is, various rights associated with ownership 
in Honoré's view, are individually necessary, but the members 
of each of a very large number of large sub-sets are jointly 
sufficient conditions of ownership. Honoré claims that "it 
would be rash to assert that the features" discussed are 
"necessarily common to different mature systems". Yet 
according to Honoré, they have a "tendency to remain constant 
from place to place and age to age."^^ That is, if a system 
did not admit them, and did not provide for them to be 
"united in a single person, we would conclude that it did not 
know the liberal concept of ownership, either of a primitive 
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or sophisticated sort". Further, these resemblances exist 
"de facto" and can be explained by common needs of mankind 
and the common conditions of human life.^^ 
Honoré's model may then be understood as a Wittgensteinian 
model. In Honoré's view, concepts take their character from 
the uses of their associated words - to explicate a concept 
is to explain a particular use. Therefore, on this account, 
there is no expectation of universality for any particular 
feature, and no requirement that each individual property 
right be a necessary condition for ownership. However, if 
this is really Honoré's position, then I find this 
unsatisfactory. As stated above, to consider property on a 
Wittgensteinian model would instantiate what Wittgenstein 
characterised as a linguistic analogue of family resemblance. 
Accepting such a view means that the various different uses 
of the word "property" each correlating with differing 
sub-sets of rights, could be said to form a family, (although 
" A.M.Honoré "Ownership", op, cit, p.109. 
^^ Ibid. p.112. 
^^ Ibid. p. 109 
for Honoré "full liberal" ownership contains all of these 
incidents)/^ However, as already stated, I find this type 
of model inappropriate for our common understanding of 
property. 
It should be noted however, that a fuller delineation may be 
made regarding property and the dispersal of rights. For 
example, distinctions are often made between private and 
public property in the context of right-holders. That is, the 
identification of the owners or right-holders facilitates 
this additional terminology. If the owners are identifiable 
entities distinguishable from some larger group, there is 
often said to be "private property". The most common example 
is individual private property, where an individual person 
is the owner. Persons or right-holders may also be considered 
together, such as in partnerships or corporations, while 
contrasted with private property are various "sorts" of 
"public property". Here the owners are the State, city, 
community, tribe, etc. It is also possible that some forms 
of ownership involve a "mixture of private and public 
property rights".^' 
Thus we may distinguish rights as they relate to property 
See A.Carter "The Philosophical Foundations of Property 
Rights" (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) p.5 
^̂  S.R.Munzer. "A Theory of Property" op. cit. p. 25 
into three groups: 
1. Collect ive property rights, that is, those which are 
held by, or in the name of, the State or — less clearly 
— a "community", 
2. Private property rights, that is, those held by natural 
and other legal persons, excluding those which act only 
or predominantly as State agencies, or agents for the 
State, and 
3. Individual private property rights, that is, those held 
by a single natural person. 
I am not making a distinction here, however, between 
different "sorts" of property, but rather how rights may be 
held by different recipients or holders. It is easy to 
exaggerate, however, the importance of the distinctions 
between collective and private property - usually the 
distinction is really over the notion of exclusivity of 
property. In fact, whether property is said to be held 
privately or in common with other people, or in some other 
mode of collectivity, it is still exclusive to that 
individual or group. Even if one were to make the distinction 
between excludabi1ity, that is, the power or the right to 
exclude others, and exclusion or exclusive (the state of 
being excluded) , we may say that the central aspect of 
property is that others are excluded from the use of a thing 
in any case, whether or not the owner's permission is 
granted. Property rights relate the owner of the thing to 
non-owners - albeit by means of a relation of exclusion. Thus 
this delineation does not add to Honoré's account. 
This does have implications, however, on how one is to 
assess, for example, a socialist's view of ownership in his 
society. Socialists stress that under capitalism others are 
excluded from access to the means of production. However, 
I would argue that under any communal system — whether 
socialist, communist or whatever — a particular community has 
the right to exclude non-members from, say, its fields. Even 
villagers may exclude non-members from grazing on communal 
land. The distinction is merely that the right to exclude is 
held by the group, rather than an individual, and exercised 
by those who are its nominal agents. This power to exclude 
can equally be equated with the power of the capitalist to 
exclude - large corporations are restricted to share-holders, 
while government corporations are also exclusively restricted 
to the taxpayers and other members of the particular State. 
The exclusionary right is thus identically grounded in 
ownership. 
In this sense, it is clear that all property is private 
property. What differs is the capacity of individual natural 
persons to enjoy private property. 
The law, of course, recognises property in a variety of forms 
from ownership (conceivably) of slaves to land, animals, good 
will to copyright; and the rights involved are also 
multivarious. That is, it appears that an owner may possess 
some rights with regard to a given object, but not others. 
Further, the combinati ons of rights may vary between 
different people in regard to the same sorts of objects or 
the same person may hold different combinations for different 
objects. More fundamentally, however, it may be argued that 
property and ownership in law is nothing but the rights, that 
the rights possessed by individuals or groups of individuals 
constitute property in terms of the legal concept. 
To hark back to the variations in the referential use of the 
word "property" already noted, property in legal terms may 
therefore be said to be not the thing itself (nor a property) 
but a relation which is defined by rights. To say, then, that 
one legally possesses property is to say that one possesses 
rights which can be defined as property rights and which have 
objects of those rights of some kind. Legal property and 
legal property rights may have their origin in custom, 
convention or legislation and these in turn may reflect 
prescription, general acceptance, habitual usage, or 
perceived utilities, needs or deserts. 
The major difficulty with Honoré's analysis of ownership, 
however, is that it avoids giving a satisfactory definition 
or analysis of ownership apart from using the term "greatest 
interest" to identify the person who is deemed to be the 
owner, thus making "owning" incidentally a relative term, and 
not just a relational term (which, formally, it obviously is) 
in the process. To say, however, that we can identify an 
owner as the person with the greatest number of rights 
(incidents), does not constitute an adequate analysis of 
ownership. Granted, under ordinary circumstances a person may 
accept on face value, that this would seem to be a plausible 
explanation of the use of the word "ownership" and its 
cognates. Nonetheless, if pushed on the point, such an 
accommodating critic may soon concede that their everyday 
speech is confused. That is, they would soon feel pressed 
to suggest particular rights, or a specific number of rights, 
which would be either sufficient or perhaps necessary for one 
to say that a person with the "greatest interest" can be 
identified. 
The initial question which arises here is how do we even 
begin to count the number of rights one has in relation to 
a thing; or how else might we begin to quantify the extent 
of an interest one has with regard to a thing? The "greatest 
interest" is so vague that we could even identify an owner 
other than the favoured collectivity, in the most 
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collectivist systems. That is, we could say that the 
regularly designated driver and mechanic of a particular 
tractor on a Soviet commune may be said to have the "greatest 
interest" in the tractor, as compared with anyone else. 
However, this is surely a reductio ad absurdum. Certainly 
this analysis would not work for this particular political 
system (as a natural person cannot own the means of 
production under strict communist doctrine). 
Leaving aside the particular political or legal system under 
which this definition may arise, the suggestion that an owner 
can be identified as the person with the "greatest interest" 
still cannot provide an adequate analysis of ownership. For 
example, we can construct cases involving long and complex 
chains of conditional and contingent assignments, as a result 
of which a lessee of land who undoubtedly has, under the 
lease, the greatest interest in the land. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be said that he is therefore the owner of the land. 
Moreover, the idea that a lessee may be an owner relative to 
the holder of a sub-lease, but not relative to his principal, 
is not an explanation but a complete distortion of our ways 
of speaking of ownership. 
Further, there may be in fact be cases in which there is no 
^̂  See J.Waldron "What is Private Property?" in Oxford Journal 
of Legral Studies, Vol.5, 1985. p.335 
owner at all, yet there may be several people who hold some 
interest in a thing. For example, there may be many rights 
and liabilities connected with a particular thing which may 
in fact be considered to be owned, and yet these rights and 
liabilities are so vague and dispersed that it would be 
difficult to pinpoint the owner. This would be the case, if 
for example, a particular thing, say, land, is leased by a 
person through various companies. 
Of course if all the rights and liabilities etc. were to be 
centred in one specific person, as Honoré suggests they can 
be, then it would not be difficult to determine that that 
person is in fact the owner. But if that were the norm, we 
would not have the problem Honoré is attempting to address. 
One must further question the use of the idea of "interest" 
in a thing in explicating ownership. It may be argued that 
ownership is a value in itself, and not merely a means to the 
end of well-being. The assertion of a right is 
"categorical",^' and a right is not the same as an interest, 
though there may be an interest behind every right. 
Nevertheless, clearly not all individual interests have 
29 
sufficient importance to form the basis of rights. We may 
have interests in things to which' we have no right, such as 
M. Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op. cit. p. 14 
J.Waldron "Rights in Conflict" in Ethics Vol.99, 1989. p.504 
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that the market value of land we own will rise precipitously. 
Further, there are many sorts of interests which would be 
irrelevant to the concept of ownership. Plainly the word 
"interest" can cover things which have no relevance to 
property (although we may say that in many circumstances the 
term is closely related to rights). For example, one's 
interest in one's health or our interests in what we believe, 
rightly or wrongly to be to our advantage, do not entail that 
one has a right to that thing or to undertake that activity, 
nor does it imply ownership. In addition, we may have rights 
to do things that are contrary to our interests,^" such as 
the right to make a bet that we shall probably lose, or have 
rights to what will never be in our interest such as to give 
away our assets or to endanger ourselves in useless ways. 
Further, it is conceivable that although various interests 
may be held by separate individuals, there may in fact be no 
owner. For example, many people may have a right of passage 
with respect to a piece of land or, say, a river, and hence 
have an interest in it, although they are clearly not owners. 
One would therefore need to distinguish those things that are 
relevant interests for ownership to be recognised. For 
example, lawyers only recognise "possessory" interest when 
considering ownership or property. As a result, I would 
See V.Held "Rights and Goods" op. cit. p. 173 
suggest that Honoré's analysis should be qualified to read: 
the "greatest rightful possessory interest" in a thing. Yet 
"possession" itself merely implies some sort of power or 
control over something, and there are, of course, cases where 
possession or control does not necessarily imply ownership. 
For example, if one has stolen something, it cannot be said 
that the person is the owner although he is in possession of 
the object.. There is, therefore, a distinction between the 
to possess and the mere physical possession of a thing. 
Further, one must question Honoré's use of the notion of a 
"liberal" concept of ownership. ̂^ It is not clear what is 
meant by this. That is, perhaps due to our rights over 
property we may be said to have certain powers to decide what 
to do with our property and to exclude others, and that this 
confers freedom. It is not clear whether Honoré is 
suggesting that property rights confer freedom to individual 
owners, and, if so, why call this analysis of ownership, a 
"liberal" one? It appears to me that it may be for two 
reasons : 
1) either Honoré is merely using "liberal" in a historic 
sense, that is, a tradition which emanates from Locke, 
or, 
2) he is using "liberal" to strongly assert individual 
rights and suggesting that property is the source of 
^̂  See A.Reeve. " Property" (Macmillan Education, 1986) p.16 
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rights. 
Certainly it can be said that property as a legal institution 
creates and protects certain private rights of the 
individual. As Reich has suggested, one of the functions of 
property is to draw a boundary between public and private 
power.^^ That is, property draws a circle around the 
activities of- each private individual or organisation. 
Within the circle the owner has a greater degree of freedom 
than without. Outside he must justify or explain his actions 
and show his authority. Within he is master, and others, 
including the State, must explain and justify any 
interference. It is in this sense that it appears as if 
property has shifted the burden of proof; outside, the 
individual has the burden; inside, the burden is on others 
and the government to demonstrate that something the owner 
wishes to do should not be done.'^ 
Although Honoré does not make it clear, perhaps he is making 
a distinction between the impact of public administration on 
what one owns in contrast to a liberal idea of property. That 
is, although under increased public administration we still 
talk of our "property", we are faced with increased 
^̂  C.Reich "The New Property" in The Yale Law Journal, Vol.73, 
1964. Reprinted in L.C.Becker and K.Kipnis (Ed.) "Property 
Cases, Concepts, Critiques", op.cit. p.109 
^^ Ibid. 
responsibilities which may impede, restrict, and even appear 
to negate our particular rights. In Reich's terms, public 
administration is encroaching into our circle. Certainly if 
we speak of a liberal notion of property we consider it to 
be rights-driven and the government is intended to protect 
those rights, yet with increased responsibilities and 
restrictions the converse appears to be true.. 
In addition, it may be asked whether Honoré considers there 
to be other concepts of ownership. Honoré merely states that 
he is describing the liberal concept of ownership. However, 
this seems to suggest that there may be others. If so, what, 
if anything, makes them all concepts of ownership? Perhaps, 
however, by using the term "liberal concept" of ownership 
Honoré merely avoids facing up to any issue of property which 
may be described in an absolute sense. Rather, the idea of 
a "liberal" concept of property may be seen as a device to 
describe the situation in which ownership allows for 
decisions to be made about the possession, use, destruction, 
etc. of a thing, subject to limitations, without specifying 
all the possible uses or all the actual or possible 
limitations. It is looking very like a liberal concept of 
ownership not in the Lockean sense, but the contemporary 
popular American sense of "liberal", in which "liberal" has 
often been a euphemism for socialist. 
As stated a b o v e , for H o n o r é , none of the particular features 
he has enumerated are n e c e s s a r y , although they may be jointly 
sufficient for a "person of inheritance" to be designated 
"owner" of a particular thing in a particular system.^^ As 
I understand H o n o r é , t h e n , we can also delineate between 
simple and complicated cases; simple cases being those in 
which things such as one's watch may be owned in the same way 
in all "mature" legal systems. ̂^ H o w e v e r , Honoré recognises 
that the category of things owned may vary from system to 
s y s t e m , and that all "mature" legal systems recognise 
ownership in some things, but not that they recognise all 
t h i n g s , nor the same things. 
A l t h o u g h it is not made clear why Honoré specifies that the 
incidents he has listed occur in a mature legal system, that 
is, how one would non-circularly identify such a system or 
what the criteria would be for a legal system to be m a t u r e , 
possibly he is making the distinction between those systems 
which have primary rules only, in H.L.A.Hart's sense, and 
those which have both primary and secondary rules as proposed 
by Hart.^' Primitive societies, according to H a r t , contain 
only primary r u l e s , which are closely related to morality and 
^̂  A . M . H o n o r é "Ownership" op.cit. p.112 
" Ibid. p.108 
H . L . A . H a r t "The Concept of Law" (Oxford University P r e s s , 
1961) pp.77-96 
to custom. They are the primary rules of obiigation.^^ 
Secondary rules are meta-rules which explain the primary 
rules, that is, by resolving the uncertainty of primary 
rules, they also accommodate changes and thirdly, are rules 
of adjudication. 
However, it must be noted that even primitive societies, that 
is, those which may only possess primary rules may also 
possess some form of property and understand the concept of 
ownership. After all, how otherwise could prohibitions 
against theft figure in the primary rules? 
Although Honoré suggests that ownership can be defined as the 
greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system 
of law recognises, he makes it clear that, in his view, 
ownership can still exist when the set of specific powers, 
rights, liberties and obligations is not complete. Yet Honoré 
goes on to highlight three of the rights as important, 
stating firstly, that the right to possess,^® that is, the 
right to exclusive physical control of a thing, is the 
"foundation on which the whole superstructure of ownership 
r e s t s " , a n d that the protection of the right to possess 
^^ Ibid. p. 91 
I make the distinction here between the right to possess and 
mere possession. 
A.M.Honoré op, cit. p. 113 
is achieved only where there are rules allotting exclusive 
physical control to one person rather than another.^" By the 
right to possess, I take it, this would not only include the 
right (claim) to be put in exclusive control of a thing, but 
the right to remain in control, that is, the claim that 
others should not interfere/^ 
According to Honoré, unless a legal system provides some 
rules and procedures for attaining these ends, it cannot be 
said to protect property. Further, for Honoré the right to 
use*̂  at one's discretion is a "cardinal feature" of 
ownership/^ Standard (legal) limitations are, in.general, 
rather precisely defined, while the permissible types of use 
constitute an open list. 
Thirdly, Honoré states that the right to security, which 
legally, is an immunity from expropriation, is an important 
aspect of the owner's position. ̂^ 
Ibid. p. 114 
^̂  One is not, however, entitled to exclude everyone from one's 
property, but this is a consequence of our particular legal 
system. 
On a wider interpretation, according to Honoré, this may 
include the right to manage and the right to income. 
Ibid. p. 116 
** Jiid.p. 119 
In the same spirit as Honoré, L.C. Becker in his analysis of 
the concept of ownership improves Honoré's list and expands 
the list of 11 incidents to 13 by splitting the right to 
capital into the right to consume or destroy/^ the right to 
modify and the right to alienate.^' Thus Becker further 
suggests that there may be various sub-sets of the list which 
may reasonably be regarded as ownership, that is, numerous 
combinations which may amount to ownership. On Becker's 
analysis^^, as with Honoré's, there is no one necessary 
condition for property, although Becker suggests (based on 
"nothing stronger than a feel for the semantic 
proprieties"^®) that among the rights which are sufficient 
to establish a claim to ownership are the right to capital 
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alone, or any paired combination of "some version of the 
right to security", that is, the right to immunity from 
expropriation, with the rights to possession, use, income, 
management, consumption or destruction, modification, 
Certainly the right to consume or destroy may be seen as 
distinct from the right to the capital. However, both 
these activities take value out of an object and may be 
said to run it down. 
L.C.Becker "The Moral Basis of Property Rights" in 
J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Ed.) "Property" NOMOS XXII 
(New York University Press, 1980) p. 192 
^^ Ibid. 
L.C.Becker "Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations" 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) p.20 
The "one who has the right to the capital is 
'fundamentally' the owner". L.C.Becker ihid p.20 
alienation or transmission. Based on nothing stonger than his 
understanding of English, the sufficiency of these elements 
allows for a person to have a property right, and that any 
further combination with the other elements in the list would 
also be considered as ownership. "Full ownership", however, 
includes all of the elements, whereas full exclusive 
ownership is full ownership, by an individual or a group, in 
cases where no other individual or group has any form of 
ownership in the same thing. ̂^ 
This then suggests that there is a very large number of 
possible forms that property may take if we look at the 
Honoré or up-dated Becker list of possible rights associated 
with ownership. However, this also suggests that there are 
many varieties of rights which may constitute "ownership", 
and many combinations of property rights which do not reach 
•the level of "full ownership". It also suggests that there 
may be something approaching varying "degrees" of ownership -
a view that, even merely based on our understanding of 
English appears questionable. What are these "non-full" 
instances of ownership degrees of? Surely they are merely 
cases of the amounts of interest one may have in a thing 
while not being the owner. One may conceivably have the right 
to capital, that is, the right to consume or destroy a thing. 
^̂  L.C.Becker "The Moral Basis of Property Rights" op.cit. 
p.192 
the right to modify it, or the right to alienate (sell, 
abandon, etc) of a thing without being' considered as the 
owner. For example, a bank may hold a mortgage on a house, 
having the right to sell it in given circumstances, yet we 
generally do not consider the bank to be the owner of the 
house (although we could argue that the owner has transfered 
his right to the bank by agreement). 
The possession by one individual of all of the claim-rights, 
duties, powers and liabilities with respect to a given thing, 
as set out by Honoré and Becker, may seem to illustrate what 
they consider to be the paradigm case of full (liberal) 
ownership, that is, that one person holds all the possible 
"incidents". This is obviously rarely the case. Some have 
argued, however, that, historically, this paradigm was 
perhaps realised for a short time in late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century America^^ by the original pioneers, 
but that this notion of "full ownership" appears to be of 
little practical importance in the late 20th Century. 
Empirically, of course, it does appear to be the case that 
social policy as applied by governments through legislation 
and other rules severely infringe on that classic set of the 
individual's proprietary rights. Further, it is often the 
case that many of the rights are not held by one and the same 
See A.Kernohan "Capitalism and Self-Ownership" in E.Frankel 
Paul, F.D.Miller, J.Paul and J.Ahrens (Ed.) "Capitalism" 
(Basil Blackwell, 1989) p.63 
person, so that the incidents go in different directions and, 
indeed, in some cases only some of the rights appear to be 
applicable at all. In addition, there may be more than one 
claim of ownership to a thing, and in some cases some 
individuals may have complete ownership of parts of a single 
whole. 
Further, Honoré's list does certainly take into consideration 
the practice of law in modern commercial life.^^ For 
example, the use of a thing can be sold separately from the 
thing itself, so that the rights pertaining to an object may 
be dispersed, as is the case with leases, sub-leases or 
hiring of machinery. Thus often those who we call "owners" 
in contemporary life make do with fewer than this full set 
of rights in things. For example, shareholders in 
corporations may hold some rights such as the right to income 
and the rights to security (an immunity from expropriation) 
and bequest, but not rights regarding the detailed management 
of the corporation. It could even be plausibly maintained 
that modern ownership patterns are typically of this sort.^^ 
It should also be noted that it is only since the mid-19th 
Century that shares themselves have been an entirely separate 
form of property, legal objects in their own right. This 
" See A.Reeve "Property" op.cit. p.20 
" A.Kernohan "Capitalism and Self-Ownership" op. cit. p. 63 
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recognition of the share as a new form of property has not, 
however, been without problems. Indeed the exact legal 
nature of this new form of property continues to elude even 
company lawyers. Lawyers know what a share is not — a direct 
5 4 
interest in the company's assets — but not what it is. For 
example, in defining the share, one leading company lawyer 
states: 
"A share is, therefore, a fractional part of the 
capital. It confers upon the holder a certain 
right to appropriate part of the assets of the 
corporation, whether by way of dividend or of 
distribution of assets in winding up. It forms, 
however, a separate right of property. The capital 
is the property of the corporation. The share, 
although it is .a fraction of the capital, is the 
property of the corporator. The aggregate of all 
the fractions if collected in two or three hands 
does not constitute the corporators the owners of 
the capital - that remains the property of the 
corporation. But, nevertheless, the share is a 
property in a fractional part of the capital 
„55 
^̂  P.Ireland, I.Grigg-Spall and D.Kelly "Conceptual 
Foundations of Modern Company Law" in P.Fitzpatrick and 
A.Hunt(Ed.) "Critical Legal Studies" (Basil Blackwell, 
1987) p.153 
" J Farrar "Company Law", 1985 reprinted P.Fitzpatrick and 
A.Hunt(Ed.) "Critical Legal Studies" ibid. p.134 
But this is neither coherent nor helpful. It appears that 
company lawyers also seem to have great difficulty in 
accommodating the major changes in the nature of the things 
we call property. Certainly the owner of a share of a company 
does hold certain rights with respect to that company, for 
example, the right to an income or to elect officers in that 
company, but the shareholder does not own the company and has 
no right to, for example, give orders to workmen. 
This separation of ownership and control is based on, 
arguably, an empirical presumption that ownership of the 
modern corporation is so diluted among the multitude of 
shareholders that this interests are essentially 
unrepresented when corporate management makes its decision. 
Sensible rejoiners to this charge have been made — that when 
the need arises, dispersed ownership will become sufficiently 
concentrated to give property guidance to, perhaps "boot 
out", an ineffective management such as in a takeover, a 
rebellion by a group of cooperating shareholders or the 
acquisition of large shareholdings by one or a few 
shareholders. These put a constraint on management even when 
they are not currently operative.^^ 
H.Demsetz "Ownership, Control and the Firm" (Basil 
Blackwell, 1988) pp.197-198 
In other, more obvious cases people have rights in a limited 
framework and still regard themselves as "owners". For 
example, one's house is subject to numerous council 
regulations and legislation, such as zoning laws, building 
regulations, limitations on the nature of its use, and 
pollution guidelines, yet one is still regarded as an 
"owner". One may not only appear to possess a limited number 
of rights, but those rights appear to be restricted. 
Further, often the legal concept embraces not so much a 
bundle of rights, as various bundles of heterogenous 
5 7 
rights. This fragmentation is most apparent in the branch 
of the law relating to land where it appears that two 
doctrines are employed to determine the content of the 
various bundles of rights. These are the doctrine of estates 
which divides rights on the basis of time,̂ ® and the 5 9 
doctrine of tenure, which divides rights on a qualitative 
basis. 
57 M.Crommelin "Economic Analysis of Property" in D.J.Galligan 
(Ed.) "Essays in Legal Theory" (Melbourne University Press, 
1984) pp.77-78 
5 6 An estate is an interest in land. An "absolute estate", for 
example, is one granted without condition or termination, 
whereas a conditional estate is one liable to divest on the 
fulfilment of a condition. Others include contingent 
estates, the right to the enjoyment of which will accrue on 
the happening of some event, and an estate in expectancy 
which one cannot enjoy until some future time. 
S 9 The mode of holding or occupying land. 
It appears then that various "owners" may hold different 
bundles of rights in one and the same thing. The fact that 
their bundles are not complete does not stop us calling them 
owners, yet can it be said that people own things to a 
greater or lesser degree? That is, that one can be a 
"partial owner"? As stated above, the holding of certain 
interests may merely entail that one holds an interest in a 
specific thing, but is not the owner. Thus we need to be 
careful of an ambiguity in the phrase "partial owner". 
I make the distinction here of having either "full ownership" 
according to Honoré's paradigm case, whereby all possible 
rights are held, or as I have stated and will discuss below, 
holding at least the core rights (which includes all other 
non-administrative rights) with respect to that thing, on the 
one hand, with holding these same rights, full (or core, as 
I will expand on later) in respect of a part of a (large) 
thing. An example here would be the ownership of a share of 
a company. One may hold rights and exercise them to the 
exclusion of others in pursuance of one's ownership of a 
particular share, but it cannot be said that the shareholder 
is a partial (full) owner in the same sense of control over 
the company. Part ownership or partial ownership can only 
mean ownership of a part. For example, there appears to be 
a general fallacy, a confusion in trying to translate a 
relationship to a part-relationship to a whole, between A has 
a relation to part of B, and A has a part-relation to B. For 
example, if I love a member of a family, I don't part-love 
that family, rather, I love part of the family. Similarly, 
if I hit part of a person, I do not part-hit that person, 
rather I have (fully) hit part of him, say, his arm. 
Further, I may own part of an airline, but it is not the case 
that I have a "part-owning" relationship to the airline — 
whatever that may be. Rather, one may say that I am the owner 
of a share in that (airline) company. The totality of 
shareholders constitute the owners of the whole of the 
company, and each shareholder wholly owns a part of the 
company. But there is also an important difference here 
between being a member of a family, and hitting a part of a 
person. A shareholder does not own an "identifiable" part 
of a company; at best he owns an identifiable part of the 
value of the company — a part that is proportionate to the 
scale of the shareholding — so that a share of a company is 
at best a metaphor — it is not a segregatable part that I 
could point to which is mine to the exclusion of all others. 
In all, I have not found Honoré's nor Becker's analyses of 
property and ownership convincing, and will therefore suggest 
an alternate view, using as a starting point our general 
understanding of rights. 
Innl 11 4 
PROPERTY AS THE RIGHT TO CONTROL 
1. Introduction. 
Although it may be argued that ownership consists of some 
sub-set of all the possible directive rights which may be 
held concerning a thing, I intend to argue that the terms 
"property" and "ownership" can, strictly speaking, only be 
applied in cases where one has the right to control a thing. 
The obvious consequence, that therefore we genuinely own very 
little of what we claim to own is one which reluctantly I 
embrace. 
The essential elements of the right of control, as I see it, 
are the rights to possess, to use and to dispose of a thing. 
What is more, if this is to constitute ownership, this right 
must be absolute. This means that it cannot be dislodged or 
nullified by other, more powerful rights. It is not a merely 
defeasible right, or what some would call a prima facie 
right; in no sense is it a right only relative to some other 
potentially competing rights. 
Further, I will argue that rights themselves may be 
considered in terms of Dworkin's "trumps", recognising the 
special force of rights — so that the holding of the right 
has the function of excluding certain actions by others, 
including actions that, in the absence of the right, would 
be considered reasonable and even highly desirable. The 
recognition of a right is recognition of its overriding 
character, which ought to be respected for its own sake and 
need not be defended by an estimate of its consequences. 
Rights can of course conflict, which is one reason why some 
people prefer to talk in terms of prima facie rights. 
However, a resolution of such a conflict does not mean that 
one right is more powerful, or may override the other. A 
resolution whereby one right is enforced leaves all rights 
intact, although decisions are made regarding the right to 
act on that right due to, say, desired outcomes or even due 
to sheer force. A right, which we may say is absolute, could 
never be dislodged by any prima facie right. But in calling 
a right "absolute", however, I am not implying that what one 
does with or to the thing owned is a matter of complete moral 
indifference. 
In calling ownership "absolute" the rights of possession, use 
and disposal jointly entail control and may be seen as the 
"rights of control". That is, anyone who is able to exercise 
these rights would in fact enjoy control. An analogy may. be 
made with the rights people have with regard to their bodies. 
That is, the rights of control a person may have over his or 
her body excludes others from making choices and 
determinations without one's permission.^ But it does not 
See also D.A. Lloyd Thomas "Liberty, Equality, Property" in 
Proceeding's of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement vol.XV. 
1981, p.181. However, I make this statement without 
imply that what a person does with, or to, his or her body 
is a matter of moral disinterest. 
There is a clear analogy between the rights of control people 
claim to have over their own bodies and the rights of control 
they have over what they genuinely own, that is, it may be 
said that in both cases we claim an overall right of control, 
and that this claim implies denial that others can ever have 
an overriding right to counter the exercise of that control, 
even when it is being exercised in a foolish or plainly 
immoral manner. 
Of course it may be argued that if rights are anything 
approaching the moral, legal or political "trumps" that 
Dworkin suggests they are, then in having a right to x, a 
person has a dangerously powerful weapon against everyone who 
may have reason to object to x, and even if this dominion is 
qualified in various ways, nevertheless that person has 
rights to the extent that he has a weapon against all others. 
As Flathman argues, "if the right is to property, it warrants 
Able, as Blackstone put it, in exercising sole and despotic 
dominion... over external tmngs ot the world" exercising 
prejudice to the question of whether one's body is one's 
property. 
^ See R.E.Flathman "On the Alleged Impossibility of an 
UnqualifiedDisjustificatory Theory of Property Rights" in 
J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman (Ed.) "Property" NOMOS XXII 
(New York University Press, 1980) p.221 
dominion over external things in the world impacts on 
resources that may be vital to the interests, objectives or 
well-being of other persons. 
As indicated earlier, however, this argument refers to one's 
general right to property, that is, what I have called one's 
"capacity" to own. Flathman's is an objection regarding 
inequality, not one concerning the nature of property rights. 
Rather, if we were to look at the specific rights associated 
with ownership, we may employ the notion, as suggested by 
Nozick, that rights are to be thought of as "side 
constraints", (and not merely "trumps" as proposed by 
Dworkin) that is, blocks or constraints on the actions of 
others, limits on the actions that are morally available to 
an. agent - the rights of others may determine the constraints 
on your actions - then these would require an agent to 
"refrain from performing actions of a specific type".^ I 
would suggest, further, that although it may be argued that 
the rights of possession, of disposal and particularly of use 
(that is, the rights which are the elements of the right of 
control) may be*subject to restrictions or "side constraints" 
as suggested by Lloyd Thomas,^ these limitations are 
ultimately restrictions on and determined by the effect of, 
say, one's use. That is, we need to distinguish between the 
^ J.Waldron "Rights in Conflict" in Ethics 99. 1990, p.503 
^ D.A.Lloyd Thomas, op. cit. p.181 
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possession of a right, the right to exercise that right in 
a given context or set of circumstances, and the consequences 
of acting upon that right. The fact that a right is absolute 
does not entail that one always has the right to exercise 
that right. Limitations on the exercise of one's rights are 
based on the extrinsic effects of the exercise of those 
rights. If it were technologically possible to do whatever 
one was doing by, with, or to, the thing owned in a way that 
bypassed that extrinsic effect (an option which may turn out 
to be no more than a logical possibility in some cases) then 
the point of the side constraints would lapse. In other 
words, it is our right to exercise our right, and not the 
right itself, that is qualified. By making this distinction, 
it can be shown that rights are absolute, and if we admit 
that restrictions on one's actions occur, this does not mean 
that the restrictions are on the right itself. Rather, these 
are restrictions on the exercise of one's right due to 
possible harmful consequences to other by one's actions. 
That is, we may still say that I have, for example, the right 
of control over my arm, but not the right to punch you. If 
it were possible for me to transcribe the same motion with 
my arm without punching you, that possibility would escape 
the side constraint. Similarly, we may say that I have the 
right of possession, of use and disposal of the knife which 
I own, but I do not have the right to stab you. If my arm, 
blade in hand, were to describe an identical motion, but with 
no other human being in the vicinity, it would be, morally 
speaking, quite unproblematic. Further, if we were to take 
another example of something I may own — say a factory — I 
have the right of control, that is, the right of possession, 
of use and of disposal of the factory. Nevertheless, we can 
arguably say, however, that I do not have the right to 
pollute the neighbouring area. Once again, if I could use the 
factory in the same way, but containing the pollution so that 
it never impacted on any person or thing beyond my property 
line, the case for restricting my use would lapse. 
In each case it is the effect of my use of my property which 
is at issue, and not whether I have the right of control. 
If I could do whatever I was doing and seal its effects from 
the neighbourhood, the case for restricting what I was doing 
would lapse. In this sense, it can be said that it is only 
when the effect or consequence of the exercise of these 
rights comes into conflict with rights of other people (and 
possibly of animals) that I may be legitimately restricted 
in the exercise of my right, and then only to the extent that 
it is not technologically possible to prevent the effects of 
my conduct without preventing my conduct. 
But this is not to say, however, that the rights are not 
absolute - to have this absolute right of control is what I 
designate absolute ownership. That is, my ownership of 
something entails my rights to possess, to use and to dispose 
of the thing which is my property, and these are exclusive. 
However, there may be restrictions or constraints which 
derive from other peoples' rights. That is, I may be limited 
in the de facto exercise of my rights of control by the 
constraint that the consequences of that exercise should not 
violate other peoples' rights. Conversely, my rights 
legitimate and protect my use, etc. as they too have the 
status of limiting other peoples' behaviour towards me, and 
generate "side constraints" requiring them to plot their own 
conduct so as to avoid the production of certain effects. 
I am not arguing, however, that these rights are defeasible; 
rather, my idea of rights in general is that they should 
function as a blocking device or be considered in terms of 
Dworkin's "trumps" - that the holding of the right has the 
function of excluding certain actions by others. Where an 
action would on balance bring about a desirable result, but 
violates certain rights, the assertion of rights will 
normally take precedence. In general, however, a restriction 
on the way in which a right may be exercised is not 
necessarily a limitation of the right itself, nor does it 
necessarily represent subordination or defeat in favour of 
an overriding right. My right to vote, for example, must be 
exercised by my attending a polling booth on a specific day, 
or by my completing an appropriate absentee form. These are 
hardly limitations or restrictions on my right to vote, 
though they clearly restrict, in a very narrow way, how I may 
exercise it. 
In characterising the position more exactly, we must take 
care to distinguish circumstances which constitute 
contingencies which negate the existence of the right, from 
circumstances which limit, even very severely, how the right 
may be exercised. That is, it is possible to claim both that 
the rights of control — the rights to possess, to use and to 
dispose — are absolute, and yet there may nevertheless be 
very good reasons, morally speaking, for the State or other 
agencies to prevent someone exercising their rightful control 
in a certain way, or in any way at all, because there is no 
practically possible way for them to do so which does not 
yield consequences others are unable to control. 
I would argue then that an owner must possess certain rights, 
(which can be derived from the Honoré scheme), but that, 
given the various rights we associate with ownership of a 
thing, there are those rights which are essential, and which 
constitute a core group of rights — and that these are 
constitutive of the single comprehensive right of control. 
It is this group which constitutes what I consider to be 
property or ownership. That is, the rights to possess, to 
use, and to dispose of a thing, and which entail an 
exclusivity of the owner towards that thing. 
2. Ricrhts — Some General Observations. 
The literature on rights, of course, is immense and presents 
us with no.sign of a general agreement on their nature, their 
definition or their source, or on their basic moral principle 
or justification on which they rest.^ When one talks of 
rights, one can mean one of several very different things. 
One might mean peoples' moral claims, or mean people's rights 
as established and recognised in law, and this would involve 
weighing up of evidence as to whether they are so established 
or not. Or one might mean, how far can such moral claims be 
established in law: "What is their content? Are they clear? 
Do they meet the pre-requisite for efficient enforcement by 
the legal system?"^ 
What is clear is that the notion of a right cannot be 
explained either as referring to or denoting any kind of 
entity, or as being equivalent to, or mutually implicative 
See E.Kamenka "Human Rights: People's Rights" in Bulletin 
of the Australian Society of Lecral Philosophy, No. 33, 1985. 
p.156 
' L.V.Prott "Cultural Rights as Peoples' Rights in 
International Law" in Bulletin of the Australian Society of 
Lethal Philosophy No. 36,1986. p.4 
with, any of the notions with which it commonly keeps 
company, such as duty or obligation, ought, liberty, power, 
privilege, or claim. Nor can it be reduced to the notions of 
right and w r o n g / (Altnough it may be explained or understood 
by reference to these other notions). 
Without expanding greatly on theories of rights, I 
acknowledge that much has been written concerning whether any 
or indeed all rights are in some sense absolute,® that is, 
can never be overridden, or whether (some or all) rights are 
defeasible. These issues, together with consideration of 
rights as liberties, powers, entitlements, immunities from 
9 
interference, whether positive duties are entailed (and, if 
so, whether they are duties of designated individuals or some 
abstraction such as "the community") and whether rights may 
be seen as interests morally deserving of protection, mean 
it is hardly surprising that some commentators have said that 
our common notion of rights is loose, ambiguous, and 
10 
vague. 
When we speak of rights, they are often considered in the 
^ A.R.White "Rights" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p.173 
® Although perhaps less has been written on the idea of 
absolute rights. 
Particularly as based upon Hohfeld's analysis of rights. 
^̂  See L.W.Sumner "The Moral Foundation of Rights" (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987) p.50. 
following manners: 
1) Rights sometimes are thought of as legitimate 
"interests", that is, a right is assigned a greater 
weight than ordinary interests and therefore counts for 
more in utilitarian or welfarist calculations, but in 
principle it can be outweighed. A similar interest or 
competing right matched against it, or a sufficient 
quantity of more mundane interests will ensure that it 
is not conclusive in generating a final requirement.^^ 
In other words rights are defeasible as, logically, they 
can be pitted against each other. By this model a right 
can always conflict with another right and one must be 
successful over the other. 
2) On a second model, the interests protected by rights are 
given "lexical priority" over other interests.^' They 
are to be protected and promoted to the greatest extent 
possible before other interests are even taken into 
consideration. This then makes rights absolute against 
considerations of mere utility, but still allows for 
what Nozick would have considered the utilitarianism of 
rights, that is, the maximising of fulfilment of the 
11 J.Waldron (Ed.) "Theories of Rights" (Oxford University 
Press, 1984) p.15 
^̂  J.Rawls "A Theory of Justice" (Oxford University Press, 
1971) pp.42-45 
rights and minimising of the violations of rights when 
they come into conflict. 
3) However, a third model may be seen as the most 
controversial and suggests that rights are not 
particular interests or lexically weighted interests. 
They may be understood as the basis of strict 
constraining requirements.^^ That is, the (moral) 
function of a right is to render morally impermissible 
certain forms of behaviour of other people which we 
would regard as transgressing the right of the 
right-holder. Indeed, it is arguable that it is morally 
impermissible to even seriously entertain the prospect 
of deliberately engaging in such behaviour. For example, 
your having a right not to be tortured makes it wrong 
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even to contemplate torturing you. This model is put 
forward by Nozick - rights so understood can conflict 
with each other, but the outcome may simply depend upon 
adjudication or even force. 
Similarly, we may follow Dworkin's argument which closely 
resembles alternative (2), above, and say that rights can 
best be understood as "trumps" over some background 
^̂  J.Waldron op.cit. p. 15 
^̂  See A.Gewirth "Are There Any Absolute Rights" in J.Waldron 
(Ed.) "Theories of Rights" op. cit. 
justification for political decisions that states a goal for 
the community as a whole. ̂^ That is, an individual has a 
right despite the fact that normally decisive considerations 
of the general interest (or other collective goals) would 
argue against the assignment. For example, if someone has a 
right to publish pornography, then this means that it is for 
some reason wrong for officials to act in violation of that 
right, even if they (correctly) believe that the community 
as a whole would be better off if they did. ̂^ Thus rights 
can be distinguished from goals or political aims. 
Further, we may apply this model to the particular rights we 
may have with respect to things as property, for example, our 
land, pitted against the political or social goals 
governments may have while enforcing their right to resume 
our land by state acquisition. Or, for example, in the case 
of the job that I have created, the rights connected to this 
may be pitted against the government's racial or 
1 7 anti-discrimination legislation. 
^̂  R.Dworkin "Taking- Rights Seriously" (Duckworth, 1977) p.XI 
^̂  R.Dworkin "Rights as Trumps" in J.Waldron (Ed.) "Theories 
of Rights" op. cit. p.153 
^̂  This of course may depend upon the goverment' s intention or 
its policies in enforcing, for example, a particular ideal. 
However, it may also be the case that the government is 
corrupt and may be said to be stealing the land, or that 
the ideology is corrupt. 
Property rights, however, like rights in general, are 
commonly left unanalysed in the jurisprudential literature 
or, what comes to the same thing, they are "defined" by 
synonyms such as "claims" or "that which is due someone", or 
according to category such as "moral", "utilitarian", or 
"legal". Nevertheless, in the broader literature on 
rights, it has become common to distinguish between claim-
rights and liberty-rights. We may generally note that rights 
that are recognised as claims have achieved at least a 
special kind of endorsement or success: legal rights by a 
legal system; human rights by widespread sentiment or an 
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international order. When we say that a person has a right 
to something, we at least mean that he has a claim to it. But 
it must mean more than that; that is, one could present 
claims of all kinds, but many may not be rights. Equally, one 
may possess rights that one does not in fact claim, or which 
one is physically or intellectually incapable of claiming. 
Generally, claims represented as rights are claims that are 
"often, perhaps usually, presented as having a special kind 
of importance, urgency, universality or endorsement that 
M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op. cit. p.13 
H.J.McCloskey, however, considers rights to be entitlements 
to certain things and do not necessarily make claims on 
others. H.J.McCloskey "Rights" in Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol.15, 1965. 
makes them more than disparate or simply subjective 
demands". It is not required that all right holders, 
however, actually themselves be claimants, for example, the 
ignorant, the oppressed and the intellectually retarded may 
not even believe they really do have the rights which others 
claim on their behalf. What makes a claim of right 
successful politically, is endorsement by a government or 
other public agency that has power to grant and protect such 
rights, or recognition within a tradition or by an 
institution whose authority is accepted within the relevant 
regional, national or international community. 
The adoption of a particular conception of a right will, of 
course, structure the way in which we view the nature and 
function of all rights; yet the denotation of "right" is not 
sufficiently stable to serve as a benchmark for whether a 
particular conception of a right should or should not be 
acceptable. 
Leaving to one side the broader question of the nature of 
rights for the moment, it seems relatively safe to say at 
least that one cannot easily separate human rights from 
property rights. Much of the literature agrees persuasively 
that the concept of a right beyond that guaranteed by a 
particular legal system is coherent and morally defensible. 
^°E.Kamenka op. cit. p. 148 
Further, while the common theological and metaphysical bases 
for natural rights may, arguably, not be adequate, there is 
a basis in human nature for rights which apply to all human 
beings regardless of their membership or status in a 
particular legal system - they call attention to interests 
independent of their citizenship in a particular State or 
membership in a particular society. These rights, like their 
"natural" ancestors can be asserted "against the world", that 
is, they constitute valid demands even though they are not 
actually met at a given time or place; and even if they are 
not ever contemplated within a particular legal order. That 
fact constitutes a criticism of that legal order - it 
provides a moral basis for censuring a State or society which 
refuses to protect these interests. For example, my right to 
vote and my right to speak on issues may be equated with 
property rights because they define the relationship between 
-myself and other people, that is, (without reducing all 
rights to property rights^^j wnat can be said is that 
property rights apply to all rights of an individual vis-a-
vis other people. Property rights are relations between 
individuals - they specify the norms of behaviour regarding 
things that are owned, or, in economic terms, "economic 
^̂  Although in this sense it may be argued that it is plausible 
to construe all rights as property rights. See J.Narveson 
"The Libertarian Idea" op. cit. p.66 
goods" . ̂^ 
In addition, the common distinction between positive and 
negative rights is also generally accepted. By "positive" 
rights it is understood that (except in very special 
circumstances) these exist only as a result of people 
undertaking the obligations that correspond to those rights 
such as by making a mutually binding promise or contract. 
That is, when a person comes to have a right by virtue of a 
contract, someone else comes to have an obligation; but the 
only person who has an obligation is the person who 
voluntarily incurred it by entering into an agreement. 
"Negative" rights, on the other hand, are non-contractual -
they are negative rights to non-interference from others, and 
others have a duty to forbear. That is, if it is a negative 
right, someone's claim to X is a right which he has against 
the entire world, including the State - the duty to forbear 
or not to interfere is universal (X being something like the 
freedom from physical interference) and the duty or 
obligation is on others. We usually think of property as 
entailing negative rights, that is, as grounds for negative 
claims to be let alone to "hold, keep and enjoy what you 
^̂  S.Pejovich "The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a 
Theory of Comparative Systems" (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1990) p.27 
lawfully acquire as your own".^^ Property rights imply 
obligations on the part of everyone else, regardless of their 
consent, and irrespective of their social position. 
The distinction between these two ideas of rights is that if 
rights are thought of as negative, then, so long as they are 
universally respected, it seems that there can be no 
conflicts. But of course the mere fact that we have rights 
does not guarantee that they are respected - thieves, 
murderers, terrorists, etc., may violate our rights, but the 
point is that our rights cannot be overridden without the 
right-holder's consent. 
It is a commonplace within what is now called classical 
liberalism to hold that private property is the basis of 
liberty, and whatever else they may be, property rights are 
examples of "liberty rights". ̂^ In general, I have full 
liberty only when I may either do or not do something, 
without externally imposed impediment, the root idea being 
that people are to be allowed to whatever they want to do. 
So long as any trains of actions are conceivable, and really 
instantiable, the question can only be whether a given sort 
23 F Michelman "Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional 
Property" in E.Frankel Paul and H.Dickman (Eds.) "Liberty 
Property and the Future of Constitutional Development" 
(State University of New York Press, 1990) p.128 
^̂  L.W.Sumner " The Moral Foundation of Rights" op, cit. p.71 
of action - the exercise of liberty in a particular way -
will "collide" with actions which are the legitimate 
liberties of others. ̂^ But this is not unique to rights as 
they relate to property. That is, although some have argued 
that property rights are more problematic than other rights, 
it is evident that if, for example one has the right to 
freedom of speech, that is, the right to exercise the 
particular rights one holds under that freedom, such as the 
right to speak as one sees fit, this enhances one's freedom, 
but may correspondingly restrict the freedom of others. ̂^ 
Thus, although the exercise of one's rights may come into 
conflict with someone else's exercise of their rights, 
adjudication or a decision may be necessary, but this does 
not mean that one's right has been overridden. 
Nozick in particular treats rights as negative, construing 
them as providing side constraints and as being exhaustive -
trumping all other moral considerations; thus rights have 
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a "secure absolute character". Rights, then, cannot be 
overridden for the sake of public welfare, nor for the sake 
of other rights nor for any other reason. The Nozick view is, 
of course, contentious and against the idea that rights are 
^̂  J.Narveson op. cit. p. 81 
^̂  G F Gaus and L.E.Lomansky "Are Property Rights Problematic?" 
in The Monist Vol.73, No.4. 1990. p.484 
^̂  J.Wolff "Robert Nozick - Property, Justice and the Minimal 
State" (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991) p.23 
negative, the utilitarian may say that we have no moral 
2 8 
rights whatsoever beyond the right to "be counted as one" 
in the utilitarian calculus, while certain socialists and 
liberal egalitarians may argue that rights are not exhaustive 
and that there are other values such as the preservation of 
the natural environment which may override rights in some 
cases. 
If we accept that there are general and specific rights, then 
here we may make a distinction between a general liberty, 
which corresponds to a general right to property, and a 
specific liberty, associated with a specific right to a 
specific item of property. A society in which there were no 
general right to property — if indeed such a society is 
conceivable — would be one in which people did not enjoy the 
freedom to deal with some resources in ways that they decided 
for themselves, irrespective of the wishes of them. A person 
who enjoys a specific right to a specific item of property 
enjoys a freedom in relation to how that item is dealt with, 
a freedom which is not enjoyed at that time by other members 
of the community, with regard to the same item of property. 
This freedom is protected by rules which prohibit any 
interference in relation to that particular property. 
There seems, however, to be an ambiguity in the application 
Ibid, p.23 
of the term "property" which appears to correspond to an 
ambiguity of "rights". That is, a distinction may be made 
between what are often deemed to be "natural rights" and 
those that are seen as "conventional rights" (which may be 
equated with the idea of general and particular rights). For 
example, it could be argued that it is not the case that 
everyone has the moral, pre-legal or general (natural) right 
to whatever posses^sions or things he is allowed to enjoy in 
the system of laws under which he lives. Exiled criminals 
living in South America, for example, may have their fortunes 
recognised as legitimate possessions by the local regime so 
that these particular possessions may be rightful in positive 
law, under particular rights, (in a conventional sense) but 
not in natural or moral law.'' However, either form of 
rightfulness will justify the conventional application of the 
word "property", so that whoever has a right may be said to 
have a title, something which entitles him or which we may 
say gives him a sort of ticket of justification to do or be 
given so and so, to be or to feel such and such. Though the 
possession of this does not entail the rightness or wrongness 
of certain behaviour, it does provide a strong reason, moral, 
legal or otherwise for or against certain behaviour. A 
person's right gives him immunity from at least certain sorts 
of criticism for what he does, and conversely, one's 
On a Hobbesian account there would be no rights beyond those 
which are institutionally recognised. 
possession of a right can expose others to possible criticism 
for interfering. 
A further familiar distinction which has often been made is 
that between a right "absolute" and a right ''prima facie''. 
Although one could argue that both are in fact rights, that 
a prima facie right is merely a defeasible right which, in 
the absense of a conflicting right, would be an absolute 
right, I would contend that a distinction can be .made between 
a genuine right (call it "absolute") and one which only 
appears to be a right. 
Although the general philosophical discussion of prima facie 
rights is unclear, it may be argued that if rights are 
potentially prima facie, then it can be said that all rights 
are prima facie rights, that is, other rights may override 
them. However, if a right is merely "prima facie" in this 
manner, then it may be said to only "appear" to be a right. 
That is, on closer inspection, it is evident that what 
appeared to be a right, in fact was not. Although it is often 
argued that these may have to yield to "other" rights with 
greater stringency,^" I would argue that a prima facie 
right is no more a species of right, or a way of being a 
right, than is an alleged criminal a species of criminal, or 
a way of being a criminal. To suggest otherwise is to commit 
See V.Held "Rights and Goods" op, cit. p. 171 
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the common modal fallacy invoivecl in treating intentional 
tags as dividing the reference of the terms, to which they 
are attached. 
It can be argued, rather, that rights themselves are not 
limited, and although rights that are associated with, say, 
ownership may appear to be limited, it is instead the 
exercise of those rights which may be limited (if that 
exercise cannot but harm others). The effect or consequences 
of one's actions, particularly in dealing with things deemed 
to be one's property, are inseparable from the use of one's 
property. As such, it may appear that the right is limited, 
whereas in fact it is one's action, the consequences of 
acting upon one's right, that is limited. 
It is imperative that we do not, however, fall into the 
common trap of confusing the idea of a prima facie right, 
that is, an apparent right which may turn out not to be so. 
in the light of further information, and the fact that 
certain activities associated with what are unequivocally 
genuine rights which may in fact be directed, limited, or 
restricted in the circumstances of their exercise. It must 
be stressed that in the case of what is described as a prima 
facie right which is overridden, a person does not then and 
there possess the relevant right at all. 
This must be contrasted with the case in which, for some 
reason, which may be morally very good or morally very bad 
— that is a separate issue in each case — a person is not 
permitted to exercise or act upon a right he enjoys in the 
way or in the circumstances he may most prefer. An analogy 
may be made with, for example, the right to freedom of 
speech. That is, even if particular speech may be regarded 
as controversial or harmful, the ricrht to freedom of speech 
still remains, and this right is not dependent upon the 
considered outcome as to whether particular speech will do 
harm or good. However, it cannot be said that one's freedom 
of speech can never be interfered with. Free speech is a 
legally protected interest, whether it be in an individual's 
interest in "self development, or a social interest in the 
general benefits of a marketplace of ideas". ̂^ But the 
propagating of racist views may be considered as abhorent in 
a particular "marketplace", and in circumstances of extreme 
racial tension it might be necessary for the particular 
speech to be curtailed. However, it is the right to exercise 
one's right to freedom of speech in this particular case 
which is overridden, and not one's freedom of speech. 
It is, on this analysis, the result or effect of the 
particular action, which is the basis of the intervention -
the actual right to freedom of speech remains. If the effect, 
^̂  S.R.Munzer. "A Theory of Property" op, cit. p. 50 
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which is contingently related, could be severed, the case for 
the restriction would go. For example, if one could utter the 
same (racist) statement where no racial tension existed, then 
there would be no reason for the intervention. Similarly, one 
may say that one still has a general right to property, but 
that the result or effect of one's utilisation of the right 
to a particular item of property may be overridden. That is, 
one would not be permitted to exercise one's right in certain 
circumstances. 
To show that the holding of a (general) right and one's 
acting upon that right can be quite separate issues, we may 
differentiate between, for example, the value we place upon 
the holding of a right and the exercise of that right. We 
may, for example, value holding a very exclusive right of 
membership to swim at a prestigious swimming pool yet have 
no desire to exercise that right; or perhaps I value the 
right that my life may be terminated by suicide or euthanasia 
even if I do not exercise this. People choose to exercise 
rights when they believe the gains from such actions are 
beneficial. Conversely, people fail to exercise rights when 
the gains are deemed insufficient. In economic terms it is 
said that people choose to exercise rights when they believe 
"the gains from such actions will exceed their costs" ̂^ and 
Y.Barzel "Economic Analysis of Property Rights" (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) p.65 
conversely, people fail to exercise rights when the gains 
from owning properties are deemed insufficient. As conditions 
change, however, something that has been considered not 
worthwhile to own may be newly perceived as worthwhile. 
Similarly, we may also make the distinction between rights 
we may hold but which we are unable or not permitted to 
exercise. Americans value the right to bear arms, but most 
of them also appreciate that the circumstances in which arms 
may be used, or even displayed, should be subject to the most 
severe restrictions. There is no inconsistency here, provided 
we insist on the distinction between those things that limit 
our rights, and those that limit the circumstances in which 
we may exercise those rights. ̂̂  By making this distinction 
we can see why it is that, if the circumstances which are the 
basis for restricting our exercise of a given right are 
removed, we can then exercise that right without further ado. 
Moreover, our having the right is both an argument for and 
— if we value it highly — a motivation for removing the 
circumstances which inhibit our exercise. 
In summary, like a decision not to exercise one's right, a 
legal and/or moral constraint on one's exercising a right, 
does not have the slightest tendency to show one does not 
^̂  See below for Dworkin's distinction between rules and 
principles. 
have it, any more than a ban on my paying my bus fare in one 
cent pieces means I do not have the value of the fare. 
As the examples make clear, restrictions per se do not entail 
that one's right is defeasible, is limited, or has been 
overridden by other rights. Rather, it indicates how a right 
is to be exercised. Of course, it is always possible for 
someone to represent cases such as these as cases of one's 
right being overridden or defeated by other considerations, 
including certain rights of others, but we do not have to 
understand it in that way, and as the examples show, we do 
not normally so understand such situations. Similarly, it 
may be the case that one may either choose not to exercise 
one's rights in respect of one's property, if that exercise 
endangers others, or may be forbidden from exercising these 
rights. Yet we may still value holding those rights, and 
look to inventing strategies for exercising them that avoid 
the harm to others that is currently unavoidable. 
If one really does own something, one must own it in an 
absolute sense, that is, one has the right to do what one 
likes with it. However, as in the case, for example, of one's 
(voluntary) right to vote, it may be (morally) wrong in a 
particular instance to exercise that right - say if my 
attending a polling booth puts my sick, dependent family 
member at risk if left unattended. Similarly, in some 
instances it may be wrong to exercise one's rights with 
respect to one's property. In both cases it is due to the 
fact that in the exercise of one's rights the effects cannot 
be practically detached from the conduct that is constitutive 
of exercising the right. 
I have stressed we should recognise the distinction between 
the holding of certain rights and the effects of the exercise 
of those rights, and that we sometimes choose how we will 
exercise particular rights, with an eye to minimising any 
undesirable side effects on third parties. However, it 
appears that in the case of one's property many restrictions 
have been placed upon the use of our property, that is, upon 
the exercise of our rights, which go well beyond the 
necessity of protecting third parties. 
For example, the factory owner may be restricted in the use 
of his machinery by the enforcement of laws which prohibits 
pollution. This protects third parties from the harm, say, 
of dangerous chemicals which may be emitted from the factory. 
However, there appears to be an increasing number of 
restrictions such as legislative requirements and other 
regulations^^ which go well beyond the protection of third 
parties from damage - that is, which limit the. effects or 
See for example R.A.Epstein "Takings - Private Property and 
the Power of Eminent Domain" (Harvard University Press, 
1985) 
"spill-over" harm caused by the use of one's property. 
Increasingly restrictions, limitations and regulation of our 
property appear to simply be furthering particular social 
policies; for example, particular aesthetic requirements for 
buildings, or even, arguably, employment regulations 
requiring the hiring of particular persons under affirmative 
action programmes. 
Here ownership appears to be compromised in favour of some 
positive public purpose. (Some utilitarian defenders of 
private ownership would represent this as a conflict between 
public purposes, since they argue that private ownership is 
itself instrumental in furthering such public purposes as the 
efficient and responsive development and exploitation of 
scarce resources.) At a political level, I would argue that 
our property rights are given very little recognition — the 
law in many cases is so restrictive that it is inconsistent 
with its own "recognition" of our rights. 
The exercise of ownership rights is in fact increasingly 
seriously circumscribed by provisions to which I will draw 
attention in the concluding chapter, although some are very 
obvious, such as sizeable taxation, the regulation of 
business of all sizes and kinds, ̂^ including the employment 
See T.R.Machan "Human Rights and Human Liberties" (Nelson 
Hall, 1975) p.122 
restrictions imposed by anti-discrimination and so-called 
equal opportunity laws. 
Generally, and loosely, it may be said that if there is an 
"ordinary ideal" when we speak of property it is the 
exclusi ve control and use of a thing*. However, when we 
enumerate the various rights (and liabilities) associated 
with any particular thing we "own", we find that rarely are 
we able to enjoy all of these "incidents". ̂^ 
We must, of course, acknowledge that on any analysis there 
are "fuzzy areas" as a result of which we may not be able to 
either decide on who is the owner, given other interests by 
different people, and it is conceivable that given various 
interests it is not clear whether in fact there is an owner. 
(It would, of course, be fallacious to equate our inability, 
on occasion, to determine who, if anyone, really is the owner 
of something, with an indeterminacy in the concept of 
ownership.) Adjudication is therefore often necessary in 
practice for a decision to be made by the courts in disputed 
cases - marginal cases are usually the stuff of litigation. 
In some cases empirical questions of fact will need to be 
resolved; in others, the facts may be irretrievably lost, so 
that arbitration or some convention-based resolution is 
necessary. 
^̂  I use "incident" in Honoré's sense here. 
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Most societies have some form of adjudication, that is, a 
system for implementing rules which act as tie-breakers or 
act to break deadlocks based on insufficiency of information, 
or otherwise irresolvable conflicts of available information. 
Where relevant facts are irretrievable, conventions function 
as tie-breakers. For example, in New South Wales lost 
property becomes the property of the finder if there is no 
one who can show that he has a better claim to the object 
within a specified period. 
But leaving aside genuinely fuzzy areas and the need for 
conventional tie-breakers, the fact remains that we have so 
many restrictions and stipulations, which suggest that what 
I called the "ordinary ideal" is rarely, if ever, 
instantiated. In many cases we have some rights (e.g. 
acknowledged or given to us by law) but these may not be 
sufficient to entail property in the sense of this "ordinary 
ideal". Yet in many cases we still call it "property". How 
is this to be understood? Given the scale of contemporary 
restrictions, perhaps we should merely say that we have 
government and other social rules which dispense rights by 
some plan or other that allows for different "interests", but 
not that we still have property according to a strict 
interpretation, although we still might call it "property". 
That is, our conversational talk, of property may merely 
reflect the pre-history of modern social arrangements, just 
as our talk of the sun "rising" in the east and "setting" in 
the west reflects pre-Copernican astronomy. 
I acknowledge that many of the restrictions may be justified, 
or said to be necessary, but given the extent to which they 
infringe on one's use of things, perhaps we should no longer 
call it "property". Our choice here will reflect the extent 
to which we are linguistic puritans. 
Perhaps we may say that "absolute" rights are being replaced 
by qualified rights, that is, the exercise of the rights is 
limited by the laws of the community which prohibit certain 
behaviour and actions to . a degree that we can no longer 
apply, for example, Dworkin's "trumps" analogy of rights. 
However, we may suggest here that rights themselves are not 
qualified, but limitations upon our actions go further than 
recognising our rights. As a result, it appears that the best 
we can say is that, in practice, we have a "proprietary 
interest" in a thing rather than property or ownership if the 
exercise of our rights to possess, use and dispose of things 
— our control of things — are being eroded by government 
intervention. But this would suggest that the residue of the 
proprietary interests, that is, those we do not enjoy, belong 
elsewhere. This could only be in the State, which lies 
behind these public agencies which direct and limit our use 
of what we continue to misdescribe as our property. Of course 
the State does not claim ownership, although there is, it 
appears, some truth in what many take to be the overly 
dramatic claim that the regulatory State has, in effect, 
socialised, without direct compensation, economically and 
socially significant property, without the intermediate step 
of nationalisation or formal and explicit expropriation. Like 
Rousseau, the modern regulatory State compensates for its 
restrictive behaviour only by awarding us the common right 
to participate in the new public good benefit it intends as 
a result. 
3. Absolute Propertv — Absolute Ricrhts? 
It may be argued that there is no property in an asolute 
sense, that is, independent of considerations of the 
interests of the community. It may be argued that 
urbanisation and greater population densities have simply 
made more evident the fundamental impossibility of absolute 
property rights in this sense. Conceding one owner total 
discretion in the use of certain land, for example, without 
restraint or liability for harm caused cannot be reconciled 
with comparable rights of any value in his neighbours. 
That is, one could argue that to permit X to do absolutely 
37 
C Donahue, T.E.Kauper and P.W.Martin (Ed.) "Property: An 
Introduction to the Concept and the Institution" op.cit. 
p.1037 
what he likes with his property would be to make property in 
general valueless. 
I will argue, however, that: 
1) the idea of absolute ownership or property rights is not 
totally implausible, and that 
2) an idea of absoluteness with regard to property and rights 
which takes into consideration "side constraints" that is, 
limitations on only the harmful effects of one's actions 
may reveal that there are not different "sorts" of 
property relationships but only one true understanding of 
ownership. 
When we talk of ownership, of owning something, we generally 
speak in relation to particular people and particular things. 
That is, the essence of ownership and what we call property 
certainly seems clearest in the sense of an individual's 
domination or control over a particular thing - a near 
absolute ownership which has its roots in Roman law in which 
the owner has absolute title to the property object, absolute 
right to dispose of it, with very few public law restrictions 
over its use.̂ ® Certainly the standard legal definition of 
ownership reads: the right to the exclusive enjoyment of a 
P.G.Hollowell "On the Operation of Property" in 
P.G.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social Relations 
(Heinemann, 1982) p.29 
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thing. Hence we may infer that the constitutive rights 
are absolute. 
Further, ownership as we generally understand it, involves 
the free as well as exclusive enjoyment, including the right 
of using, altering, disposing of or destroying the thing 
owned. Ownership is then also of indeterminate duration in 
the sense that it is terminable only by the deliberate act 
of the owner by, for example, selling it or giving it away. 
Some have argued, however, that the idea of "absolute 
property" is merely a conceptual device whereby we imagine 
someone with a perfect title (that is, unqualified in any 
way) to a thing, who can do what he likes with it, without 
sharing it unless he wishes, and who can transfer these 
rights to someone else, since ownership has no temporal 
limit.^^ However, this seems to confuse the notion of 
absolute with "unencumbered freehold". ̂^ For example, 
Macpherson means by absolute, the "unfettered discretion of 
an owner, unencumbered by customary or communal claims upon 
Osborne's Concise Law Dictionary. Sixth Edition. (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1976) 
4 0 See for example A.Reeve "Property" (Macmillan, 1986) 
^̂  A.Ryan "Locke on Freedom: Some Second Thoughts" in 
K.Haakonssen (Ed.) "Traditions of Liberalism" (Centre For 
Independent Studies, 1988) p.36 
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the property" , whereas lawyers have a use for the 
distinction between "absolute" and "non-absolute" - they 
understand absolute as that of a single owner who possesses 
all the powers (be they few or many).over his property that 4 3 the law recognises. 
My point is that the notion of absolute is possible with 
respect to property notwithstanding the fact that I have 
consistently stressed, that in practice we may not be 
permitted to deal with our property in such a manner. 
Macpherson appears, like many, to confuse his justificatory 
position with the concept of property. That is, claims that 
4 4 
absolute property is a "kind" of property, to be compared 
with property circumscribed by social considerations, merely 
lead to confusion. That is, Macpherson confuses the concept 
of property with ideas about who is to do what with whatever 
property is in question. 
Macpherson, like many, is in fact concerned with what I call 
the "spill-over" of one's actions or extrinsic effects of 
one's actions. That is, it is uncontroversial that one would 
hold the view that action which harms others should be 
^̂  C.B.Macpherson "Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions" 
(University of Toronto Press, 1978) p.10 
^̂  See A.Ryan op. cit, 
^̂  C .B.Macpherson op. ci t.p. 11 
restrained — as Macpherson points out, social pressures are 
developing such as the "growing public consciousness of the 
menaces of air and water pollution"^® The issue is, rather, 
whether restrictions are put into effect due to the 
(potential) harmful results of one's actions, or whether the 
restrictions entail restrictions on one's rights. I would 
argue that restrictions can in fact be considered as 
impediments to one's actions rather than on one's rights, 
thus not compromising the notion of absolute, and although 
it may be argued that the contrast between acts and 
consequences cannot be used as a basis for considering the 
notion of absolute, an important distinction can nevertheless 
be made. For example, it is not inherently, morally, wrong 
to carry a gun without a licence if one does not use the gun 
and does not intend to use the gun. Nevertheless, legal 
restrictions are placed on all gun-owners and potential 
gun-owners in case harm is brought to others, that is, due 
to the possible consequences of one's actions. As stated 
above, if there were a way of ensuring one's actions did not 
impinge on others, then there would not be a case for 
restrictions. Of course this is not feasible in many cases 
— we cannot isolate the particular use, say the firing of a 
gun in the vicinity of others, from the harmful consequences 
to others. As the action and the (potential) results are not 
severable in practice, restrictions operate to protect third 
" Ibid. 
parties so that, as a result, we may not operate in an 
unqualified way. 
This is not to say, however, that any ownership of, say, the 
gun is not absolute. By absolute I take it that there is 
indisputibility of title to a thing-but that our actions may, 
in some particular circumstances, be restricted. 
There appear to be two notions of "absolute", however, which 
are employed by various commentators with regard to rights 
and which may equally be applicable to rights associated with 
property: one, as suggested by Gewirth that a right can never 
be overridden, that is, that nothing can override it in its 
importance. On this account, a right can only be said to be 
absolute when it cannot conceivably be thought to be 
overridden by anything else in any circumstances, so that it 
can never be justifiably infringed or limited.Of course, 
arguments that employ this definition inevitably run the risk 
of criticism that, since rights often come into conflict, 
either rights "trump" each other to the conclusion that one 
particular right (say, the right to life) is the one and only 
absolute right that we have, or it is merely concluded that 
there are no absolute rights. But we do not need to think of 
rights in this sort of hierarchical way - we may merely 
^̂  See A.Gewirth "Are There Any Absolute Rights?" in 
Philosophical Quarterly 31. 1981 reprinted in J.Waldron 
(Ed.) "Theories of Rights" (Oxford University Press) p.92 
concede that rights do clash and this may need a resolution, 
or in fact the conflict may be insoluble and the 
circumstances may ultimately turn on a question of force or 
power, or on adjudication. As Gewirth points out, if two 
(moral) rights can only be fulfilled by infringing the other, 
the right takes precedent whose fulfilment is more necessary 
for action, and the criterion for the degrees of necessity 
47 may require "institutional rules". 
A second notion of "absolute" as it may relate to property 
is suggested by Unger; that by absolute terms we mean those 
that do not admit of degrees. I will discuss these ideas in 
J. turn. 
Both ideas of absolute may be asserted when -considering 
property, and it appears that sometimes we mean one or the 
other. That is, we may mean either: 
1) that nothing, however appealing, can be said to override 
our rights with respect to our property, or 
2) that rights including those with respect to property are 
unqualified, that is, there are no other interests which 
matter regarding what I do. 
^^ Ibid. p.93. 
A third typé of "absolute" as it relates to property may be 
where all the possible "incidents" as enumerated by Honoré 
are present. See below. 
Arguments of the first category suggest that a right is 
absolute when it can not only never be justifiably infringed 
in the name of another right, but there cannot be any claim 
so morally compelling that it can justify hindering my 
exercise of my right. (This of course is not to deny that 
in some circumstances it may be better not to exercise my 
right) . 
A necessary consequence of a thing's being an absolute right 
in this sense is that the holder has not only the right to 
exclude others no matter what the circumstances from the 
thing, but may equally not be restricted in any sense, and 
implying how the thing is to be used — this is a matter of 
his control. In the sense, then, of having a proprietary 
right to a particular thing, one would say that a person's 
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claim is absolute by having exclusive use or control of 
the thing. In other words, an absolute right to a thing 
entails an unqualified right to have and use that thing (and 
if there is a clash of rights with respect to the property 
in question, this might well be an insoluble situation which 
ultimately will be resolved by, say, force or power, or the 
enforcement of particular institutional rules). 
^̂  All property, however, is exclusive, both in the the sense 
of either an individual or group holding exclusive control 
of a thing, and further, that there is always a cut-off 
point which excludes some as owners of a particular thing. 
In practice, particularly in a legal context, however, it 
appears that no society allows for this behaviour, and let 
me grant at once that there may not be any legal system that 
recognises absolute proprietary rights in the sense of total 
and exclusive control no matter what the consequences. As 
stated above, restrictions are placed upon one's actions as 
a consequence of possible harm to third parties. It does not 
follow, however, that there are no such rights; it is only 
that no society has thought it worthwhile or practicable to 
give them all full recognition - to allow for one's rights 
to be acted upon. It is conceivable, however, and logically 
possible that in a world with a different range of 
technologies from ours, in which we could insulate others 
from harmful consequences of free use, that absolute rights 
would be given legal recognition. 
Property in this absolute sense is not logically 
unattainable. We may consider property as a sort of limiting, 
case with all actual cases of property as really more or less 
"thick" — it is logically attainable but that it is always 
conceivable that a rights-based case can be made relative to 
the property right in question and which overrides its 
exercise. Generally, we require people to cease harming 
other persons and hence restrictions are often applied. 
There is a very important distinction, as stated above, that 
must be made here between the exercise of one's right and the 
consequences thereof, which is a specific instance of of the 
general distinction- often difficult to draw in practice -
that can be made between acts and consequences. For example, 
if we were to consider the restrictions on an individual's 
utterance of racist views, it is arguable that these 
curtailments would be taken to be restrictions on one's right 
to freedom of speech. Although this is the way in which some 
of the less reflective tabloids do characterise it, I would 
argue that the restrictions are merely directed towards the 
exercise of one's right, taking into consideration the 
possible consequences of those utterances. 
Take, as an analogy, the distinction that is made by Dworkin 
between "principles" and "rules". For Dworkin, "principle" 
refers to a standard (as opposed to a rule) that is to be 
observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, 
political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because 
it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality.^" Thus the standard, for example, 
that no man may profit by his own wrong is a principle. 
However we do not mean that in all cases a person may not 
profit from wrongdoing - the granting of an easement after 
trespassing on another's land long enough is a case in point. 
Therefore principles are not falsified or qualified by the 
R.Dworkin "Taking Rights Seriously" (Duckworth, 1977) p.22 
fact that there are some circumstances in which they are 
displaced by permitting what amount to exceptions. "Rules", 
however, are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion - like 
the rules in a game - and although there may appear to be 
exceptions, an accurate statement of the rule would 
incorporate these apparent exceptions, and any formulation 
which ignored them would be literally wrong. That is, 
apparent exceptions must be incorporated in a pre-stated and 
more complex rule. 
By this distinction it may be argued that one's right to 
freedom of speech is an example of a principle, that is, an 
unrestricted right with exceptions. Like the right to vote, 
which is circumscribed by procedural limitations such as the 
nominated hours for polling and qualifications such as one's 
age and citizenship, but which nevertheless remains a right, 
the right-to freedom of speech is no more compromised by the 
prohibition in some instances on the utterance of racist 
views. 
À case can, then, be made for the distinction between one's 
right and one's action, and the limitations which are imposed 
on one's right and on one's exercise of that right. Take, for 
example, a situation in which an individual calls out "fire" 
in a non-burning cinema; it is clear that the right to make 
a statement is one thing, but to call this out in a crowded 
theatre is quite another. Here there is a distinct difference 
between the limitations on one's right and on one's action. 
Further, there is a distinct difference between one's action 
and the result or consequences of one's action. It is quite 
irrelevant, for example, who owns the gun when restrictions 
are imposed, that is, it says too much if we insist that the 
limitations are on ownership - owning entails rights to do 
things, provided that they do not have particular effects, 
and these effects may occur independently of one's ownership 
of a thing. As an analogy, we may take the example of the use 
of nuclear radiation - it has no intrinsic value as to 
whether it may be good or bad - but it is the result of one's 
use which may be weighed. For example. X-rays are used to 
treat children with leukemia, which we agree to be good, 
while nuclear power plants may be built for the sole purpose 
of creating nuclear weapons which may have disastrous 
effects. 
One could argue, of course, that restrictions or limitations 
on one's actions necessarily entail restrictions on one's 
right - there being no apparent difference. However, I would 
argue that this would be synonymous with asserting that the 
illiterate do not have the right to freedom of information. 
That is, by this argument, being unable to read is a 
restriction on one's ability to act as a consequence of a 
right, and hence the restriction also has bearing on one's 
right - there being no practical difference, then, between 
a person who is illiterate and a person who is denied the 
right to freedom of information. 
Contrary to this argument, we do commonly distinguish between 
having the right and the capacity to enjoy that right. We can 
make the distinction and demonstrate the difference. (We may 
merely teach the illiterate to read so that they can exercise 
their right.) But this does not mean, however, that we should 
fund, for example, or permit the continuance of the 
activities of the factory that is belching out pollution -
this remains the domain of the problem of available 
technology to limit the harm to others. 
Absolute rights with regard to what one owns are defensible. 
That is, if one really owns something, no-one has the right 
to force one to use or not use that thing in a particular way 
unless, as a contingent fact, it is morally unacceptable to 
third parties. These restrictions are justified so long as 
that contingency remains. For example, say a butcher, who we 
may say has the right to freedom of movement, is brandishing 
a knife which may only appear to be putting a nearby baby in 
his shop at risk. We may say that we are justified in 
disarming the butcher to the extent that it will prevent harm 
to the innocent baby - but not more than is necessary. In 
this case it is not relevant what the butcher's motive is. 
By "absolute", then, we may say that restrictions on usage 
are justified, but only as necessary conditions to prevent 
morally unacceptable harm to others. 
The use of terms such as "relative" and "absolute", of course 
are troublesome - no-one would argue that one may use 
anything (including the things one owns) irrespective of the 
the harm which could be done to others, even the use of one's 
own body to beat up another body. So that by "absolute" I 
mean that it cannot be subordinated to some other good, but 
that restrictions may be warranted to limit harm, but only 
if there is no other available way to do so. 
For example, one may have the freedom to smoke, that is, use 
tobacco as one pleases. However, as technology, at present 
at least, is not sophisticated enough to prevent harm to 
others as "passive smokers", restrictions on the smoker's use 
of tobacco is regularly enforced. We do not, however, say 
that the smoker's ownership is limited if he is prevented 
from smoking his tobacco in public places. The restrictions 
are enforced to prevent morally unacceptable harm to others. 
These limitations are restrictions on the exercise of the 
smoker's right, but are not limitations on the smoker's 
ownership of the tobacco. 
In stating that property should be viewed as an absolute 
term, I make two observations: 
1. There exists the pervasive attitude that if I really do 
own something, I can do anything with it, and 
2. We recognise that if someone has a greater interest in 
a thing than I do, then whatever relation I may have to 
it, I do not really own the thing. Even if their 
interest is smaller, I still do not own the thing; I 
(fully) own a (large) share in the thing. 
Thus, it can be said that property and ownership entail the 
absence of other sorts of interests. Although others deny 
the existence of absoluteness when speaking of property and 
ownership,'^ I would contend that it would make no sense to 
speak of property without having an idea of what it is we are 
comparing it with as an example. 
I turn now to the second notion of "absolute", and draw on 
Peter Unger's distinction between absolute and relative 
terms. For Unger, the term "flat", for example, in its 
central, literal meaning is an absolute term. To say that a 
"surface is flat is to say that some things or properties 
See for example C.Donahue op. cit. 
^̂  P.Unger "Ig-norance - A Case For Scepticism" (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1975) 
which are matters of degree are not instances in the surface 
to any degree at alT Thus, something which is flat is 
not all bumpy and not all curved. Bumpiness and curvature are 
matters of degree. That is, when we say of a surface that it 
is bumpy or that it is curved, "we use the relative terms 
"bumpy" and "curved" to talk about the surface."®^ So that, 
for example, if we say that a surface is pretty near flat or 
very flat, or extremely close to being flat, we have not 
simply said how flat the surface is, but, rather, how close 
the surface is to being flat.®^ That is, if a thing is very 
nearly flat, by implication, it is not flat. 
Semantically, our absolute terms indicate, or purport to 
denote, an absolute limit. "Flat" then, purports to denote 
a limit, flatness, which more or less curved or bumpy things 
approach to the extent that they are not bumpy and are not 
curved, and so on. If we were to look at the relative term 
"bumpy", however, and say that the surface is pretty nearly 
bumpy or extremely close to being bumpy, this would make no 
sense at all. Thus if we say that the surface is very bumpy, 
it is entailed by what we say that the surface is bumpy, 
while if we say that the surface is very close to being 
" Ibid. p .54 
Ibid p . 54 
Ibid. p . 57 
bumpy, it is entailed that the surface is not bumpy. ̂ ^ 
Consequently we can distinguish between absolute and relative 
terms. 
Further, if we are to compare two surfaces, one of which is 
said to be the flatter of the two, we must say either that 
the first surface is flat, but the second is not, or else it 
is closer to being flat than the second. ̂^ 
Similarly, we may say that in the case of ownership and 
property, if A's degree of ownership is greater than B's, 
then this entails that B is not the owner of X. If A's right 
to use X is greater than B's, and this greater right to use 
cannot be traced to some concession by B, then B does not own 
X, even if B holds certain rights (or in a weaker sense, has 
interests) with respect to X. By linger' s analogy, if we 
think of something as flat, but it is not as flat as X, then 
that thing is not really flat. To be flat is to be 
absolutely, perfectly flat, so that if we can order the 
relatives, we must also concede that in the case of 
ownership, for example, that a person with say, fewer rights 
than another, does not really own X. 
Given the possibility, at least, of absoluteness with respect 
^^ Ibid. p. 58 
Ibid. p. 59 
to rights, we may now look at the particular rights as they 
relate to property, and initially, we may note that a 
problem arises as a consequence of applying rights to 
property. For example, ownership may involve intangibles or 
non-corporeal things such as copyright, which can themselves 
be said to be legal rights, so that ultimately one may say 
that one "owns the rights to" a particular film or 
manuscript. Thus we would be asserting that one has an 
absolute right to a legal right. This of course appears to 
be confusing. 
The problem appears to be that although one may say that one 
has an absolute right to a particular thing, it may not be 
clearly the case once the particular rights (and liabilities 
etc.) are enumerated. For example, I may, quite rightly, say 
that I have an absolute right to this car (which is my 
property), but if pushed on the specific rights involved, 
such as the right to use it (e.g. I may drive it as fast as 
I please whenever I like), the question of absolute 
(specific) rights may not be as clear. 
We may ask, if there are many rights which come into play 
regarding property, how do we apply the notion of absolute? 
The formal possibilities for the idea of absolute rights in 
the context of property and ownership are as follows: 
Either: 
1) All of the possible rights are absolute in the above 
sense, and for one to have ownership one would need to 
possess all of the rights. 
2) Some rights may be said to be absolute in the above 
sense (at least one right is absolute) but the others 
need not be. 
3) None of the rights are absolute, that is, any one of 
them can be overridden. 
We can say, generally, that in practice there are always 
restrictions, legal and/or moral, on what a person may do 
with an object even if it is said to be their property. But 
to what extent can these restrictions be permitted before 
they denude the concept of ownership itself, or put more 
simply, how far may restrictions be permitted before the 
owner would no longer find any value in the thing and not 
want it any more? 
Looking at the three possibilities above, one may say of (1) 
that this seems to me to be a plausible account of ownership. 
However, it is obvious that government and other restrictions 
make this alternative, in fact, impossible. 
Number (2) also appears to be a possible alternative, but one 
must question whether this can in fact be equated with 
ownership. That is, firstly one must stipulate which of the 
rights might be said to be absolute, and are they the same 
rights in each case of ownership. That is, for each object 
said to be one's property can we specify the particular 
rights which are absolute, and say that these are the same 
rights for each object? 
Similarly we may say that (3) appears to be the case in 
practice. That is, we may say that one possesses many rights 
with respect to an object or thing, but that for every right 
we may find examples of restrictions. However, this does not 
answer the question of whether this may be a possibility or 
an adequate explanation of one's ownership of a thing. In 
fact, it may be questioned whether the possibility of all of 
one's rights being able to be overridden simultaneously can 
be compatible with ownership. 
Of course, one could argue that so long as one's rights are 
not challenged, one is put into a privileged position, or has 
an advantage over another who does not possess any rights 
with respect to a thing. However, there is very little 
operational difference between a person who may possess 
certain rights such as the right to use or to dispose of a 
thing, but whose holding of these rights may be overridden 
at any time and in fact are overridden by, say, legislation. 
But, as I have stated earlier, restrictions need not be 
considered as the defeasibility of one's rights, rather, they 
may be seen as limitations on one's actions. Interference 
with one's actions need not entail a negation of one's right. 
For example, I may have the right to play a game of football, 
to play by the rules or to try to make a goal, but I do not 
have the right to win or to actually make that goal, thus 
others are permitted to restrict me from making that goal by 
tackling me even though I still retain the right to play the 
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game. 
It is of course useful for us to define property and 
ownership as strictly interpreted; not least to provide a 
standard benchmark against which to determine the extent to 
which we have property. For example, Grunebaum suggests that 
we can define the concepts of property and ownership by 
specifying the subject, object and content of the ownership 
relation.^' The subject would, of course, generally be 
persons, individuals or groups of persons, the object being 
any possible ownable, that is, anything at all and, I would 
assume, logically even other persons, and the content is that 
" See J.Narveson "The Libertarian Idea" op. cit. p.43 
J.0.Grunebaum "Private Ownership" (London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1987) pp.9-10 
which defines the ownership, that is, the vestiture of the 
right to use ownables in any way whatsoever (limited perhaps 
only by moral considerations). 
4. Property as Control. 
Although there appears to be no agreement over which rights 
are necessary or at least sufficient as defining 
characteristics of ownership and property, as proposed by 
Honoré and Becker, I suggest that there is an essential core 
right to property, and that right is the right of control. 
After all, for something to be capable of being owned, a 
thing must be capable of being controlled. 
But what is it to control something? In general terms, it 
is to have power to direct a thing or that matter in a way 
that accords with your desire as to how it should be 
directed. When we say of someone that he owns an object, we 
assert that he has the power to act, command and to restrain, 
and that he enjoys certain rights over that thing against the 
world at large. To have the rights of control is to have the 
right to that power, and to exercise that power rightfully, 
one must have, I would argue, the right to possess, the right 
to use and the right to dispose of a thing. These rights 
entail the right to exclude others. It is one of the 
essential components that property entails the exclusivity 
of ownership. By this I mean that an owner has the right to 
choose what to do with what he owns, how to use it, and who 
is to be given access to it. The exclusivity of ownership 
thus creates a strong link between one's right to choose how 
to use the property and bearing the consequences of that 
choice. 
Control involves the power to exercise one's will in relation 
to how the subject matter is to be deployed. To be in 
control of a thing or matter is to have the power to 
implement your desires, to direct the thing or matter in 
accordance with your desires. As an owner has a power to 
exclude others, he has substantial control over what h^ does 
with his property - he can wear the clothes he wishes, spend 
his money, smoke in his house or rearrange the furniture in 
the house. He also has control over others, that is, he can 
decide who may read his books or who may enter his house. 
Certainly I would further contend that exclusion rights are 
central to ownership. By this I mean those rights which 
allow a person not only to exclude others from a particular 
thing, but for the person to be able to use, to manage, to 
possess, etc. a thing to the total exclusion of others. 
See S.Pejovich "The Economics of Property Rights: "Towards 
a Theory of Comparative Systems" (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1990) p.27 
Certainly control stems directly from this power. That is, 
exclusion, entails that another cannot do anything regarding 
the thing without the owner's consent. For example, in any 
society regarded as civilized, even police officers may not 
enter a private house without consent. That is, this 
excludability is directly related to the owner's power to 
keep the State from interfering.^' Further, I make the 
distinction that ownership is not based upon the ability to 
exclude others, as this would suggest that owners must have 
more ability to exclude others such as thieves. Rather, an 
owner must have the right to exclude others. Thus the 
distinction between mere control ana the right of control may 
be made - the control or power is "congruent with right". 
It is, of course, the case that these rights may be seen to 
be limited or overridden by legislation or regulation; for 
example, the police officers may have been issued with a 
police search warrant to enter the house. The rights of 
control, as legally recognised, thus often appear to be 
restricted. However, the police may ordinarily conduct 
criminal searches and seize evidence only with a warrant, and 
they must justify a proposed search before a magistrate will 
issue a warrant - these are the particular institutional 
61 See S.R.Munzer Theory of Property" op. cit. p.91 
^̂  M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op. cit. pp.172-
173 
rules which regulate certain actions. 
However, the distinction must be made between limitations on 
one's actions regarding a thing and the rights one holds with 
respect to that thing. For example, it may not be possible 
in a given situation for me to exercise my right A without 
thereby violating my neighbour's right B. But this does not 
necessarily mean my right A is inherently qualified or 
limited. It may be a perfectly "full" right, which I will 
only ever be able to exercise freely if some technology is 
invented which enables me to isolate its impact on my 
neighbour's exercise of his rights, and although restrictions 
may appear to be qualifications on my rights, these are not 
necessarily on the right itself, but represent limitations 
on how one's right can be exercised. In thé meantime, 
institutional rules regulate certain actions. (This may be, 
however, sufficiently powerful to be mistaken as limitations 
on the right itself.) 
Of course in one's house or factory one is not free, at least 
legally, to commit an assault or to create a nuisance - but 
save for the actions the law prohibits, restricts, or 
requires, one can do what one likes. I agree here with the 
civil libertarian tradition that the exercise of one's right 
to exclude should only be allowed to be overriden by a 
legally authorised discretion — to be exercised in the most 
scrupulous and highly scrutinised way, like the oversight 
many believe ought to be set on search warrants. This of 
course lies behind the well-known sentiment that an 
Englishman's home is his castle. 
Certainly it is clear that by "property" we may invoke to 
certain particular rights such as the right to use, to 
possess, or to exclude or to manage, which may be seen as a 
"core" group of rights. 
Alternatively, "property" may be thought as already noted, 
to refer to the thing to which some entity or entities, 
natural or artificial persons, have some or all of the 
incidents of the full list as enumerated by Honoré and 
perhaps it is this second sense which has become the 
"popular" conception of property. ̂^ That is, that given all 
of the incidents of ownership as set out by Honoré, if they 
are held by an individual and each held to the fullest degree 
possible, there would not be any dispute over his or her 
ownership of a thing. In this sense it is often suggested 
that his or her ownership is absolute. Even Honoré himself 
admits that there is a sense of "absolute ownership" which 
emphasises the exemption of ownership from social control. ̂^ 
See S.R.Munzer "Property, Incorporation and Projection" in 
Nous Vol.23, 1989. p.292 
^̂  A.M.Honoré "Ownership" op. cit. p. 113 
However, I would argue that the set of rights to possess, use 
and dispose of a thing are far more central to one's 
ownership of a thing and that these may be said to comprise 
the "core" group of rights which entail control; hence 
absolute property in the sense of indisputibility of one's 
ownership. By "central", I suggest that these rights are 
.paramount, particularly when it comes to resolving disputes, 
and in the sense that other rights are not merely subordinate 
to them, but in fact may be reducible to them. 
It has, however, been argued that the advent of capitalism 
has resulted in the view that a property claim is absolute 
with respect to an object. ̂^ In particular, Macpherson 
argues that with the advent of capitalism has come an 
emphasis on exclusivity or an exclusive conception of 
property, as the object is viewed as a form of capital, to 
be valued merely for its capacity to earn interest or 
profits. However, as stated above, this merely reflects 
Macpherson's particular view on the justification of 
property. Rather, on analysis, I would argue that anything 
less than the exclusive use of an object would make the 
concept we know as property too vague. 
See for example C.B.Macpherson "Property - Mainstream and 
Critical Positions" op.cit. p.7. Although Macpherson has 
made the claim that capitalism has given rise to 
absoluteness, the term, in the sense of the "trumps" idea 
is even found in ancient Greek and Roman literature. See, 
for example, the notion of theft in Plato's "Dialogues" and 
the discussion of the immorality of theft. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that a different view of 
property is that property consists in particular rights which 
are distinct from the thing itself. That is, that the bundle 
of rights "combine" in the concrete thing'' and that some or 
all of the rights may be considered to be suitable as subject 
of property claims of individuals or groups. The distinction 
appears to be between a theory which holds that the object 
of the property relationship is the item or thing itself, and 
one which holds that the object of the property relationship 
is the right to a specific quality of an object (such as the 
right to use the item). 
However, first, such a distinction cannot be drawn between 
what I consider to be the idea of ownership (that is 
absolute) and the idea of a bundle of rights theory. In both 
cases rights are involved. For ownership, one would require 
that there be the right to possess, the right to use in any 
way one saw fit and the right to dispose in any way one saw 
fit, but that one's actions based on these rights are 
contingent upon the requirement that no harm be brought 
others. The bundle of rights theory may be able to 
accommodate this position, provided we are clear to 
distinguish the rights and limitations which qualify the 
strategies we may employ in exercising these rights - that 
'' R.L.Rariden "The Right to Property" (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
1985) p.15 
there may be limits on our actions. 
Of course this would not accommodate the violation of the 
rights of others. Any limitations would not, however, be on 
one's rights, but on the strategies one undertook — that is, 
on the exercise of one's rights. For example, I may wish to 
dispose of my house by blowing it up, thereby causing 
suffering to my neighbour from falling debris and nuisance 
from noise. However, if I could explode it in a way in which 
the debris did not put my neighbour or his property at risk 
and could suppress the noise, then I would have found a 
strategy for blowing up my house without violating my 
neighbour's rights. 
Further, if it is asserted by the theory which advocates a 
bundle of rights, that several property claims can be made 
simultaneously and successfully on one and the same thing by 
several individuals or groups, then it cannot be the case 
that each has the exclusive rights to possess, to use and to 
dispose of the thing. Once this is recognised, it is clear 
that all that can properly be claimed is that the various 
individuals or groups have various "interests" in that thing, 
and that no single set of which can be equated with 
ownership. 
It is not inconceivable, however, that different individuals 
may claim to own one and the same thing in the sense of each 
possessing a share, say, of a given company, but this would 
merely be the assertion that one had the exclusive control 
by the right to possess, to use, to dispose of that 
particular share. It cannot be said that this power or 
ability extended to the whole thing, the company. 
Rariden,'' for example, suggests that separate individuals 
could have a private property in the same physical object. 
I bel ieve, however, that Rariden is simply wrong. It is 
uncontentious that several individuals may hold some rights 
with respect to a thing, but this cannot be equated with 
ownership. Property requires exclusivity in the thing, and 
although Rariden asserts that an object can be seen as held 
by private individuals with absolute control over certain 
limited functions of the thing, this cannot be equated with 
property or ownership of the thing itself. Either the 
individuals hold certain rights other than the rights to 
possess, use and dispose of the thing, in which case they may 
only be said to hold an interest in the thing itself, or they 
hold the rights to possess, use and dispose of some thing 
such as a share. In this latter case, it may be said that 
they "own" the share, and it is an exclusivity which is 
independent of the whole, so that on a proper analysis we may 
say that the holding of certain rights with respect to a 
R.L.Rariden ibid. p. 15 
thing does not necessarily entail ownership. 
We may take the example of a parcel of land which is 
considered to belong to the government, that is, it is owned 
by the State, and find that the timber rights may be held by 
one individual and the hunting rights on the land may be held 
by another. In this case, we can go so far as to say that 
both of the individuals have absolute control over their 
respective claims, that is, exclusivity of their part." 
This sort of example may be used to illustrate that we are 
able to enumerate many different rights one may have with 
regard to a particular thing. In the case of the hunter, he 
has the right to take possession of the animals by capturing 
them, to use them by shooting them for their skins or meat, 
and disposing of them by selling the fur or meat. Similarly, 
the holding of the timber rights may also be said to contain 
analogous particular rights. However, to equate these 
separate proprietal relations individuals may have with say, 
in this case, the land itself, is a misconception of what 
constitutes property and ownership. 
With respect to the land, it merely indicates that various 
rights (those associated with the hunting licence or the 
timber licence) are held by separate individuals. This does 
" Although of course in the case of "tennants in common", all 
are said to own the whole and do not have exclusive 
control of a part. 
not mean, however, that the hunter "owns" the land. That is, 
a distinction can be made between the many different rights 
related to an object (which can be dispersed among different 
individuals) and the holding of certain central rights with 
regard to a particular object which is a part of the whole. 
That is, the hunter may be said, loosely, to "own" the 
hunting licence. However, the holding some of the rights 
(even when these rights may be those core or central rights 
equated with property) indicates that the hunter merely has 
an interest in the land, even though he may possess absolute 
control over his interest, comparable to holding a share in 
a company. 
A legal interest" in a thing exists when one has a set of 
legally enforceable rights, titles, advantages, duties and 
liabilities connected with it, and as a result we may say 
that the hunter "owns" the hunting licence, but he does not 
own the land — he merely has an interest in it. More 
generally, I have an interest in something, though not 
necessarily a legal interest, when the way in which future 
events unfold (either positively or negatively) involving 
that thing, advantage or disadvantage one has in particularly 
significant ways. This, however, falls a long way short of 
" Osborne's Law Dictionary, op. cit. 
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having a right/® 
As stated earlier, the word "property" usually brings to mind 
an image of a physical object, say, a block of land or a 
wristwatch. However, this is misleading, for as soon as we 
begin to look at the actual use of the word, it is apparent 
that property is not only a set of things but may be seen as 
a set of rights as well as interests. 
Most writers on property, including Honoré, have recognised 
property as a set of rights. John Locke, for example, 
defined "property" so widely as to mean by it rights to 
"life, liberty and estate", while standard interpretations 
see property as consisting of rights such as to possess, use, 
manage, dispose of, and keep others away from things. But 
property may also be associated with a set of interests.'^ 
However, these are only corrolaries of ownership — if the 
things we own were to become worthless, then we would no 
longer have property. For example, a person who owns a car 
has an interest in its resale value, while a person who owns 
a house has an interest in having the value of the property 
increase through an upgrading of the neighbourhood, although 
he may have no right to have its value increase in this way. 
" The holding of a right, however, does entail that I have an 
interest in a weak sense - the interest in there being 
nothing which prevents me from exercising my right. 
V.Held "Rights and Goods" op. cit. p. 167 
Property rights and interests are complicated; we have rights 
to pay our debts with the balances in our bank accounts, and 
interests that the paper they represent not be devalued. We 
have rights to the dividends that our shares in a corporation 
accord, and interests in the corporation's paying as high a 
dividend as possible; we have rights to a superannuation 
from the plan we have joined, and interests in the plan not 
going bankrupt. But we must not confuse what are quite 
correctly considered to be rights which amount to ownership 
and those that merely give us an interest in a thing - I may 
"have" two computers, one at home, the other at my office, 
and both render the same service, yet I "own" the home 
computer, whereas I merely have an interest in the office 
computer - I cannot, for example, (legitimately) sell it or 
give it. 
Of course if all of the rights (and liabilities) are held by 
one person, it would be uncontentious as to who should be 
declared to be an owner. That is, if one person were to be 
not only the owner of the land, but also be able to utilise 
it in the various ways including, for example, those 
connected with what would have been the rights under a lease, 
he would undoubtedly be considered to be the owner. 
Further, we could argue that property can be explained as a 
bundle of rights, but the problem really is whether one holds 
particular rights which can indicate ownership, and not 
merely an interest in a thing. The question must then be 
asked: Which rights are necessary, and/or which are 
sufficient for ownership? My argument is that there must be 
at least a core group which entails ownership, and/or a core 
group which is entailed by ownership. 
One could hold the view that if one has ownership then it 
cannot be accepted that various specific rights can be 
alienated while one can still retain that unique position 
with regard to a thing. But I think that this is the nature 
of the bundle theory, that is, others may have various 
interests but not ownership. The holding of the core group 
of rights would necessarily indicate control and exclusivity 
which is beyond mere interest in a thing. 
Of course it can be argued that there must be a balance 
between the rights of the individual and the State's right, 
power, and perhaps obligation, to regulate one's rights in 
relation to property. That is, the State by legislation, 
regulation, and through court decisions, might establish 
specific limits on the individuals freedom of acquisition, 
of possession, of use and disposal of things owned, that is, 
on one's specific property rights. This appears to be the 
case for two reasons: 
1) The State may protect the individual owner's rights 
against the plunder of other individuals, or 
2) The State may attempt to ensure that all individuals 
have the benefit of these freedoms as all individuals 
have the same relationship to the State. 
But I would suggest that certain rights are paramount in some 
sense when we look at property rights. That is, that some 
rights are at least sufficient to entail property or even 
that some (or at least one) is necessary for ownership. 
Certainly the law has always suggested that possession is 
central to the notion of property. However, it cannot 
constitute or generate a right to some (particular) property. 
After all, it is conceivable that one may possess something 
that is not rightfully yours and, conversely, one can own 
something which is not in one's possession. 
5. Core and Residual Rights 
Several attempts have been made to explain the nature or 
essential qualities of property and ownership employing 
Honoré's list of incidents. I will argue, however, that 
certain rights are paramount in determining ownership, and, 
further, that the other rights as enumerated by Honoré and 
Becker are reducible to three core rights — namely the rights 
to possess, to use and to dispose of a thing. 
Certainly within the law, the general right property or the 
right of ownership contains four elements, namely, 
1) the right to use a thing (usus) 
2) the right to capture the benefits from that thing (usus 
fructus) 
3) the right to change its form and substance (aJbusus) 
4) the right to transfer all or some of the rights under 1), 
2) and 3) to others.'̂  
If we accept the Honoré and Becker enumeration of property 
rights as being the definitive set of all possible rights we 
could conceivably consider in cases of ownership, and given 
my apprehension of accepting a "bundle of rights" theory, one 
could argue that there are 3 possibilities by which we can 
^̂  Villey, for example, describes the "modern" concept of 
property as the right of an individual to use, enjoy and 
dispose of material things, and emphasises that it is 
unlimited in amount and indefinitelyextensible. (Michel 
Villey Notes Sur le Concept de Propriété" [Notes on the 
Concept of Property] in C.Wellman (Ed.) "Equality and 
Freedom: Past,Present and Future", op. cit.) Macpherson 
also takes the view that property can be described as the 
right to use, enjoy, and dispose of material things, but 
emphasises that the right to exclude others from the use 
or enjoyment of the thing is also a corrolary of this 
definition. (C.B.Macpherson "On the Concept of Property" 
Ibid.) 
See S.Pejovich "The Economics of Property Rights: Towards 
a Theory of Comparative Systems" op. cit. p.28 
identify property and ownership: 
1) by identifying a particular element or particular right 
as necessary and sufficient; 
2) by identifying a combination of elements or rights as 
necessary and sufficient for identifying property and 
ownership ; 
3) by identifying some elements or rights as more central 
and others as more peripheral to the concept of property 
and ownership, and arguing that certain variable 
combinations and permutations are sufficient, and their 
inclusive disjunction necessary for property and 
ownership. 
The crucial question is to determine which of the rights or 
incidents are necessary by asking which, if any, of the 
rights or "incidents" suggested by Honoré and Becker can 
exist independently of any particular legal concept and 
institutional arrangements/* That is, one must ask: which 
of the incidents could exist conceivably in a state of 
nature. Although I accept that as property is a relational 
concept, denoting not material things, but certain rights -
See J.Chandler "A Reconsideration of the Concept of 
property" in C.Wellman (Ed.) Equality and Freedom: Past, 
Present and Future" op.cit. p.147 
relations between individuals in relation to a thing - some 
may interpret this as entailing that property rights do not 
exist in a world apart from organised society. We may 
nevertheless consider whether property and ownership can 
exist independently of government or a legal system - whether 
property claims can be valid even if none of the mechanisms 
of enforcement that a particular legal system provides are 
available. 
If the answer is that property rights do not exist 
independently of institutional arrangements, then this would 
vindicate the thesis of Hobbes that property and ownership 
rights are necessarily conventional, conceivable only 
relative to a possible legal system. However, it is at least 
arguable that, for example, the right to possess and the 
right to use would make sense in a pre-legal or extra-legal 
setting - they could, arguably, exist also in a "state of 
nature". If this is so, it may be possible to identify some 
immutable characteristics of property and ownership, 
attributes of property that have non-contingently remained 
unchanged by government practice irrespective of place or 
age; such attributes would have a strong claim to constitute 
the basis of the only "true" property. 
Thus if we are to analyse the meaning of the claim: "A owns 
X", we could examine this in a simple setting, without 
government and limited to a small universe. In the absense 
of government, the connection between A and X, when using the 
terms "property" and "ownership", would be to say that A can 
possess, use and dispose of (transfer through voluntary 
exchange or gift, or even abandon) X at A's discretion. 
If the general right property is seen as the freedom, within 
as yet unspecified limits to acquire, hold and transfer a 
thing, then it can be said that the specific rights of 
possession, use and disposal'^ are rights which are 
perfectly capable of existing in the natural state and which 
are subsequently enforced in a social State. Indeed, despite 
Hobbes* contention that property rights are purely 
conventional, he also maintains, most famously, that in the 
state of nature we each have the natural right to everything, 
even one another's bodies. 
The various rights, or in Honoré's more cautious terms, 
"incidents", I will show are reducible to the rights to 
possess, use, and dispose and may be said to be secondary 
manifestations of the three core rights. This reductionist 
approach I believe is useful in determining the essence of 
property and ownership. It enables us to consider ownership 
S.R.Munzer also makes a similar point. He contends that the 
(claim) right to possess and use and the power to exclude 
are enough for a "rudimentary" form of property. 
S.R.Munzer "Property, Incorporation and Projection" op. 
cit. p.292 
as a clearly defined set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, each of which may be complex. Although many 
commentators have suggested various rights which may 
constitute property/' I have singled out Honoré's right to 
possess and the right to use, and suggest that the right to 
capital (which Becker has elaborated upon to expand into the 
rights to consume or destroy, the right to modify and the 
right to alienate) may better be explained by the general 
right to dispose. 
Of course it may be argued that "property" is ambiguous; that 
there is a "thick" concept and a "thin" concept of ownership. 
A "thick" concept of property or ownership would include all 
11 rights or "incidents" as suggested by Honoré, or indeed 
13, vis-a-vis, Becker, whereas a "thin" concept may merely 
include a few of the "incidents". This would correspond to 
their suggestions that there is "ownership", "full 
ownership", and, in Becker's case, "full exclusive 
ownership". But concepts, like other entities, should not be 
'' Pound: notes that in the civil law tradition property 
involved six rights: the right of possessing, of excluding 
others, of enjoying fruits or profits, of destroying or 
injuring, of using, and the right of disposition. 
Blackstone: "The third absolute right, inherent in every 
Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free 
use, enjoyment, and disposition of all his aquisitions, 
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of 
the land." Snare: the right to use, to exclude, to 
transfer, to punish, to receive a recompense for damages; 
and liability for damages. 
E.Frankel Paul "Property Rights and Eminent Domain" (New 
Brunswick Transaction Books, 1986) p.240 
multiplied beyond necessity; since on any such view the 
"thin" concept would be a proper part of the "thick" concept, 
it simply obscures matters to talk of ambiguity. 
There appears to be just four ways in which an individual can 
assert a claim to own something: 
1) first, by simply asserting that it is his exclusively. 
It is generally agreed, however, that mere unsupported 
assertion is not sufficient to substantiate a claim to 
ownership; nor is it even necessary that a genuine owner 
should explicitly assert the fact of ownership. 
2) The second method is by taking possession of something — 
possession can itself take many forms, depending upon the 
nature of the property. 
3) The third possible way is by using something - by 
transforming the property, or by causing the property to 
transform something else. 
4) The fourth method is by disposing of the property; by 
causing someone else to come into possession or to use the 
property — a process which presupposes for its validity 
an implicit assertion of ownership on the part of the 
transferor for an unspecified period immediately preceding 
the transfer, and while the process of transfer is being 
executed. 
Having eliminated mere verbal assertion, that is, the first 
option, we are left with three possible ways in which 
ownership may be expressed. I contend that all other 
expressions of ownership reduce to these three. If ownership 
is rightfully enjoyed then, and only then, are these 
expressions exercises of ownership rights. 
These rights can be said to be the rights which allow for the 
control of the thing, to benefit from it and to be able to 
alienate it, that is, to dispose of it as one sees fit. But 
what of the right to exclude others? It is wrong to regard 
this as a separate since it is not merely causally 
impossible, but logically impossible to exercise any of the 
other rights, unless one has the power or the right to 
exclude others. 
Let us look at each element in turn: 
1. Possession 
Possession has the best claim to constitute the minimum 
content of property. (Although it is clear that mere 
possession cannot constitute or generate a right to 
property.) Possession is the de facto holding of a thing. 
What constitutes "holding", however, varies as does the 
nature of property, so it must be understood as acquiring 
increasingly metaphorical nuances as we move from the 
tangible to the intangible. We may thus say that the minimum 
content of property is whatever is involved in enjoying the 
possession of a thing, although it is not enough, for 
ownership. 
Certainly in a state of nature an individual's possession of 
a thing would depend upon his natural ability to take and to 
defend the possession of the thing which he needs to sustain 
his life. Later, in a social setting, one is compelled to 
rely on the law of the society which governs one's 
acquisition and retention of the possession of things.'' 
Whether or not one is of the view that rights also exist 
naturally, that is, prior to, or without a legal system or 
system of conventions, certainly in the organised State the 
right to resist intrusions'' upon one's possessions replaces 
J.Chandler "A Reconsideration of the Concept of Property" 
in C.Wellman (Ed.) "Equality and Freedom: Past, Present and 
Future" op. cit. 
I am not arguing however that one's consent to participate 
in a social state is an absolute and unconditional 
surrender of one's power. 
'' It can be said that the very nature of the right to hold 
things with security and without interference necessarily 
embraces the right to resist intrusions by the state upon 
the physical power to resist intrusions which one would 
conceivably need to exercise in a natural state. 
By taking possession of a thing, we can distinguish three 
elements by which this can be achieved. That is, 
a) one may directly grasp something physically; this 
would be quite literally "taking possession"; 
b) one may possess something by shaping, forming or 
through bringing it into being as a distinct 
entity; developing it out of . an amorphous 
collection of raw materials; and 
c) taking possession by simply marking off, enclosing 
or segregating something." 
It is evident that intention must inform all three activities 
if they are to underlie property. In taking possession of 
an object I must intend that it is to become my property, 
if it is to be so - mere accidental possession cannot be 
sufficient for property. An essential feature of property is 
the intention'^ of entities or individuals to, at some 
individual possession, or interference by the state with 
the individual's freedom to aquire possession. See for 
example, J.Chandler op. cit. 
" See W.M.Hoffman and J.V.Fisher "Corporate Responsibility: 
Property and Liberty" in L.C.Becker and K.Kipnis (Ed.) 
"Property: Cases, Concepts, Critiques", op.cit. p.215. 
See S.R.Munzer "Property, Incorporation and Projection" in 
Nous 23, 1989, p.298; and W.M.Hoffman and J.V.Fisher 
"Corporate Responsibility - Property and Liability." Ibid. 
stage, acquire or retain a thing. One must intend the 
possession in order to establish the sort of link between the 
individual and the object, after all, a prisoner does not own 
his cell, although his possession of it may be protected by 
law for a considerable period. Property must be intentionally 
acquired for something to be owned. That is, whether it is 
acquired by creation, by purchase, by finding or even by gift 
from someone else, there is an intention (either by the 
acquirer or recipient, or the benefactor) for the thing to 
become the property of the owner. Certainly intention appears 
to be a necessary element in one's ownership of a thing — it 
is true that at least all initial acquisiton, that is, the 
first time a particular thing is acquired, must be done so 
intentionally. Even if something comes to me by accident -
say I find myself in possession of something that belongs to 
nobody else - it requires an aquisitive intent to retain it, 
if I am to think of it, henceforth, as my property. Owning 
a thing is an action and therefore a necessary condition for 
A's owning x is A's intention to own x. 
» 
Further, this intention must extend beyond the initial 
acquisition, but it need not be intentional with respect to 
every element of the thing possessed. For example, if I 
claim ownership of a parcel of land, by implication I also 
intend that my ownership will be extended to, say, the rare 
flowers growing on it of which I had no prior knowledge, or 
the mineral deposits of which I am unaware. This extension 
would also apply to organic consequences of activities 
naturally occurring on the land such as the offspring of my 
cows. 
This intention is, of course, usually more detailed or 
pronounced if I am to take possession by creating something, 
by shaping or forming something - I intend that the piece of 
wood, for example, which has no prior claim on it, and which 
is fashioned into a chair by me, will be mine. As Hegel 
pointed out, a person puts his will into a thing - this is 
the psychological investment that underlies our feeling of 
"attachment" to what we call our property.'^ Hegel's 
characterisation of property is that it results from a mental 
act; the person decides that he wishes the thing and wills 
it - "I want it, this is mine". Thus Hegel distinguishes 
between property and mere possession. It is this will that 
produces rights and thus is unique to humans.'^ Similarly, 
by marking off something as my own again extends my intention 
to ownership beyond the immediate thing that is actually 
manipulated, such as a plot of land, by the act of marking 
" G.W.F.Hegel "The Philosophy of Right" op. cit. By contrast, 
Locke's natural man is entitled to (particular) property as 
a result of mixing his labour with a natural object. 
" See P.G.Stillman "Property, Freedom and Individuality in 
Hegel's and Marx's Political Thought" in J.R.Pennock and 
J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII "Property" op. cit. p. 133 
off. 
Of course counter-examples may be given. For example, 
corporations may acquire additional assets such as factories 
where intention may not appear at first to be apparent in 
this process. However, it must be said that a corporation's 
activity is ultimately determined by entities capable of 
having the appropriate or relevant intentions, such as the 
managers of the corporation. One cannot own something 
accidentally. 
This raises the further question of whether the recipient's 
intention to accept or acquire is equally a necessary 
condition. That is, one could argue, say, that the recipient 
of a gift or a beneficiary from a bequest might not have 
intended to acquire the particular thing. However, we may 
equally say that the intention is still present, albeit 
centred in the benefactor - I may not have even heard of the 
inheritance from a forgotten uncle! Similarly, we allow that 
intellectually retarded people, incapable of forming the 
intention to acquire ownership, may nonetheless own things -
this is attributed to them on the express intentions of 
others, who cause certain items of property to be aligned 
with the retarded person. 
In sum, it may be said that mere possession of a thing - the 
physical description of a thing - in the absence of an 
intention to aquire or transfer-would not be ownership. Take, 
for example, a case in which I have two coins in my pocket -
I own one (aquired as change from a purchase) while the 
other happened to fall into my pocket. Both coins are 
physically identical and both have the same physical 
relationship to me. Yet as the original owner did not intend 
to give me the second coin, and I did not intend to receive 
it. In the absense of either the other person's or my 
intention, I cannot own the second coin, although I do 
possess it. However, the coin may be said to be mine if I 
decide to keep it; and if I merely possess something that I 
do not think of as my property, it may still be considered 
by others as something I own. It is interesting also to note 
here that the intention to convert to one's own use is an 
inherent element of the offence of theft as a trustee. 
2. Use 
All claims about ownership can be analysed in terms of rights 
to perform various actions. Generally, it may be argued that 
all are rights to do certain things to intentionally bring 
about states of affairs. For something then to be eligible 
for ownership, it must be capable of being affected by 
someone in some way, at least potentially. Both Narveson and 
Carter have recognise the importance of use with regard to 
ownership; Narveson arguing that the right to use is 
"primary" in ownership," while Carter points out, the "core 
aspect of property" is the claim to the exclusive use of a 
good." That is, we claim the right to the use or benefit 
of various things which in turn enjoy some sort of community 
sanction. 
The use that is involved in ownership of a thing need not be, 
however, and typically cannot be, its simultaneous, or even 
sequential use in every possible respect, or every possible 
way. Indeed, some of these may in any case actually be 
mutually inconsistent. In some cases it is even possible that 
one may not be able to use or even cannot use the thing 
owned. 
Thus we can include from Honoré's list of incidents under the 
general right to use, the rights to the income of a thing 
(which may be derived from foregoing personal use of the 
thing) in addition to the right to manage (that is, by 
deciding on how the thing is to be used, and perhaps 
directing others in its day to day exploitation, as, say, by 
managers, or when we have transfered or leased a thing to 
another for a period of time). 
" J.Narveson "The Libertarian Idea" op. cit, p.80 
" A.Carter "The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights" 
op. cit. p.130 
A further essential feature of property for something to be 
capable of being used is the materiality of property - it 
must be material at some stage. That is, even if there is 
an element of substitution or surrogacy in the form of 
"tokens" such as musical score sheets, the manuscript of a 
novel, deeds, money or copyright, which convey what is 
valuable, there must at some stage be a physical, material 
entity which is capable of being stolen, in other words, of 
being misappropriated or expropriated. Moreover, it is 
through an examination of the tokens that we discover whether 
there has been a theft of intellectual property or for 
example a breech of copyright. Not all property of course is 
material, nor are all the rights one may have, rights in 
material objects; for example, one's property may be a 
copyright or a patent. However, even copyright and patent 
firstly requires the existence of some writing, drawing or 
model through which rights are claimed, and, secondly, points 
in an intentional way to some possible physical object 
(printed paper, celluloid, magnetic tape, etc.) which will 
embody the subject matter of the copyright or patent. 
Certainly, for example, one's legal position with regard to 
a patent, particularly one's power to exclude others, would 
be worthless, if not literally meaningless if the patent did 
not pertain to some physical manifestation of the intangible 
property (the patent which forbids people producing a 
patented machine without a licence from the patent owner). 
3. Disposal 
"Disowning" something, for example, by selling it, giving it 
away, abandoning it or destroying it, presupposes, as a basis 
for the rightfulness of my activity, that it is, up to that 
point, mine. Hence, disposal or disowning is an expression 
of antecedent ownership. Overwhelmingly, of course, the 
method by which we acquire something is that of transfer from 
a previous owner, that is, by exchange or by gift; even the 
chair that I fashion from wood is usually made from lumber 
acquired though exchange. In this sense, a public declaration 
is made as to the intention of ownership - first by the 
selling of the lumber to a new "owner" and secondly by the 
purchase of the wood and the fashioning of the chair. 
Here there appears to be three methods by which I may dispose 
or "disown" something: 
i) by giving it over to another in exchange for 
something I deem to be of value, for example, money 
(this would entail sale), or by barter; 
ii) by outright gift — so long as it is accepted as a 
gift, that is, others may conceivably refuse a gift; 
or 
iii) by abandoning it, so that it becomes "res nullus" 
— the property of no-one. 
It may be argued that destruction is a fourth method, that 
is, I may intend that the thing not only becomes the property 
of no-one, but that it ceases to exist at all and, hence, not 
an object that can be classified in terms of property. 
However, by destroying the thing, my expression of ownership 
may be similar to abandoning it as in (iii); no-one is 
henceforth the owner, although the effect or outcome of 
destructi on is not the same as the outcome of abandonment. 
That is, if the whole is destroyed, then there is no 
possibility of anyone owning the thing. But if we were to 
destroy something to obtain the various ingredients, such as 
destroying a car with a view to re-use of its parts, then the 
question of disposal or disowning does not arise (until, of 
course, we sell, barter, or give away those those parts, thus 
leading us back to (i) and (ii).) 
The first and second options are clear enough. That is, we 
often sell or exchange items and give presents, although this 
does leave open questions such as what constitutes a fair 
exchange or an appropriate gift — issues that are not 
relevant to address here - yet it may be pointed out that one 
must intend that a thing be the subject of sale or purchase, 
or of gift. A transfer thus cannot be exclusively one way -
exchange is always subject to agreement, and gifts must be 
accepted. However, the third option is less clear; that is, 
although I may deliberately abandon a thing, intending to 
disown it, it is not clear whether the attached rights of 
ownership continue to exist, whether they remain with the 
"former" owner, or indeed whether any associated duties 
remain with the owner. For example, it is arguable that even 
in a pre-legal setting I may not deliberately abandon my 
nuclear waste, particularly near inhabited areas, and merely 
declare that it is no longer mine. 
Now it may be objected that the right to dispose of a thing 
is an implausible element in one's definition of property. 
Certainly we do sometimes acquire things at least with the 
first or second forms of disposal in mind. One may intend to 
buy, for example, a house merely for the profit one would 
receive as a result of a future sale. Yet it it clear that 
it is only if I own the house, that I can rightly dispose of 
it and equally clear that if I own it, then one of the things 
1 must have is the power to dispose of something. I must 
have the right to cease to own it - this is implied in the 
voluntariness associated with the link between ownership and 
intention. Thus, a person may be said to own an object if 
and only if he has the right to decide upon the disposition 
to be made of that object." After all, it may be said that 
the "out-and-out" version of what is property, of "X is A's 
" See G.Mavrodes "Property" in Personalist Vol.53, 1972 
However, this may be ambiguous, in that a distinction can 
be made between our right to dispose of a thing and the 
method by which this may be permitted to be undertaken. 
property", means "A has the right to determine the 
disposition of X".'' 
Moreover, possessing a right to dispose of a thing entails 
the following: 
1) The fact that the owner has disposed of the object 
in a way contrary to some other person's 
preference is not per se evidence that the owner 
has done something which (morally) he ought not, 
and 
2) the fact that some other human agent has disposed 
of the object in a way contrary to the owner's 
preference is, per se, evidence that this other 
agent has done what (morally) he ought not." 
Of course it could be argued, however, that if the owner 
wished to dispose of a rare Rembrandt painting by 
deliberately destroying it, that a moral argument — t h a t 
it is morally wrong to wantonly destroy an object of 
aesthetic appreciation — would prevail and that a strong 
argument would be put to prevent the owner exercising 
his right to dispose of the painting as he wished. 
To recapitulate, the three core property rights I contend 
are: 
J.Narveson op, cit. p.64 
" G.Mavrodes op, cit,p,247 
1) the right to possess 
2) the right to use, and 
3) the right to dispose of a thing. 
Although I agree all other "incidents" may be present in a 
"full liberal conception" of ownership as suggested by 
Honoré, it is the right to possess, the right to use and the 
right to dispose of a thing which are the singly necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions for ownership, and which 
therefore constitute the core group of rights inherent in 
ownership. If we return to the remaining "incidents" proposed 
by Honoré and Becker, we find that some of the incidents 
collapse into these three, while others can be dismissed as 
mere rules of a particular legal system. 
The right to possess may stand alone as a general, necessary, 
right within the concept of property; suffice it to say that 
we generally consider the right to possession to be the 
minimum requirement for any case of genuine ownership. The 
right to use, however, as stated above, may include the right 
to the income of a thing and the right to manage that thing, 
as suggested from Honoré's list of incidents. That is, the 
derivation of income from a thing is dependent upon one's 
prior use of a thing, or is derived from a delegated use by 
others, thus forgoing personal use. We may permit others to 
use our things, or voluntarily transfer our powers to others 
by agreement, so that they in turn may, for example, licence 
others or lend the thing, or direct how the thing is to be 
used. But we must be clear to distinguish between what may 
be delegated, such as managerial powers, and those that 
constitute ownership. 
The right to dispose of a thing includes, by definition, the 
right to the capital from that thing, that is, the power to 
alienate a thing (by alienation. Honoré means the power to 
dispose by sale, mortgage, gift or by any other manner) and 
the power to consume, waste or destroy the thing. Further, 
we may include under disposal, the incident of 
transmissibility, which entails the right to transfer assets 
to others at mutually agreed term, that is, to sell assets 
or to give them away." (Although, more correctly, perhaps 
this should not be considered as a right, as the transfer of 
assets usually in this category entails transfer after the 
holder's death to a successor, and does not necessarily 
entail that there has been a choice made by the holder.") 
In considering the remainder of the list of "incidents" 
enumerated by Honoré, we find that the right to security. 
that is, an immunity from expropriation, the absence of term 
" S.Pejovich "The Economics of Property Rigrhts: Towards a 
Theory of Comparative Systems" op. cit. p.28 
'' A.M.Honoré "Ownership" op. cit. pp.120-121 
— the indeterminate length of an episode of ownership — the 
prohibition of harmful use of the thing, the liability to 
execution (liability of the owner's interest to be taken away 
from him for debt, either by execution of a judgement, debt 
or insolvency), together with the residuary character of 
ownership, that is, rules which govern the reversion of 
lapsed ownership, are all based on general observations of 
our legal system, and can be claimed to be more or less true 
of all fully developed legal systems. 
Certainly the right to security of property, although 
important, simply reflects our common expectations that we 
should remain owners so long as we choose to do so, and also 
reflects an ideology which holds that adequate compensation 
should be paid to an owner as a result of expropriation by 
the State. Similarly, the incident of absense of term, 
although a legal term, reflects our expectation that our 
ownership is to be indeterminate in length and that we should 
continue to enjoy our property as long as we choose or as 
long as possible (terminated only by death). 
It is apparent that at least two of the "incidents" do not 
involve rights at all that owners can be said to have — 
hence, as I have already observed, his studious use of the 
more general term "incident". These are: the prohibition of 
harmful use and the liability to execution. These 
"incidents", as with the preceding ones are not inherent in 
the concept of property or ownership, and can stand alone 
without any reference to ownership. Although I have argued 
that we have a corresponding duty not to harm others, many 
harmful uses are prohibited without any reference to 
ownership - I am prohibited from using anyone's (or nobody's) 
knife to stab you in the chest, but what attaches to 
ownership is less the prohibition of harmful use than 
liability for injuries caused by my property in the absense 
of criminality.'^ But this suggests merely that liability 
for the injuries caused by my property is an observation of 
our particular legal system - if my property causes you harm, 
it is to me that you turn for compensation. 
Thus if we examine the list of "incidents" proposed by 
Honoré, we find that for Honoré ownership does not 
essentially consist of claim-rights. That is, following 
Hohfeld's analysis, property rights may be claims, 
privileges, powers or immunities. Thus Honoré holds that, 
for example, using what one owns in a way likely to cause 
harm to others can lead to legitimate confiscation of the 
thing owned.Similarly, one may be deprived of one's 
things due to outstanding debts, taxes, etc. 
See A.Ryan "Property" (Milton-Keynes: Open University 
Press, 1984) p.54 
" A.Carter "The Philosophical Foundations of Property Riqhts" 
op. cit. p.5 
Honoré holds what, on the face of it, appears to be is the 
odd view that these two incidents are also inherent in his 
full liberal concept of ownership, although they are not 
rights. For Honoré, then, ownership is something other than 
a series of claim-rights. However, even if it is granted 
that one ought not use something in a harmful way, or that 
penalties rightfully imposed may be legitimately executed on 
what you own, it is a non-sequitur to infer that prohibition 
of harmful use or the liability to execution are part of what 
it means to own a thing. The prohibition of harmful use is 
a limitation enforced by law which corresponds to our duty 
not to harm others — it is not inherent within the concept 
of property. By including prohibition of harmful use as an 
"incident" of the concept of property. Honoré confuses a 
contingent connection with a necessary one. This is a 
non-sequitur. That is, by making the step from the claim 
that people should not cause certain categories of harm, to 
treating this as an incident of property, this merges two 
separate issues. For example, as Mackie points out, suppose 
that A has a right to do X but it is causally impossible for 
him to do X unless he does Y, it does not follow from this 
alone that he has a right to do Y.'̂  So that if in fact it 
is impossible to detach the harm that is caused by one's use 
of property, at best we may say that one would be limited in 
" J.L.Mackie "Can There be a Right-Based Moral Theory?" in 
J.Waldron Ed.) "Theories of Riqhts" (Oxford University 
Press, 1984) 
the exercise of one's right of use of one's property, not 
that the prohibition of harmful use is a necessary incident 
of property. 
In addition, liability to execution'^ may be said to be an 
observation of legal systems generally. If, for example, a 
penalty could be executed in some other way, by, say, 
requiring you to perform some personal service, there would 
be no a priori reason, and certainly there is nothing 
inherent in the concept of property, to suggest that 
execution via property should be the preferred mode of 
redress. 
This same point I have recently found in Alan Carter's work 
in which he states that the prohibition of harmful use and 
the liability to execution are social restrictions in modern 
liberal societies on ownership - they are limits set by 
society on ownership or conditions set upon our use of the 
things we own. They are not conditions of the concept of 
ownership." 
The distinction between core and residual rights as I have 
Alan Ryan, however, holds the view that this is part of the 
concept of property. A.Ryan "Property" op. cit. pp.54-55 
..Carter ""The Phi2c 
Rights" op. cit. p.5 
" A.C losophical Foundations of Property 
presented them, is not, of course, a new or novel idea. " It 
does, however, offer a way of becoming clearer about what is 
important in ownership. Moreover, this idea can be used in 
elaborating the distinction between an "ultimate owner", 
where the core is left to the owner while the object itself 
is enjoyed temporarily by another person, and what in legal 
terms may be called-"complete or beneficial ownership" where 
a person enjoys all the rights and privileges associated with 
a thing but- is not the legal or nominal owner. 
Many attempts have been made by political theorists, jurists 
and economists to defend property rights. Yet a complete 
theory of property ought to be internally consistent and 
should provide separate theories which explain how one comes 
to acquire property legitimately, what constitutes a proper 
use of that property, how one is to transfer title of what 
one owns to another person or dispose of it, and what means 
one may employ to recoup one's property if it is taken, lost 
or damaged. 
" See for example C.R.Noyes "The Institution of Property" in 
P.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social Relations" op.cit. 
p.29 
" See E.Frankel Paul "Property and Eminent Domain" op.cit. 
p.195 
6. Implicationfl. 
Possession, use and disposal do not form a random list of 
rights; instead they lie at the core of a comprehensive and 
coherent idea of ownership. As Epstein has pointed out, the 
right way to think about these "incidents" is to ask what 
ownership means if any of them are removed. "Is it sensible 
to have a notion of ownership without the right of 
possession? If so, who can possess the land in question, and 
why is he not the owner?"" Given that possession is 
recognised as essential, what should be done about the 
question of use? If the owner cannot use the thing in 
question, who can? And what does it mean to use and not to 
possess? Any effort to lodge possession in one person and the 
right of use in another, creates a high degree of 
"incoherence"" in an analysis of property. Any viable 
conception of ownership that embraces the right of 
possession, must embrace the right of use as well, and, 
similarly, the right of disposal must be vested in the owner. 
The unity of these rights is an inseparable part of the 
concept of ownership. Further, ownership gives us the right 
to exclude others without the need for any further 
justification. Like the feedom of speech, whereby one has the 
" R.A.Epstein "Takings: Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain" (Harvard University Press, 1985) p.60 
" Ibid. 
right to talk in ways that are unpleasant to others without 
any justification for so doing, so too, ownership gives us 
the right to exclude others without the need for any 
justification.^" 
Gi ven that the concept of property entails that if A owns X, 
then A can possess, use and dispose of X at A's discretion, 
this does not entail that A may use X or permit others to use 
X in ways that cause harm to others; this limits the 
circumstances within which that discretion may be exercised. 
In addition, this means that as others do not own X - they 
cannot possess, use or dispose of X without A's consent. If 
we extend the universe to include all valuable things and all 
individuals, nothing essentially changeŝ "̂ - the picture 
merely becomes more cluttered. In legal terms at least, we 
find that if X harms others in ways they could not 
necessarily avoid, then A is responsible for the damages and 
must pay compensation, whereas if X is harmed by the 
calculated or negligent acts of others, A is entitled to 
compensation. Further, it is wrong for others to take X away 
from A against his will, and if X is taken away, then A has 
the right to recover X or to be compensated. 
See R.A.Epstein "Takings - Private Property and the Power 
of Eminent Domain" op.cit. p.66 
See E.Frankel Paul "Property and Eminent Domain" op. cit. 
p.195 
Of course, if X is a simple thing, then we have practically 
no problem with this analysis. But the likelihood of harm to 
X, (or by A's use of X on others), increases dramatically 
from "spill-over" effects or externalities by several means 
and for a number of reasons. For example, in more recent 
times possible harm or damage from such things as air 
pollution, water contamination or annoying noises has 
increased as industries multiply. This, together with the 
increase of populations, means that the extent to which these 
"spill-over" effects are considered to constitute harm and 
the extent to which ownership of X is permitted freedom from 
others' "spill-over" interferences, will depend upon the 
various particular property rights theories which are 
utilised by various authorities (all of which must address 
the issues of aquisition, legitimate use and disposition). 
Ownership entails an element of intention; if something is 
my property then either I intend that something to be my 
property, or I at least acquiesce in the fact that other 
responsible people so intend. This aquiescence may be not 
only innocent but even ignorant, as when I do not realise 
that I am a beneficiary under the estate of a long lost 
relative. Equally, that intention underlies the elements of 
possession, use and disposal. As stated earlier, mere 
possession cannot constitute ownership, nor can mere use of 
a thing or disposal of it, without the element of intention 
in relation to that owner's ownership; but not necessarily 
on the part of the present owner. 
Although intention to possess a thing and the disposal of it 
may not present us with serious problems - these may be dealt 
with by the various justificatory theories of property (for 
example, they may be considered in terms of a theory which 
denies certain types of things as property, or allows 
disposal only in certain fashions) - however the intention 
to use a thing in various ways, that is, producing certain 
results or consequences from one's actions, may lead to 
critici sm of this strict interpretation of the concept of 
property. I have argued that we hold certain rights viz. the 
rights to possess, use and dispose, and also that these are 
absolute - only we can possess, use and dispose of a certain 
thing we call our property, and that by doing so we hold 
total control of that thing, barring the requirement that we 
do not exercise these rights in ways that harm others. But 
we are in fact often restricted in the use of our property, 
and this might be interpreted as restrictions on the rights 
themselves; that is, it may be argued that there is no actual 
difference between the restrictions we commonly encounter 
that are placed upon our use, and interpreting this as being 
restriction on our ricrht to use. However, as stated above, 
we need not think of rights in this way - that they are 
restricted in all cases. I make the distinction here between 
our right (say, to use X) and our actions in our use of X 
which bring about certain consequences. In fact, what 
restrictions often are applied to are the "spill-over", that 
consequences of my actions - and if we could 
separate, given appropriate technology, the consequences from 
my actions (eg. shooting a gun without the danger of hitting 
someone, or disposing of my house as I wish, even blowing it 
up, so long as it does not harm others) then there would be 
not be the restriction. Thus it can be shown that 
theoretically there can be restrictions based on the 
consequences of my exercise of my right to use, but these do 
not compromise, undermine, or qualify the full reality of my 
ricrht to use. 
Of course it still may be argued that if restrictions are 
placed on the results of our use, then the use itself is 
limited. That is, it may be argued that if one were to 
restrict the production of certain consequences, then this 
would entail that the use of that which produces them would 
be equally restricted. The issue of acts and consequences is 
not an easy one, particularly if intention and purpose are 
brought into play to indicate the distinction between what 
is intended by one's use and the resultant side-effects, that 
is, those effects of one's actions which are not intended. 
However, we need not bring in intention and purpose on this 
analysis. That is, as consequences go, there is no difference 
in the case of the restricting of loud music in urban areas 
between the playing of music by someone who is merely deaf 
and cannot hear how loudly he is playing it (thereby not 
intending to annoy the neighbours); a player of music who has 
no regard for others; one who intentionally wants to disturb 
others; and someone who wants to "fill the world with music". 
It is merely the consequences on others that are to be 
considered. That is, restrictions are imposed merely on the 
basis of the resultant event (or in anticipation of the 
event), and not because of motivation. 
Of course the distinction of what is intended and what is not 
intended, but brought about as a side-effect (what I have 
called the "spill-over") is the basis of the vast modern law 
of tortious liability in negligence, and is the focus too of 
the criminal law's long accepted distinction between murder 
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and manslaughter. Side-effects can be genuine side-
effects, that is, not intended, even if they are foreseen as 
a probable consequence. For example, I may put up curtains, 
knowing that they will fade, but I do not put them up 
intending that they do so. It is difficult to determine, of 
course, whether something is intended or not - what we can 
show is that even if certain things are forseen as certain, 
this does not entail that one intends that result. 
J.Finnis "Intention and Side-Effects" (Legal Theory 
Workshop Series, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 
1988) p.l 
The intenti on 'thâ'b I hâ,ve ou'tlined â.bove reçfa.rding' property 
and ownership - that I intend that something be mine, or that 
someone who then owned it intended it as mine, or even that 
I intend to possess it, use it, or dispose of it - is not 
necessarily the same as intending to, say, use it in a 
particular way. This is not to say that we should choose to 
act regardless of side-effects, even if the consequence is 
something not intended. Ownership carries with it certain 
duties. 
Of course people may still think that by calling something 
one's property, that this entails unrestricted rights which 
are morally untennable. However, I do not suggest that by 
proposing a definition which is "absolute" that this entails 
unfettered control no matter what the consequences. Firstly, 
from a justificatiory point of view, even the liberal 
justification of property does not defend ownership by the 
private individual out of sympathy for the narrow interest 
of the property owner and "stony indifference" toward the 
welfare of others. Contrary to Macpherson's plea that 
social considerations be returned to our understanding of 
property, I would say that they are already here, if indeed 
they ever left. Property as commonly understood is burdened 
'̂̂ See R.A.Epstein "Takings: Of Naginot Lines and 
Constitutional Compromises" in E.Frankel Paul and H.Dickman 
(Eds.) "Liberty, Property and the Future of Constitutional 
Development" (State University of New York Press, 1990) 
not only with duties and liabilities imposed by the State, 
but these become even more burdensome, and our sense of 
something's really being our property even more flimsy, with 
growth of the administrative-bureaucratic State. That is, not 
only are restrictions increasing but so indeed are 
liabilities (see, for example, the notion of strict liability 
— the latter is a liability you may have even after something 
has ceased to be your property — indeed does not depend on 
property at all.) Secondly, we may conclude that these may 
increase the social considerations bound up with property, 
but, as a result, we may already be living in what some 
people already think of as a post-property society, if 
property is to be understood as certain rights which entail 
control and, hence, may be said to be absolute as a concept. 
As Tay has noted, ownership and control no longer part 
company as an exception. As a result, what we consider to 
be our property often resembles things over which we hold 
stewardship, although we hold certain "interests" in those 
things. 
There are three empirical observations to be made regarding 
control, although I realise that control, as a right is not 
the only element inherent in property. 
A.E.S.Tay "Law,the Citizen and the State" in E.Kamenka, 
R.Brown and A.E.S.Tay (Eds.) "Law and Society - Crisis in 
Legal Ideas" (Edward Arnold, 1978) p. 11 
(1) One's rights regarding property are becoming 
increasingly restricted through government intervention 
to the extent that one no longer can strictly profess 
to have control over most things. 
(2) Those rights which pertain to property and ownership are 
being apportioned to various individuals and other 
interest groups so that control again does not rest with 
a specific individual. 
(3) Increased responsibilities and additional liabilities 
placed onto the property holder not only restricts the 
actions of owners but again generally distorts the 
notion that the owner is to have complete dominion or 
control over an object. 
By (1) I mean restrictions such as those which are evident 
even in respect of one's own home. For example, my house may 
be deemed by the government to be of historic importance and 
hence National Trust orders or particularly burdensome and 
discriminatorily restrictive local council regulations may 
be applicable. As the owner I am bound by these regulations 
and cannot, for example, paint the outside walls any colour 
other than those stipulated. These regulations not only have 
bearing on one's control, but also on the value of one's 
property. 
Further (although this may be more contentious as the sorts 
of things we generally consider as property) jobs may be seen 
as property^" and, as a result, employers may claim that 
they are owners of the positions they have created, yet they 
are restricted by various union regulations, 
anti-discrimination laws and other statutes in regard to who 
is to be employed in those positions.^"' 
(2) Secondly, with the increase in the sorts of things we 
identify as property, such as corporations, associations, 
companies and other business enterprises, we find that 
particular rights associated with property are scattered 
amongst several individuals or groups. The separation of 
ownership and control has occurred particularly in the modern 
corporation no longer can it be said that a certain 
individual or individuals are owners or have property in the 
sense of control. Reference is usually made instead to the 
various rights as "interests" one may have in something, 
although the interests of the owner and the ultimate manager 
See for example A.Ryan "Hegel on Work, Ownership and 
Citizenship" in Z.A.Pelczynski (Ed.) "The State and Civil 
Society" (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
181 Whether or not employers should have full moral rights of 
ownership over jobs they dispense, i.e. give jobs to 
whomever they please, is, of course a separate issue. See 
for example J.J.Thomson "Preferential Hiring" Philosophy 
and Public Affairs. Vol.5, 1973. pp.364-384 
H.Demsetz "Ownership, Control and the Firm" op.cit, p. 187 
may, and often do, diverge. For example, stockholding owners 
today have little or no direct"control over what they "own" 
because ownership is so broadly dispersed across large 
numbers of shareholders, and control being for all practical 
purposes totally in the specially trained hands of 
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management, although the stockholders, of course, still 
hold other rights in regard to the company such as a right 
to the income. 
(3) Thirdly, the imposition of social responsibilities and 
liabilities ranges from those applied to corporations and 
companies to individuals in suburban settings, and again 
raises the question of the relationship of ownership to 
control. For example, the notion of strict product liability 
as developing in some U.S. States, places on manufacturers 
the responsibility of ensuring the safety of their products 
beyond even forseeable limits. The ownership of, say, a 
refrigerator, may be straightforward, but the sale of it does 
not constitute outright transfer, that is, the manufacturers 
remain the "owners" of the attributes that are subject to 
warranty and those for which they are liable - "the 
manufacturers are "owners" of potentially lethal escape of 
W.M.Hoffman and J.V.Fisher "Corporate Responsibility: 
Property and Liability" in L.C.Becker and K.Kipnis (Eds.) 
"Property: Cases, Concepts and Critiques" op. cit, p. 212 
coolants and of the motors' longevity." 109 
Further, with the growth of the environmental movement and 
increased awareness of, for example, hazardous effects of 
pollutants, responsibility is placed on all individuals to 
ensure that anti-pollution and anti-noise guidelines are 
adhered to (although some regulations provide for strict 
penalties and therefore may correctly be included in category 
(1) as direct restrictions on one's activities in regard to 
one's property). Generally, however, social questions such 
as how are we to use our natural resources, concerns 
regarding polluting of the environment and the destruction 
of the ecological balance of nature all depend to a great 
extent upon the concept and institution of property. 
The question which faces us then is: to what extent can so-
called property not be in one's control and still be called 
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property. As Tay has asked, as social and economic 
functions of ownership, particularly the constraints under 
which it works, have changed, "are we approaching the time 
— or have we reached it — in which the legal norm itself has 
to undergo radical transformation striking at the very 
Y.Barzel "Economic Analysis of Property Rights" op. cit. 
p.86 
lis A.E.S.Tay "Property and Law in the Society of Mass 
Production, Mass Consumption and Mass Allocation" op. cit, 
p.88 
definition itself or lose its centrality in the law and in 
social and political thought?" 
Further, as standard law textbooks point out, the whole 
community's concern about the use and enjoyment of property, 
particularly land, by those who have interests as owners and 
possessors has been stressed much more vigorously than ever 
in the past. It has resulted in legislation (either of a 
general kind applicable to our whole community, or of a more 
specific kind only applicable within particular municipal 
areas), which regulates what use and enjoyment may be made 
of particular properties.^^^ Our modern concern about the 
environment has produced complex environmental protection 
legislation, which uses the machinery of administrative law 
and the criminal law to achieve its purposes. 
Although the use and enjoyment of things (excluding land) has 
always also been affected by the rules of criminal law and 
of the law of torts; this gives protection to other interests 
which people have and which may be affected by the use of our 
own property. However, today they are also controlled by 
general legislation such as car parking regulations, or by 
legislation prohibiting the use in particular areas of 
particular things such as motor vehicles in certain 
^̂^ D.P.Derham, F.K.H.Maher and P.L.Waller (Eds.) "An 
Introduction to Law" op. cit, p. 93 
districts, or noisy instruments or annoying toys in public 
parks and reserves.^^^ 
It may be argued that in these regards the interests of the 
majority prevail over the admitted interests of the owner in 
the use and enjoyment of his property. However, given the 
restrictions on one's property and the divergence of 
ownership and control, it can be asked: is there a point at 
which what we customarily call property is no longer really 
property? (This of course has led us to the question: is 
property an "all or nothing" concept?) Property and ownership 
are a matter of control. Yet the extent to which one's use 
is regulated and curtailed suggests that there may be a 
threshold after which something can no longer be classified 
as property (or can there be different degrees of 
ownership?). Certainly it appears that given extant 
restrictions, we do not, strictly speaking, have ownership. 
Further, can it be said that one has ownership of a part, in 
the sense of a share in a company, or only part ownership of 
a whole company? Property and ownership are, inherently a 
matter of control and this entails certain rights. 
Yet the permissibility by the State or government of the 
application of this concept of property - conditions which 
include the qualification that no harm be brought to third 
Ibid. 
persons - appears to be rare and indeed it is obvious that 
these conditions do not in fact prevail, although property 
and ownership in this strict sense is still a useful concept, 
particularly because it is clear and specific. That is, we 
see that when things are sentient beings, restrictions are 
applied which are not dependent upon others' claims to 
ownership, but are tempered by moral constraints not to harm 
others (and this may include even animals). When things are 
of unique aesthetic value, restrictions are applied by 
various authorities, and are often controversial. 
Restrictions are even applied on so-called historic grounds, 
some of which are little more than mere sentimental ism. 
Further, limitations are often placed on things that have a 
particular productive capacity - such examples include the 
growing of certain crops or regulation of the amount to be 
grown. 
In all cases restrictions are applied in manners that seems 
arbitrary. For example, in some societies dogs are considered 
a delicacy and are readily eaten, whereas in ours this is 
prohibited or at least discouraged. The aesthetic value of 
things varies not only between communities but temporally in 
the same society. Similarly, in cases of things considered 
to be of historic value, or considered to necessitate 
regulation as a source of productive capacity, again these 
vary and often appear arbitrary. 
But this is not to say that there is no ownership or property 
in an absolute, definitive sense; rather it is precisely 
because we do not live in isolation, and property is a rights 
relation, that we therefore have corresponding duties, in 
particular not to harm others, which are enforced by 
appropriate authorities. The problem, however, is to question 
the extent to which regulation, limitation and the associated 
enforcement duly applied, transgresses the boundary of 
personal property and erodes the concept of property. 
Apart from various legislative restrictions, we may even 
question the extent to which possible moral restrictions 
could conceivably impinge on one's enjoyment of what one owns 
and thus further erode the concept of property. For example, 
moral considerations may dictate that an owner of a 
particular parcel of land, which also happens to encompass 
the whole town's water supply, should not sell that land to 
the owners of a large paper mill, the use of which will 
inevitably pollute the water supply. However, if we are to 
admit restrictions on the use of property which (may) cause 
harm to others, regardless of the intentions concerning the 
use, then this example does not present us with major 
problems. 
But a different sort of example would be, say, if I were to 
buy a rare Rembrandt painting and subsequently wished to 
destroy it (discounting that I am ill or otherwise incapable 
of making a rational judgement). Should I (morally) be 
stopped from doing this? Some would say, "yes", due to 
considerations of rare historic or aesthetic value. 
Both examples, of course, raise the question of scarcity and 
rarity — in the first instance perhaps there is no other 
available water supply, and in the second, there is only a 
limited number of Rembrandt paintings in existence and no 
(legitimate) renewable source — but they differ in community 
interest. It is this notion of community interest that is 
both from a purely logical point of view arbitrarily applied, 
and yet apparently being increasingly applied as a 
justification for State encrouchment on one's ownership. 
This then brings us to the central issue of the concept of 
property. That is, there appears rarely to be instances in 
which one may be said to be an owner in the absolute sense 
I have suggested (the examples that we do have are trivial 
and limited to such uncontentious things as one's clothes or 
one's watch). When we apply the core set of rights which 
would enable us to identify an owner, we find that the rights 
to possess, to use and to dispose of a thing (to which the 
other rights are reducible) do not always come up "trumps". 
This is particularly due to government intervention through 
legislation, regulations and other rules. Not only is it 
sometimes unclear whether the consequences of utilising the 
rights attributed to property are permitted, but that the 
rights themselves appear to be limited. That is, there may 
sometimes be an indeterminacy of ownership. For example, 
one's use of a thing may be questionable as to whether it 
constitutes use — how much does one have to use something for 
it to be "used"? -Similarly, possession may also admit of 
degrees. Take, for example, a miner who digs for gold on a 
site for a short time, but who ultimately leaves his 
diggings. In this case it is not clear whether the miner's 
activity constitutes possession of the site. Further, one may 
dispose of or abandon a thing even unbeknownst to the owner. 
As a result, we can conclude that ownership is not always a 
determinate thing, nor may it be possible to identify a point 
at which something is owned, that is, that there may be no 
threshold at which one may identify ownership. 
However, this does not mean that, as in the case of extended 
twilight hours, we cannot say that there are times which are 
identifiable as night or as day. Similarly, as Wittgenstein 
points out, there is indeterminacy in identifying a point at 
which a person is able to read - at one stage he clearly 
cannot read, at another he is able to read.̂ ^̂  To give 
another example, we could consider the colours red and blue. 
^̂^ L.Wittgenstein "Philosophical Investigations" op.cit. 
ss.159-171 
the shading of which from one to another will give us various 
shades which cover a range including purple. These shades 
are different and may be indeterminate when we try to equate 
the colours with red and blue. Nevertheless, the colours of 
red and blue remain definite, identifiable colours, so that 
the indeterminate shades may be said to be neither one nor 
the other, but not that the shades are therefore degrees of 
red or blue. 
This indeterminacy does not compromise the idea of ownership 
in an absolute sense ~ we may still say that if A owns X is 
true, then "Not-A owns X" must be false. Thus someone other 
than A ought not to possess, use or dispose of X (unless of 
course voluntarily permitted to do so). ̂^̂  This suggests 
that we have a definite idea of ownership, and this is not 
inconsistent with the position held, particularly in modern 
law, that we often cannot identify the exact point at which 
something may be deemed to be property. That is, the law 
merely adjudicates on unclear cases, and the rules which are 
applied are mere conventions. 
It is, however, often unclear who has the right of control. 
In some cases it may be said that no one is the owner, yet 
Although, of course, there may be no fact of the matter as 
to who owns the the particular thing. That is, it is 
conceivable that no-one owns it but some may have an 
interest in it. 
one person has more interest in the thing than another -Mary 
may have more interest in a thing than Betty, but neither is 
the owner, nor may there be an owner. ̂̂ ^ In the case, say, 
of an abandoned thing, I may see it first and make the first 
claim, yet you may pick it up first. As a result of two 
conflicting interests as here, of course, a conventional 
tie-breaker is usually introduced to settle the matter. 
In the case of a company, the governing body holds some 
degree of control, yet this is not identified as ownership, 
some members of the Board of Directors may have no shares at 
all. Similarly the State, by limiting the control one has 
over property also exercises some degree of control. There 
is thus a shared control although the State does not declare 
this to be ownership on its part (although it has the power 
to control, it does not possess or use the item in question) . 
If the physical power of another limits my control, then my 
capacity to control is limited. However, it cannot be said 
that my ricrht has been limited. Limitations may be effected 
because my use of my right would cause harm to others. If 
To suppose that things must have owners is habitual with 
Kant and Hegel, but alien to the utilitarian tradition. On 
the utilitarian view, ownership is a convenient device but 
one whose function could largely be replaced by other sorts 
of rights and it would not be troublesome in a legal system 
if many things were simply unowned and were dealt with in 
quite different ways. See A.Ryan "Utility and Ownership" in 
R.G.Frey (Ed.) "Utility and Rights" (University of 
Minnesota, 1984) p.184 
one could causally unconnect the harm from one's use, then 
the one's use cannot be limited by others. However, given 
that my capacity to control is often limited by the State or 
government, but my right remains, then this may be equated 
with theft. While restrictions are imposed, they are applied 
because the possible resultant harm is causally incidentally 
connected to one's use. 
But can it still be asked whether ownership is a matter of 
degree, that is, dependent upon the degree of possession or 
control one may have? Take, for example, two children who are 
given a bicycle by their parents and told to sharê '̂ it. 
Neither child here has complete control, yet there is a 
plenum of ownership. 
However, in some cases the plenum of ownership is not 
competing control, and in these more difficult cases can it 
be asked whether there is a point at which a thing is owned 
or unowned? For example, in the case of unowned land the 
first (legitimate) occupier may mark off an area of land, 
cultivate it and occupy it permanently. This then is 
xindoubtedly ownership. However, a different person may 
merely set foot on a piece of land, declare it his own, but 
leave the area. 
This example must be distinguished, however, from the legal 
concept of "joint tenancy" and "tenancy in common". 
Certainly the law itself is unclear on explaining property 
and ownership. Some rights which are not proprietary rights 
in law may nevertheless be enforceable against others, 
including the owner. For example, an exclusive licence 
granted by a copyright owner, or, for example, the rights of 
ownership may not be universally enforceable such as in the 
wrongful sale of another's goods by a "mercantile agent". 
A further problem with English law, for example, is that 
there are two kinds of owner, that is, a legal owner and an 
equitable owner. The latter case arises from the use of 
trusts — that is, the legal title to property is vested in 
trustee(s) who hold the property on behalf of a beneficiary 
who owns the beneficial interest and is in effect the real 
owner. However the trustees have the full legal ownership 
and the beneficiary would lose equitable title if, say, the 
trustees sell to another who buys in good faith. 
I would argue that as (legal) property and ownership are, a 
priori, logically arbitrary, that is, dependent on the 
particular rules of a legal system, property does not exist 
independently of the rights (and liabilities) which 
constitute it. Therefore I would argue that there must be 
1 1 7 D.Lloyd "The Idea of Law" op.cit. p. 323 
at least a "core"^" concept of ownership, that is, that the 
legal concept of property must be explained in terms of 
certain rights and that these rights are necessary to entail 
property. These are: the right to possess, the right to use 
and the right to dispose and that these entail exclusivity 
and permit us the right to exclude others. These rights 
extend equally to a pre-legal sense of property. 
Without some necessary elements, the notion of ownership and 
property would be too vague and one would not be sure whether 
a case is one of property or not. For example, easements, 
bailments, and licences are clearly legal examples of (groups 
of) rights which do not have enough of the elements nor the 
necessary elements to qualify as ownership — they are merely 
examples of an interest one may have in a thing, or as Honoré 
suggests, examples of "limited property rights". There must 
be some clear delineation between the holding of these sorts 
of rights and being a true owner, of having property. The 
concept of property and ownership must entail control so that 
the right to possess, the right to use and the right to 
dispose are paramount. 
However, there appear to be two types of restrictions which 
See also F.Snare "The Concept of Property" op.cit. p.202. 
Snare states that the core concept of ownership consists of 
the right to use, the right of exclusion and the right of 
transfer (although none is necessary when speaking of 
property). 
are imposed upon us in respect to our property. First, there 
are those restrictions imposed upon us which protect the 
interests of others. These, for example, ensure that harm 
is not inflicted onto others - I am not permitted to emit 
poisonous gases from my factory, or use the incinerator in 
ray back garden. These restrictions are based upon the causal 
impossibility of my using my property (my factory, my 
incinerator) without harming or risking harm to others. 
Second, there are those restrictions which appear to merely 
amount to benefits for others. For example, the payment of 
gift tax is based on the notion of a redistribution of wealth 
which will benefit others. To take another example in this 
category, restrictions are put on one's National Trust house 
(or the house briefly visited by D.H. Lawrence) which require 
that redecoration of one's house is not permitted if this 
amounts to change to the original structure and design. As 
a result, the legislative restrictions amount to benefits for 
others (they find the house, in its original design and 
authenticity pleasing) and subsidises others' experiences. 
In the first category we may say that if it were possible to 
do X without causing Y, then there would not be a basis for 
restricting X. 
It is the second category, however, which appears to be most 
problematic and which appears to be increasingly imposed upon 
us. Not even Honoré, in his list of "incidents", commonly 
found in the legal notion of ownership, included a duty to 
uplift aesthetic beauty as judged by others. As such, we may 
look at the various limitations placed upon us which go far 
beyond acceptable limits of moral and legal norms that 
require us to refrain from harming others. Constraints that 
range from substantial ones such as price controls, to minor 
restrictions such as keeping one's fence two feet from the 
property line, all reduce our set of choices of what to do 
with the things we own. 
CMFf; 
PROPERTY AND STEWARDSHIP 
1. Introduction. 
Having considered what the concept of property (and 
ownership) entails, it is evident that we do not commonly 
have as many instances of property as first thought, although 
we still talk of property in the terms I have suggested. 
There are two distinct ideas to which I draw attention; these 
are, first, that genuine ownership entails the the right to 
control, although restrictions may be applied to limit harm 
to others. I suggested in the previous chapter that the 
notion of absolute may be shown by differentiating between 
one's right, and the actions that may be licenced via that 
right, and the result or consequence of that action. Thus it 
is possible to maintain both that the rights of property, are 
absolute, but that restrictions may be imposed on the manner 
and circumstances in which that right may be exercised, 
generally based on considerations regarding the prevention 
of possible harm to others. Restrictions based on contingent 
consequences of one's action do not necessarily entail 
limitations on the right itself. 
Second, however, it is clear that restrictions and 
qualifications upon one's enjoyment and use of one's property 
are today being applied for purposes other than the 
prevention of harm to others and in order to harness the 
property in question for the service of some supposed public 
or community good. This further erodes the application of the 
concept of property. 
Thus it appears that present usage of the word "property" is 
inconsistent with the above concept of property, and is being 
applied often to examples other than those consistent with 
that standard. That is, we often apply the word "property" 
to things to which our relationship, although we have an 
interest in the thing, is at best no more than stewardly. 
It appears that with the growing increase in regulation over 
things which are becoming of greater social, economic and 
cultural importance, that the rights we associate with 
property may be held elsewhere. Rights associated with 
property nominally owned by the individual have become in 
practice vested in the State, without any form of transfer 
in direct action of expropriation by the State. Although 
regulation by the State is, in many cases, necessary, it 
appears that the State is becoming all but in name the owner 
of many of the things we commonly own only in name. Although 
th State does not claim this, we are nevertheless faced with 
property rights so dispersed or limited to the extent that 
no-one appears to to hold ownership of the things in 
question. 
Thus we may conclude that, looking at the concept of 
property, we are moving towards what some would consider a 
socialist State whereby the individual is becoming equivalent 
to a steward in respect to his "property" while furthering 
State aims. While this might still be called "ownership" and 
"property", this may be merely a linguistic phenomenon which, 
in my view, has neither caught up with, nor reflects, our 
current practice. 
2. Property and the State. 
In effect, property is being quietly overridden by the State. 
It is both obvious and accepted that governments regulate the 
use of our property and that the terms and extent of this 
control vary with the decisions of legislatures and 
subordinate administrative agencies. That is, the State 
appears to have resumed the individual's ownership rights, 
leaving the individual only interests, liabilities and 
duties, all of which constitute something less than 
ownership. It is not the case, as Mavrodes believes, that 
ownership can be "fragmented"^ for social purposes. On the 
contrary, we appear to be moving towards a form of 
stewardship by stealth. 
^ See G.I.Mavrodes "Property" in The Personal ist Vol ,53, 1972, 
p.261 
For example what, at minimum, can we expect if it is indeed 
ever true that someone owns something? Norman Malcolm tells 
the story about Ludwig Wittgenstein^ "When in very good 
spirits he would jest in a delightful manner. This took the 
form of deliberately absurd or extravagant remarks uttered 
in a tone, and with a mien, of affected seriousness. On one 
walk he 'gave' to me each tree that he passed, with the 
reservation that I was not to cut it down or do anything to 
it, or prevent the previous owners from doing anything to it: 
with those reservations it was henceforth mine." 
Clearly Wittgenstein was here indicating through this game 
what it means to own something, what owning something must 
be. The "reservation" cited is absurd precisely because it 
would render it meaningless to say that the tree then belongs 
to the nominal assignee, that the ceremony of bequest 
transferred ownership to Malcolm. Precisely as Wittgenstein 
put "reservations" on the owning of the trees, the 
limitations put on us by governments and other authorities 
render calling something "property" in many cases equally 
absurd. 
So what can we say about the talk of property and ownership, 
given present circumstances? Generally, we may say that 
^ "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir" reprinted in T.R.Machan 
"Human Rights and Human Liberties" (Nelson Hall, 1975) 
pp.125-126 
regarding human interdependence, much of economics at least 
assumes that resources are limited and wants are 
indeterminate and unlimited,^ so that the exercise of 
particular rights individuals hold with respect to their 
property may come into conflict in respect of things. Without 
necessarily agreeing that all conflicting rights reflect or 
reduce to an allocatory question in a context of scarcity, 
the right to (particular) property and the associated 
property rights carry implications for the relationship of 
one person to another with respect to a thing or to a line 
of action. These rights are the instrument of the society 
by which inevitable human interdependence is managed in an 
orderly way, and potential conflicts over who gets what are 
resolved in what is by and large an effective manner. The 
existence of such rights also motivates the holder of the 
rights. For example, empirical facts indicate a person will 
not plant his field if it is expected that someone else will 
take his harvest. Conversely, individuals are generally more 
productive in comparison on land, the harvest of which is for 
their own consumption or other use, that is, if they have the 
rights to possess, use and dispose of the harvest as they 
wish. (This has been the case most notably in the Soviet 
Union. For example, in the former Soviet state of Latvia, 44% 
of the collective farm income came from tiny private plots 
^ A.A.Schmid "Property, Power and Public Choice" (Praeger, 
1978) p . 4 
of land, and 43% was produced in Lithuania in 1975. The 
private sector produced 39% of Lithuania's total agricultural 
output, while 17% of Estonia's marketed agricultural output 
was produced on 5 to 7% of the total arrable land/) In an 
interdependent world, in economic terms, the "opportunities" 
of one person are shaped by the opportunities of others' and 
it is the rights that define potential opportunities. 
Arguably the most popular notion of the foundation of 
property rights is that of John Locke, who regarded property 
as a fact' — created by the mixing of one's labour with 
something never owned (or owned only by God) or abandonded, 
it may be said that property is for Locke and his followers 
incorporated labour. In the end, however, for labour to 
impart a right, it must depend upon the society being 
selective over which laborious actions are acceptable — that 
is, as between actions, including labour, which lead to 
rights and which are regarded as violations of other rights. 
It is this issue which leads me to conclude that property is 
not being honoured. On a traditional account of liberalism, 
conceptions of property are to be defended by reference to 
R.Misiunas and R.Taagepera "The Baltic States: Years of 
Dependence 1940-1980" (C.Hurst and Company, London, 1983) 
p.221 
' Ibid p.6 
' Ibid p.24 
justice. An assignment of goods is just if and only if each 
person owns the goods he holds, according to the rules of 
property. In Nozick's case, he sets out three fundamental 
principles: 
1) The principle of acquisition which specifies how objects 
may originally come to be held as property. 
2) The principle of transfer, that is, how property titles 
may be transferred from person to person. 
3) The principle of rectification, that is, how violations 
of property rights acquired under 1 and 2 can be 
corrected.' 
Thus, the allocation of goods is just if the person owns what 
he holds either by (1), (2) or (3), so that the justice of 
the distribution is dependent upon the history of how it was 
acquired. The Lockean liberal State, through its legal system 
was conceived to protect one's rights to possess, to use and 
to dispose of something, that is, to control what we consider 
to be our property. Yet the linear heirs to the Lockean 
conception are infringing the individual's ability to do so. 
The result is a loss of freedom and independence for the 
individual which the classical liberal State was supposed to 
' R.Nozick "Anarchy, State and Utopia" op cit. pp.150-153 
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provide. For example, various government taxation on one's 
land, investments and income/ other regulatory legislation 
which govern the use of one's house and land, environmental 
protection standards, various building codes - many of them 
merely decorative in aim - and, on a larger scale, the 
nationalisation of industries and the government powers of 
compulsory acquisition, enable authorities to acquire 
proprietary interests — whether called by that name — from 
private owners without consent. 
In the case of taxation, one may say that taxation is the 
power to coerce other individuals to surrender their honestly 
9 
acquired property without consent. As Nozick has claimed, 
"taxation on earnings from labour is on par with forced 
labour".^" Legitimate taxation does generally support a wide 
range of public services, and is intended as a transfer of 
money for some other use. However, if we assimilate property 
rights in external thing to property rights in one's body, 
taxation can be seen as "taking" by a government and hence 
a kind of forced labour or slavery. Further, one could say 
that there is an added element of force involved in those 
cases in which payment for items includes sales or 
' It is interesting to note that income tax was first 
introduced as late as the 19th century. 
' See R.A.Epstein "Taxation in a Lockean World" in Social 
Philosophy and Policy Vol.4, 1986 
^̂  R.Nozick "Anarchy, State and Utopia" op.cit, p. 169 
consumption tax - amounts which are often unknown to the 
consumer/^ and are collected by third persons, such as 
retailers, on behal£ of the State - a "camouflage" for the 
State. 
Of course, one may argue that this is true only if coercion 
is actually used. However, I do not think that it would be 
difficult to make a case to illustrate coercion by the State 
through threats of fines, an increasing willingness to use 
public humiliation, and even, in the most extreme cases, 
threats of imprisonment. By governments imposing wage and 
price controls and many other regulations, they are arguably 
guilty of "extorting a restrictive covenant". ̂^ That is, an 
individual is offered a choice between paying the price 
charged by the government - thus ensuring freedom from 
government penalties - or maintaining control over, and using 
his object as he wishes; running the risk of incurring 
government sanctions. Yet an individual who chooses to pay 
the price has not consented to the transaction; he feels that 
he has been robbed "just as surely as the individual who 
hands his wallet to the stick-up man to save his life."^^ 
Although the thief who says, "your money or your life" has 
^̂  A further normative element arises if the purpose or use to 
which one*s taxes are put do no meet with one's approval. 
^̂  M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op. cit, p.22 
^^ Ibid. 
given his victim a "choice", he cannot keep the money on the 
grounds that the victim has put his hands in his own pockets 
and given it to him. The thief's threat of force has 
transformed the victim's action of disposal of his money into 
an illegal taking, a theft. Matters do not change if the 
government sets a monetary sum - call it a tax - which the 
citizen can relinquish from whatever assets he chooses. "The 
element of choice ¿dded to this stage simply transforms the 
case from garden variety coercion - "your money or your life" 
- to one of duress of goods - "of your possessions, you may 
keep A or B, but not both."^^ Although this is a simple 
equasion between taxation and government theft, the 
government does end up with what was once in private hands, 
which, prima facie, suggests a theft or taking of an 
individual's property. 
To take another case, under the doctrine of eminent domain 
a government asserts the right to take private property for 
public purposes. That is, under international law the State 
is regarded not only as having power of disposition over the 
whole of the national territory, but also as the 
representative owner of both the national territory and all 
the property found within its limits. This is a common 
doctrine arising in many different legal and political 
^̂  R.A.Epstein "Takings: Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain" (Harvard University Press, 1985) p.100 
systems — it is not merely an aberration of one legal system. 
In principle, of course, the power of eminent domain is 
intended to facilitate, particularly during national 
emergencies, a planned distribution of benefits and losses. 
In this respect it is formally similar to taxation, the 
difference being that particular assets and not monetary 
value are sought. Compensation is intended to ensure a 
return of benefits to the individual equal to the value of 
the property acquired by the State. We understand property 
as involving the notion that the State may not deprive a 
person of his property without due process or payment of 
compensation, so that actual appropriation of, say, land for 
public use such as for a park, highway or reservoir must be 
accompanied by compensation. Yet it is difficult to accept, 
given our fundamental understanding of ownership, that 
forceable acquisition by the State is anything but a 
repudiation of the genuine owner's right to that particular 
thing, and this is particularly the case when an individual 
disputes the government's expropriation.^^ If we accept that 
property provides a concrete, literal boundary to the 
intrusiveness of others, including governments, that is, 
others, including governments, cannot take what is mine, 
cannot unilaterally enter my home, etc., then the 
^̂  Gilbert Matraire recently posted a "private property" sign 
on a section of the Grenoble-Valence highway where his home 
and hazel tree orchard used to stand. A French court ruled 
the expropriation illegal and he now owns 70 metres of 
highway - minus his house. (The Toronto Star, 5.10.1991) 
qualification of eminent domain allows government to "take" 
private property. And if this expropriation is done under 
police power, this stands more obviously against the autonomy 
of the property holder's rights. 
There are further examples of government limitations, 
restrictions and interference: for example, limitations upon 
bequests or testaments lead to the conclusion that these 
restrictions are incompatible with the notion that their 
subject matter is private property.^' That is, in all cases 
the owner is not only restricted, but may even be flatly 
denied the exercise of the right to dispose of what he owns 
in the way he wishes, even when this in no way harms either 
the intended beneficiary or those who do not benefit from the 
intended disposition. 
In this same vein, there exist limitations on goods to be 
sold and prices to be charged in the form of quotas and 
prices. For example, farmers in many countries, including 
what are generally regarded as liberal property-owning 
democracies, must adhere to set prices and are required to 
limit the amount they produce per annum in wheat, wool and 
other products. The result of these directives by the State 
In America, for instance, an owner may le'ave his goods in 
his will to more or less anyone he pleases. Yet in England 
this liberty is not so great, and it is even more heavily 
curtailed in New Zealand. See J.Waldron "The Right to 
Private Property" op. cit. p.29 
may be equated with privileges permitted by the government 
to grow, for example, particular crops on one's land. It 
cannot be said that the person who chooses to abide by these 
terms has consented either explicitly or implicitly 
(although, of course, he may well agree to do so).^' 
In all, it may be said that property rights seem to be 
regarded, not only by Marxists but also by contemporary 
democratic interventionists who might consider themselves 
non-Marxists, not as a limit on State action, but as a test 
of the State's ability to limit and direct the use of 
property to serve an alleged general interest. Thus the 
freedom to use and acquire property and the security of one's 
acquisitions appear to be the potential objects of regulation 
and redistribution. 
3. Self-Ownership and the Body as Property. 
But in talking of one's property and the associated rights, 
it would be too hasty to suppose that this only covers land, 
other "chattels" as variously legally defined, and an array 
of intangibles such as patents and copyright. This would fail 
^̂  So that coersion and choice are not always mutually 
exclusive. But as Hayek points out: "though the coerced 
still chooses,the alternatives are determined for him by 
the coercer so that he will choose what the coercer wants." 
M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" op. cit. p.22 
to take into consideration the rights, which many interpret 
as property rights, in the human body. It is this example of 
a thing owned that many would consider to be "absolute",^® 
maintaining as the most fundamental example of property the 
right of control of one's own body. Generally, it could be 
argued that there are three broad categories of entity over 
which a person might claim ownership: a selection of the non-
human resources, whatever their form, of the world external 
to himself, his own person - his body (if this be different)-
and his powers, and other people.^' But more importantly, if 
the person or body turns out to be property, that is, the 
rights we consider in relation to ourselves or our bodies can 
be deemed to be property rights, then these may serve as a 
springboard for justifying rights to other things in the 
20 
world. After all, theories of property need a theory of 
legitimate acquisition and legitimate transfer, and behind 
every legitimate transfer or transaction there will 
ultimately always be the first owner and an unowned thing, 
and this first owner will own the thing either as a result 
See A.Levine "Capitalist Persons" in E.Frankel Paul, 
F.D.Miller, J.Paul and J.Ahrens (Eds.) "Capitalism" 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p.42 
See G.A.Cohen "Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality" 
in F.S.Lucash (Ed.) "Justice and Equality Here and Now" 
(Cornell University Press, 1986) p.114 
20 And, of course, there woud seem to be little point in 
defending people' right of self-ownership unless one 
also defends their rights to control things external to 
themselves. 
of discovery or by creation. Many theories of property and 
of justice appear to start from two fundamental premises, 
viz., firstly, the absolute property right of each individual 
in his own person or his own body - the right of self-
ownership and, secondly, the absolute right in material 
things as property of the person who first finds an unused 
thing.̂ ^ The right of self-ownership implies the right to 
then also give away any property either gratis or in exchange 
for something else, and to use or not use that thing as one 
sees fit. 
Take, for example, Locke's theory of the origin of property 
— his belief that there is a natural right to property — 
which is based upon the premise that a person is capable of 
self-ownership and, as I interpret this, the ownership of 
one's own body.̂ ^ (If "person" is not equivalent to "body", 
then it must at least be said to necessarily encompass the 
body, in this world in any case). For Locke, 
1) everyone has property in his own person, and no-one has 
a right to it but he himself, and 
2) the labour of his body and the work of his hands are 
^̂  See for example M.N.Rothbard "Justice and Property Rights" 
in S.L.Blumenfeld (Ed.) "Property in a Humane Economy" 
(Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois, 1974) p.106 
^̂  Although many commentators treat Locke's idea of self-
ownership as synonymous with ownership of one's labour or 
productive power. 
properly his." 
Thus a person is a proprietor not only of his person, and his 
actions, but the things an individual produces by his own 
labour (1 imited by the amount that he can use and so long as 
he leaves "enough and as good" for others). Locke's classic 
text suggests what may be a logically sufficient condition 
for property: "It is mine because I made it" (although not, 
of course, when one is in the employ of another). 
As an analytical foundation of property rights in external 
things, Locke's theory of property may be seen as a 
projection theory. ̂^ That is, things become property by 
embodying the person in that external thing, and Locke uses 
the metaphor of our mixing our labour with unowned things and 
by so doing converting them into our property. Further, in 
Locke's view, one's labour adds "value"" to the thing, and 
ultimately it would be unjust not to allow the person to have 
what they have worked on (and on some interpretations, it is 
also, if not equivalently, what the person "deserves"). This 
J.Locke "Two Treatise on Government" (Reprinted Scientia 
Verlag Aalen, 1963) "Second Treatise on Government" Ch.5, 
"Of Property" S.27 
" See S.R.Munzer "Property, Incorporation and Projection" in 
Nous, Vol.23, 1989 
" Locke's theory of labour has been interpreted on some 
accounts as the "labour theory of value", however, these 
are arguably two distinct theories which have often been 
intertwined and confused. See D.P.Ellerman "On the Labour 
Theory of Property" in The Philosophical Forum (Boston) 
16, 1985 
is, of course based on a metaphor. Although contentious, some 
argue that such useful polemical devices as metaphors should 
always be replaceable with non-metaphorical literal language; 
that is, that every metaphor can be cashed out in terms of 
a literal equivalent. A metaphor itself is not literally 
true, but points the mind of the audience in the direction 
of that literal truth which is its counterpart, and does so 
with a particular rhetorical face — this indeed is the power 
of the metaphor. Others maintain that a metaphorical 
statement may be meaningful and yet there be no counterpart 
literal truth. The metaphor may prod the mind in the 
direction of a truth which is inexpressible literally; 
perhaps something that can only be shown, and not said, to 
use the celebrated but difficult distinction of 
Wittgenstein's "Tractatus". I find such a view unpersuasive, 
but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to resolve that 
issue. 
Metaphor or not, the question is properly asked of how one's 
labour could lead to property, that is, ownership of a thing, 
and how labour could be a basis for, as Locke suggests, one's 
entitlement to the thing, or its being our just desert. 
Suffice it to say that fundamental to our idea of the 
legitimacy of property - whether individual, collective, or 
state property - is something to do with an acknowledgement 
of productive human effort. We distinguish between the labour 
of someone who creates a watch, from that of the "labour" of 
a thief who steals it. Thus Locke's idea of property based 
on the need to reward persons for "taking pains", for 
undertaking productively motivated effort, does have 
intuitive merit. We are comfortable with the idea that people 
are entitled to the fruits of their labour. 
But behind Locke's "mixing" theory, and absolutely essential 
to it, is his contention of self-ownership, or more strictly 
ownership of one's body. (I will ignore the philosophically 
important distinction between the concept of the human 
person, and that of the human body, in what follows). Locke's 
theory of self-ownership has led libertarians to argue that 
each person is the owner of himself, and by extension, of the 
material and indeed other goods (if we allow intellectual 
labour) he has produced, that is, that people become owners 
of the world's resources which they can acquire as a result 
of the proper exercise of their self-owned personal 
powers." Moreover, when private property in natural 
resources has been rightly generated, then this, morally, 
insulates it against expropriation and limitation. 
The idea of self-ownership, of course, supports a powerful 
and deeply entrenched intuition about bodily integrity - the 
" See G.A.Cohen "Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality, 
Part II" in Social Philosophy and Policy" Wol ,3, 1986. p.77 
idea that our bodies ought to be protected from intrusive 
(non-consensual) invasion. Self-ownership confers rights 
against involuntary bodily intrusions and against coerced 
deployments of the individual's bodies and powers. Our bodies 
are, or should be, our own; "they are the only ones we've got 
and we don't have anything else to make us who we are" ̂ -
the principle being that each person, by virtue of being a 
human being, owns his own body, that is, has the right to 
control his own body free from coercive interference. It 
follows that no one else should be in a position to dispose 
of us while we live, nor sell us into slavery, force 
transplants from or upon us, or force us to bear children. 
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As Levine, for example, suggests, no one would hold that 
a healthy individual can be rightfully compelled to give up 
one of his kidneys for someone who is about to die from 
kidney malfunction, even if it is demonstrably morally 
obligatory according to a widely accepted moral theory, such 
as one which holds that this sort of transplantation will 
maximise overall utility. One would still say that his 
kidneys are his own, and while he may be liable to (moral) 
criticism for keeping them both to himself, it seems 
blatantly wrong to allow them to be taken from him by force. 
^̂  K.Campbell "Comments on 'The Body as Property: Ethical 
Issues' By Russell Scott" Bulletin of the Australian 
Society of Leg-al Philoàophy No. 23, 1982 p. 65 
A.Levine 'Capitalist Persons" in E.Frankel Paul, J.Paul 
and J.Ahrens (Ed.) "Capitalism" (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1989) p.44 
(Precisely this intuition lies behind Nozick's purported 
reductio ad absurdum of welfarist arguments for 
redistributive taxation; that the same ai^guments lead mutatis 
mutandis, and subject to the surgery being technologically 
possible and perfectly safe, to a forcible redistribution of 
bodily parts.) 
In discussing the most basic of things of which we claim 
29 
oenership, Becker, however, argues that property rights in 
one's body can be perfectly well understood merely as the 
correlation of other people's duties to forbear from acting 
so as to allow one to possess, use and manage one's body. 
Property rights, he contends, as in the standard cases of 
ownership, are fundamentally rights to exclude others, 
however he does not analyse the possible application of all 
of the "standard incidents" of ownership as outlined by 
Honoré in relation to one's body; nor am I aware of the 
application of the "incidents" vis-a-vis Honoré having been 
attempted elsewhere (as distinct from examinations of one's 
labour and activities) . Becker merely states that assertions 
such as "my body is my property" are not logically 
troublesome. 
L.C.Becker "Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations" op 
cit., pp.36-37, and "The Labour Theory of Property 
Aquisition" in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.73, 1976, 
p . 6 5 6 
However, I will explore this in an attempt to demonstrate 
that the concept of property and ownership can be applied to 
the most fundamental of things we call our own, our bodies, 
but that the limitations imposed on us by authorities show 
us that it is indeed problematic. Although many hold the view 
that the body should be thought of as property, that we each 
own or have title to ourselves, others maintain that the body 
ought not to be thought of as property as all, and that it 
"demeans" human beings to think of themselves or their bodies 
as property.^" While many may consider it even shocking to 
say that our bodies or our minds are our "property", ̂ ît is 
at least conceivable for us to, for example, sell or 
otherwise transfer control over ourselves to another person 
as in the case of slavery. (Those who argue that our right 
to our own body is inalienable are surely making a moral 
rather than a logical point). In fact, in the case of 
indentured servants, this form of slavery can simply be 
considered as a labour contract. (Although forced slavery of 
course is initiated by abduction or kidnapping, which can be 
viewed as special varieties of theft). Further, there is 
clearly a market for such things as human hair, blood and 
detachable or replaceable organs such as kidneys. 
The question may be asked, however, is the body something 
S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" op. cit. p. 37 
^̂  J.Narveson "The Libertarian Idea" op. cit. p.67 
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which can be owned? Let me answer this first. The formal 
possibilities of whether the body may be said to be property 
are as follows: 
(1) One's body is owned by God (this appears to be Locke's 
position); 
(2) One's body is owned inalienably by the community — what 
we do with, or to, our bodies is consequently subject 
to community approval; 
(3) One's body is logically capable of being owned either 
by the person whose body it is, or by some other person 
or group of people — whether or not it is owned, and, 
if so, by whom, is a matter of contingent fact; 
(4) One's body is logically incapable of being owned; 
(5) One's body is the inalienable property of the person 
32 whose body it is. 
(1) I will not elaborate on this first possibility since it 
clearly depends upon theological questions beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Suffice it to point out that Locke held the 
view that man was the property of God. "We are His whose 
workmanship we are, sent into the world on His business made 
to endure as long as He should choose. 
" See also J.L.C.Chipman "The Body as Property" (Unpublished 
Paper. University of Wollongong, 1983) 
" J.Locke "Second Treatise of Government" Ch.5 "Property" 
op.cit. S. 6 
(2) To say that the body is owned by the community is 
implausible. Certainly there are restrictions and controls 
under various laws and people are subject to all sorts of 
community rules. However, these restrictions which, in some 
societies forbid self-mutilation, and in most societies 
forbid public nudity - so-called indecent exposure - and 
other bodily displays, do not appear to be, and are never 
explicitly asserted to be, based on a community proprietary 
interest in one's body. 
(3) If the body is not in fact owned, then one may ask why 
organs/body parts of those who no longer need them or who are 
incapable or unable to give consent (for example, the 
retarded) are not merely taken from them. And if ownership 
is not contingent, then how does transplant surgery among the 
living legitimise the recipient's possession of the 
transplanted organ? However, it would be possible to argue 
that one owned disposable (i.e. inessential for one's own 
life) parts of one's body, though not the whole of one's 
body. 
(4) If one asserts that the body is logically incapable of 
being owned, then one would need to have a new and distinct 
argument for this, since everything else we consider to be 
incapable of being owned is inherently incapable of being 
controlled (such as rainbows, clouds and numbers), therefore, 
there can be no right to control. One might argue that the 
ownership relation implies separability of its terms - they 
are "distinct existences" in Hume's sense. However, this 
condition is satisfied, in that my body can certainly exist, 
and one day will exist when I do not, and my identity is at 
least logically capable of transcending the particular 
constellation which is, at present, my body. 
(5) The body and its parts are in fact the property of the 
person whose body it is. This, of course, leads to the 
presumption that one could sell, give away or exchange body 
parts at will or indeed one's whole body. 
If one were to deny that there is a relationship between 
oneself and one's body, then it could be argued that one's 
body could be free to anyone for plunder. After all, as 
Nozick points out, governments enforce income redistribution, 
so why not body part redistribution? That is, by analogy, 
the marginal loss of an eye to someone with two good eyes may 
be less than the gain to someone congenitally blind. The 
consequence of denying self-ownership leads to only two 
alternatives; either 
(1) there is no prior ownership right that can be appealed 
to, to rebut a contention that one class of people have 
a right to own others (or another class of people) , or 
parts of others; for example, those who could benefit 
most, or 
(2) there is no prior ownership right that can be appealed 
to to rebut the contention that everyone has a right to 
own, say, an equal quotal share of everyone elsê ^ 
(and, by extension, things people produce). 
Neither is satisfactory. Either one class of people is 
allowed to exploit another (the first alternative), or no one 
is free to take any action without the prior consent of 
everyone else (the second alternative). The body is logically 
capable of being owned, and is in fact owned by the person 
whose body it is. If one does not concede that the body is 
capable of being owned, then it would certainly be difficult 
to resist utilitarian arguments for redistribution. 
Certainly one could argue that possession and use are the 
strongest plausible candidates as rationale for our 
understanding of bodily ownership. In particular, being in 
possession of that to which no one else has any prior title 
throws the onus of justification of dispossession on the 
potential dispossessor, so that possession here does serve 
as a general ground for ownership. After all, the only ground 
See E.Frankel Paul "Property Rights and Eminent Domain" (New 
Brunswick Transaction Books, 1986) p.207, and 
M.N.Rothbard "Justice and Property Rights" in 
S.L.Blumenfeld (Ed.) "Property in a Humane Economy" op.cit, 
p.107 
on which others could prevent the individual from ownership 
is an implicit claim to previous ownership by someone else. 
I would contend that we can apply the notion of property and 
ownership to one's body, but that this is increasingly being 
restricted by legislation, and other regulations. These, 
together with increased technological advances, particularly 
in medicine, indicate that we are not given a degree of legal 
control over our bodies commensurate with ownership. Take, 
for example legislation which prohibits suicide. Although 
such legislaton has been repealed in most western legal 
systems, the aiding of that person by another is still a 
criminal offence. Further, scant regard is given in most 
jurisdictions to those documents commonly called "living 
wills", written at an earlier time prior to the onset of 
debilitation, and which direct others to act in certain 
manners towards that body to alleviate pain or to allow one 
to die. This leads one to conclude that if the body is to be 
considered as property, then it is generally given little 
regard as something which is to be exclusively possessed, 
used or conceivably disposed of by (or as directed by) the 
owner. 
For example, if we were to apply Honoré's set of eleven 
"incidents" (leaving aside the question of their reducibility 
in number), we find that although logically conceivable, 
these cannot be universally applied, and that the legal 
position regarding rights in one's body are extremely 
arbitrary. Here I would counter such arguments which suggest 
that persons merely have "limited" property rights in their 
bodies, that is, that too many incidents are lacking to 
conclude that persons own their bodies in the same way as, 
say, a car, and that a juxtaposition of those rights which 
we do acknowledge with respect to our bodies with an analysis 
of property, would be too superficial. To say that we merely 
have limited property rights in our bodies would equally be 
too hasty - one's body certainly can be considered in terms 
of those rights which constitute control, that is, the rights 
to possess, use and to dispose. 
There are countless ways in which particular legal systems 
do limit what people can do with their bodies, from being 
able to sell oneself onto slavery, ̂^ to being able to 
transfer those body parts which are deemed by others to be 
essential for our life. I will give some examples of 
restrictions and show the difficulties inherent within a 
legal system which arise as a consequence of suggesting that 
one owns one's body. 
Although some do argue that selling oneself into slavery is 
fundamentally incoherent. See, for example, J.M.Smith "The 
Scope of Property Rights" in S.L.Blumenfeld (Ed.) "Property 
in a Humane Economy" op. cit, p. 237 
For example, the right to use, manage and dispose of the 
income as a consequence of bodily use is hindered by law if 
the person is, say, a prostitute. Yet if one assumes that 
body entail s bodily parts, we find that in some countries 
there is legislatively permitted commerce in bodily parts and 
bodily materials, for example, the sale of blood (excluding 
Australia), and Britain permits (in the sense of not being 
illegal) commerce in human tissues.^^ Recent reports also 
indicate that consideration is being given to the 
legalisation of the sale of bodily parts in the United 
States. Due to a thriving blackmarket in body parts, at 
present, it has been reported that violent crime in South 
America has increased, possibly as a consequence. 
Further, one might say that we do not have the right to 
capital (the power to consume, waste, destroy) in cases in 
which this would contravene laws governing suicide. Although 
in the United Kingdom and most of Australia one does have a 
right to commit suicide, one cannot bequeath the whole body 
or any of its parts, except to approved scientific agencies 
for approved scientific purposes, even though one may kill 
oneself by destroying one's body. The State will, however, 
try to prevent the killing or mutilating of oneself, and does 
not allow persons to consent to murder or criminal 
R.Scott "The Body as Property" (Allen Lane, 1981) p.2 
assault.^' Yet self-mutilation is an offence in military, 
but not in civil law, which might be then taken to suggest 
that the body is considered to be the property of the 
military. 
The right to security (immunity from expropriation) does not 
hold against laws which demand arrest and imprisonment. 
Further, laws are arbitrary when applied to bodily parts. 
For example, one can refuse to donate an organ or bodily 
materials even if one is the only compatible donor, and it 
is generally agreed that persons have an immunity against 
appropropriation of part or all of their bodies, yet 
increasingly jurisdictions permit organs to be taken from the 
dead without prior living consent. 
The power of transmissibility (that is, to devise or 
bequeath) is al so restricted in cases where laws demand 
disposal of bodies in a certain manner due to assumptions 
about hygiene; for example, one may bury the family dog in 
the private household garden, but not one's parents. Further, 
(if we consider a person as more than the physical body) such 
things as one's reputation and good will can be sold, used, 
or bequeathed. The absence of term (that is, indeterminate 
length of one's ownership rights) can be made determinate in 
the case of the carrying out of the death penalty. 
See S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" op.cit. p.43 
Prohibition of harmful use (the duty to forbear from using 
the thing in certain ways harmful to others) can also be 
disregarded by certain occupations which may indeed demand 
actions on the part of its members that are harmful to others 
and themselves. For example, the law may require police 
officers to undertake pursuits and arrests which expose both 
them and those whom they pursue to the risk of serious bodily 
damage. Liability to execution (liability to having the thing 
taken away for repayment of a debt) is conceivable and is 
manifest by debtors' prisons, in those jurisdictions that 
continue to permit imprisonment for debt or, as in N.S.W., 
for non-payment of a fine. Residuary character (existence of 
rules governing the reversion of lapsed ownership rights) 
perhaps may be the only inappropriate "incident" for 
application to persons or bodies. 
Although the above examples may suggest that the body is not 
in fact property in the same way as, say, a piece of 
furniture, nevertheless persons do have the legal power, and 
the right, to forcibly exclude others as when defending 
themselves against murder, rape or battery. Persons do have 
the right to use their bodies largely as they wish (so long 
as they do not harm others) and they may even sell or donate 
some parts of their bodies while alive and, by will or 
contract may donate their bodies to medical institutions on 
death. Thus we may conclude that, whether we call those 
rights we possess in regard to our bodies property rights or 
"personal rights", the rights do correspond to those commonly 
attributed to property. Whether we speak of our car or 
ourselves (whether as persons or bodies), in both cases the 
rights to possess, to use or manage, to dispose of, to 
transfer, and generally to exclude others are involved. 
A further example of the body as property, although it may 
muddy the waters somewhat, is the contentious argument 
regarding ownership of other bodies. (I leave aside the 
question of slavery here.) My concern is with control by a 
person of another's body, and I will restrict this example 
to unborn "bodies", and the control possessed by a mother in 
relation to the foetus she is carrying. 
Pro-abortion arguments are generally presented in terms of 
what one is permitted to do with one's own body, rather than 
strict arguments concerning what one can do with someone 
else's^' (assuming that the foetus is not strictly an 
[independent] human being). Although the questions are 
usually concerned with ethical considerations regarding 
rights of human beings and possible conflicts (for example, 
between the rights of the mother and the rights of the unborn 
See for example J.J.Thomson "A Defence of Abortion" 
Philosophy and Public Policy Vol.1 No.l, reprinted in 
T.L.Beauchamp (Ed.) "Ethics and Public Policy" (Prentiss-
Hall, 1975) 
child ) , these are not generally considerations of 
questions of conflicting property rights. Yet the arguments 
do still suggest an idea of property. That is, in 
pro-abortion arguments women often claim: "This is my body", 
and that therefore they may do as they please. Leaving aside 
ethical questions regarding conflicting moral rights, what 
is it that these women are saying? That is, that I "own" my 
body, that this body is my "property" (and that therefore I 
have certain rights)? Can these rights be equated with 
anything resembling property rights or is this merely a 
problem of semantics and/or grammar? 
Many have argued that rights associated with property cannot 
be applied to persons,^V as this would suggest that the body 
is no different from land and cars. Of course, if we think 
of examples such as restrictions on body searches, we think 
of them not in terms of property, but rather in terms of 
privacy, or even reputation (but even these can be said to 
be "mine" - a non-physical part of me). However, it is 
unhelpful to suggest that none of the same rights can equally 
be conferred on the body or on one's person. Many seem to 
Although on some interpretations it is argued that it makes 
no sense to say that a foetus can exercise, waive, claim, 
secure, or surrender a right or have a duty, privilege, 
obligation, power, etc., but can nevertheless have a 
"right", - this stretches the ordinary notion of a right. 
See A.R.White "Rights" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 
p.172 
See S.R.Munzer "A Theory of Property" op.cit. p.47 
contend merely that it is "inappropriate" to speak of 
property or property rights in the body, as this would treat 
person or body in the same way as "things" or "commodities". 
Certainly in recent cases of surrogate motherhood, for 
example, the question of whether the child may be considered 
to be a commodity or property has been raised. Some critics 
of the practice have objected to commercial surrogacy on the 
grounds that it improperly treats children as well as the 
women's reproductive capacities as commodities.^^ The 
argument is that commercial surrogacy applies the market 
norms which regulate production, exchange and enjoyment of 
a commodity, thus treating the children as property, and the 
participants as bargaining over the use and disposal of the 
child. The natural mother deliberately conceives a child with 
the intention of giving it up for material advantage. She 
and the couple who pay her to give up her maternal rights 
over the child thus treat her rights as a kind of property 
right. 
Of course, proponents of commercial surrogacy would deny that 
in the transfer of children, which includes the exchange of 
money, the industry is engaging in the sale of children. 
They would argue that payment to the surrogate mother is not 
^̂  E.S.Anderson "Is Women's Labor A Commodity?" Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 1990, Vol.19, no.l, p.71 
Ibid. p. 74 
in exchange for the child, but for the mother's services. 
However, to say that payment would be merely for services, 
can be equated with, say, a baker who sells his bread; the 
baker may seek payment by selling his bread as compensation 
for his labour and expenses, but no one would argue that in 
so doing he is denying that the bread was ever his property. 
Thus on balance there is no barrier to regarding human 
bodies, or embodied persons, as property. Some will respond 
that it is "inappropriate", "demeans people" or "affronts 
human dignity" to embrace such a conclusion. This is 
unconvincing. The point to remember is that although people 
may be property, this has no tendency to show that we are 
"mere" property. In sum, the body is capable of being owned; 
the body is thus property, but in many cases this ownership, 
and the status of the body as property, are not honoured by 
society, and not fully recognised in its legal system. 
It may be objected that if people could own their bodies, 
then they would be owning themselves, and self-ownership is 
an absurdity, or even a contradiction in terms. Self-
ownership might indeed look paradoxical, and some may even 
consider it misleading.^' The relation of owning, it turns 
out, has the formal properties of a relation which is 
See A.Levine "Capitalist Persons" in E.Frankel Paul, 
F.D.Miller, J.Paul, and J.Ahrens (Ed.) "Capitalism" 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p.42 
non-reflexive, non-symmetrical, and non-transitive. There is 
no logical problem about something owning itself, nor does 
the belief that one can own one's body commit one to dualism. 
Even if one can sell parts of oneself, there is no 
requirement that the selling part is different from the sold 
part, nor must the selling part be differentiated or 
differentiable from the sale. Indeed, it may even be wrong 
to speak of one part of the whole selling another part of the 
whole; rather the whole sells part of itself. For example, 
when a corporation sells off part of itself, it is not one 
part of the corporation selling off another, rather it is the 
corporation selling a part. (Although it must be added that 
the corporation is not an entity which acts independantly of 
the individuals who make up that corporation.) Here it is 
cl ear that "ownership is a didactic relation which is 
satisfied by the whole - part relation".^* 
4. Labour as Property. 
To further our comparison of our bodies and other forms of 
property vis-a-vis Honoré's incidents within ownership, we 
may look at an additional question which arises as a result 
of property rights in our bodies - an aspect of oneself which 
has special interest as property - that is, ownership of, or 
J.L.C.Chipman "The Body as Property" op. cit p.7 
property rights in external things as a result of our labour. 
Indeed, the connection between ownership of oneself and, by 
extension, of external things is often cited as a strong one 
- that, arguably, the rights of self-ownership would be 
curtailed severely in practice if people were not permitted 
to exercise strong control over some material possessions.^^ 
This arises particularly on Locke's account of ownership of 
oneself - that by extension we may claim ownership of our 
labour and that persons have proprietary claims on parts of 
the external world. Locke states that for a person "the 
labour of his body and the work of his hands are properly 
his."^' The idea of ownership of one's self or one's body 
and one's labour (and therefore what one's labour produces) 
has been dismissed by some as simplistic, particularly in the 
modern w o r l d , a n d as Nozick has most famously suggested, 
labouring on, and changing a thing does not make a thing 
one's own - it is merely a way of losing one's labour.^® 
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See J.Narveson "The Libertarian Idea" op, cit, p. 71 
^̂  J.Locke "Second Treatise on Government" Ch,5 "Of Property" 
op.cit. S.27 
Although some accept the premise that we own ourselves, but 
argue that we do not need to accept the legitimacy of 
(private) ownership of other things. See for example 
G.A.Cohen "Self-Ownership, World Ownership and Equality" in 
Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol.3, 1986. 
" R.Nozick "Anarchy, State and Utopia" op. cit. p.174-175. 
"If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it into the sea 
so that the molecules (made radioactive, so I can check 
this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come 
to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato 
juice?" 
However, work is predicated of all our other activities, and 
may be the most "fundamental of all human activities".^' 
After all, labour does, as Locke rightly points out, 
distinguish what we own, what we have an exclusive right to. 
(Who else would be entitled to the thing I have made, or to 
the previously unowned land that I have cleared, given that 
I am not of course in another's employ?) In what sense, 
however, does one own one's labour - both in the sense of 
one's capacity and in specific instances? One could argue 
that labour is logically dependent upon the existence of the 
person, and therefore if we own our own person (that is, 
body), then one owns one's labour as well. However, it 
appears that, like the body, although labour may be owned, 
it often is not honoured as property. That is, although the 
importance of one's labour or work is not in dispute in the 
heirarchy of human activity, as Haggard has recently pointed 
out, "what is in dispute is the proper role of government in 
regulating this activity".^" 
However, the difficulty with this example is that the sea 
may already be owned, and further, there may not be an 
appropriate emotional response, that is, a "feeling" or 
intention to own by this action. 
T.R.Haggard "Work, Government, and the Constitution: 
Determining the Proper Allocation of Rights and Powers" in 
E.Frankel Paul and H.Dickman (Eds.) "Liberty, Property and 
the Future of Constitutional Development" (State University 
of New York Press, 1990) p.241 
T.R.Haggard Ibid. p.241 
Of course, one could hold the view that one's body and labour 
are not inter-dependent, that is, that one can be owned 
without the other. Alternatively, it could be suggested that 
a person cannot "own" or have property in one's labour in any 
case, as labour is not a distinct entity. The formal 
alternatives both conceptually and substantially for owning 
one's body and one's labour are: 
(1) one does not own the body but owns one's labour; 
(2) one owns one's body, but not labour; 
(3) neither body nor labour are owned. 
(1) One could argue that I merely have a right to my body 
or to my person, but that I do in fact own my labour. 
That is, I may control my labour; I may possess, use, 
dispose of my labour, but that this is not dependent 
upon the ownership of my body. However, I have already 
suggested that the body may be property. 
(2) One could imagine, of course, that one could own one's 
body or person, but not one's labour. For example, I 
may be employed by another person, and in this situation 
it may be said that I do not "own" my labour as I am 
restricted to this employment, particularly if I am 
under contract to the employer and am not free to work 
elsewhere for a period of time. Although this may be 
seen merely as restrictive, or at worst a temporary 
surrendering of my labour (and one presumably does this 
voluntarily in any case), still it can be argued that 
for the duration of the employment I do not possess my 
labour, in the sense of exclusive control. I do not, for 
example, have the right to use it elsewhere (that is, 
legally for any other employer) nor can I exclude the 
employer as the contract binds the employee to the 
employer. Hence, Locke argued that the turf cut by the 
servant remained the property of the master. Certainly 
the wage of the servant is still rightfully his in 
exchange for the cutting. 
(3) Alternatively, one may say only that I have a right to 
my labour. Locke argued that by mixing one's labour 
with something led to a property in the thing. However, 
one could argue that it is also true that I have a moral 
right to my labour, without relying on the idea of 
property. That is, one could simply say that I have a 
right to my body and I have a right to my labour, 
without relying on the notion of property. 
Generally it is unclear what labour is, that is, it is 
difficult to separate an entity called "labour" that exists 
between the person and the finished product. Even motive may 
be relevant. The same activity may be regarded as labour if 
undertaken for productive purposes, whether or not 
commercial, but considered to be relaxation if undertaken for 
enjoyment. Consider, for example, the difference between a 
commercial driver working to a tight timetable, and a person 
dri ving in a long distance motor rally. 
Labour is an activity^^ dependent upon the person, it is 
ephemeral and can be seen as the expenditure of energy — a 
particular dissipation for a particular purpose. Labour may 
be intentional, that is, the activity is intended for a 
particular "purpose, although it may be intended that the 
particular activity is for some purpose other than the 
result. Further, the labour may be totally unintentional -
that is, X attempts to make A, but instead creates B. For 
example, a sculptor may attempt to create a bust of a person, 
but the finished product may look like a pineapple. 
Labour certainly is not a product. For example, if we were 
to strip back a pair of shoes one has laboured upon to 
produce, one would not find an entity called "labour". Labour 
cannot be equated with the actual product, namely the shoe. 
Perhaps labour can best be understood in terms of a 
channelling of effort, not only of actual labour or "labour-
er, conceivably, a non-activity in the case of, say, a 
nightwatchman who merely stands with a torch in hand in 
anticipation of further activity. 
p o w e r " b u t also of directing and supervising it, to 
create (in the future) a new object, so that labour 
encompasses such diverse activities as manufacturing, 
storage, transport, exploration, and sometimes "ritual 
incantations"." We may of course understand the notion of 
one's labour as one's work in the sense of one's job and that 
this, conceivably, may be considered to be our property. 
The idea of job property is often put forward as a crucial 
one for the understanding of much of collective bargaining 
in industry, and many public employments, particularly the 
public services and professional occupations have the 
practice of "establishing" positions giving tenure for a 
person's working life.^* Various pieces of legislation also 
provide for compensation for the loss of a job. We may thus 
say that a job is property both due to the objective elements 
we perceive such as the particular rights held in regard to 
that job one may have - the right to possess, the right to 
use and the right to dispose of (by retiring or resigning) -
and to the subjective elements, that is, that we often claim 
Which is the subject of Marx's explication of property - the 
right to direct, control and profit from one's power to 
produce valuable products. 
" M.Silver "Foundations of Economic Justice" (Basil Blackwell, 
1989) p.47 
^̂  See P.Hollowell "Career: The Claim to Job Property" in 
P.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social Relations" 
(Heinemann, London, 1982) p.183 
a job or position to be mine, that is, as property. 
If the idea of mixing of one's labour with something, thus 
entailing ownership of that thing, is not a metaphor, then 
we may ask whether one's labour can be an "ingredient". It 
seems implausible that by the act of labouring one "mixes" 
things together; for example, one cannot say that labour 
stands to the product as flour does to cake, or water to ice. 
Certainly labour cannot be identified as an ingredient in 
this sense. This appears to be a category mistake if 
interpreted literally, that is, how can labour be an element? 
If one says plainly that one makes things, how does this lead 
to property? Yet mixing is intended to answer this. The 
general question remains, however, of whether one's labour 
is the sort of thing that one can deem to be property. Can 
we do anything with it, or pass it and the corresponding 
rights and responsibilities to another? Certainly there is 
a confusion if we were, for example, to apply the concept of 
property to labour in an employer and hired labour situation. 
A person may hire himself out to another, but how inalienable 
is one's labour in the sense of personal involvement or 
responsibility in the employment of one's labour? Is labour 
alienable in any sense, or is it inalienable like the "self"? 
Further, it may be argued that work and property are 
fundamentally similar in that they are transformations of 
each other — property is objectified work activity and work 
is potential or future property. Yet we should distinguijsh 
between genuine property and mere (proprietary) interest, 
even in one's job. Ellerman" for example, poses an 
interesting example of an entrepreneur and his employees who 
rob a bank. As Ellerman points out, a worker cannot turn 
over the use of his self to the entrepreneur and not have any 
personal involvement in the employment of his labour. Unless 
a worker is for some reason incapacitated and doesn't know 
what he is doing, a worker is inexorably involved and 
inescapably de facto responsible for the results of his 
intentional actions — all would be held legally responsible 
for the crime. Ellerman's conclusion is that by rejecting 
the idea that labour is hired to others, the legal system 
upholds the labour theory of property that people are 
entitled to the fruits of their labour. A person cannot in 
fact transfer the use of his actions (fruits of one's 
labours) even when the enterprise is not criminal. ̂^ 
Certainly we do, legally, abide by the concept of vicarious 
liability. 
" D.P.Ellerman "Property and Production" in L.C.Becker and 
K.Kipnis (Ed.) "Property: Cases, Concepts, Critiques" 
(Prentiss Hall,1984) pp.221-222 
But this may be more in line with a person's individual 
moral judgement in the case of a crime, and thus the two 
cannot be equated. 
If we think of the ownership of one's labour as ownership of 
one's personal productive powers or labour powers, we may 
again apply the Honoré set of rights and powers, particularly 
if applied to one's talents and abilities. Although I have 
already reduced these "incidents" to a sub-set, it is still 
useful to examine Honoré's full list. In fact, it may be more 
appropriate to apply this set to one's labour powers than to 
one's body; that is, the rights to possess, to use, to 
manage, to the income, to alienate (to sell one's labour or 
waste one's talents) security, infiniteness of term and 
reversion (although one cannot bequeath one's talents because 
of their nature, nor is it likely that one would have one's 
talents taken in repayment of debts)^^ to such things as 
one's skills at building, talents such as computer 
programming, painting, or the ability to endure strenuous 
physical labour. 
Certainly in the case of an individual it would appear that 
we can safely apply the notion of property rights with 
respect to a person's productive powers. Regarding ownership 
of productive powers (labour power) and ownership of the 
means of exercising productive powers (means of labour or 
Although it could be argued that, according to a strict 
application of a contractual obligation, this would not 
rule out forced labour or indentured servitude in 
satisfaction of a contract or the sense of community 
service orders applied later by a court as a penalty 
(although this was not a condition of a contract) if in 
debt. 
means of production), this is sometimes complicated because 
the product of the labour, for example, cars, may be 
something consumable, or they may be a means of production, 
such as the machinery which makes the car. Because of this, 
then, it may be that the conclusions contradict the 
traditional conclusions about the relation between ownership 
of labour and ownership of its product. 
Further, it is possible to argue that people lose property 
rights in their labour in ways that are similar to the 
various transactions a person employs in regard to property 
rights in a thing, for example, by selling the thing. To sell 
one's labour power one sells the right to direct, control and 
profit from one's power to produce valuable products, that 
is, one leaves to the discretion of others the use of one's 
talents, abilities and capacities. (Although a person cannot 
justly lose property rights in a thing through actions of 
others, for example, if A sells X to B, but C was also a 
joint owner with A of X, then without consent, C has been 
defrauded.) But even if one can only exercise one's skills 
via a particular method, and that method is denied, then this 
does not entail that one's skills have been lost. 
However, Kernohan argues that if one owns just the skill 
itself, but not its exercise, then this is less than "full 
ownership".^' That is, it would be analogous to someone who 
has legal title to a piece of land, but does not own the 
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leasehold and someone who owns land in "fee simple". The 
former cannot use, manage or produce income on his land and 
thus has an interest which is of a "lesser degree" than 
ownership as compared to the latter. That is, if someone does 
not own the exercise of his or her productive powers, then 
it may be argued that his interests, real as they may be, do 
not amount to ownership of the powers themselves - we may say 
that he merely holds an interest in the thing, in this case, 
the thing being his productive powers. 
It may be argued, however, that^the libertarian justification 
of private property needs to have both. That is, if 
self-ownership merely guarantees ownership of the capacity 
to labour and not of labour itself then the labour 
justification of private property loses credibility.'*' This 
is evident if one "mixes" one's labour (something one owns) 
with something one does not own and begins to own the latter. 
That is, this becomes a worse argument if one mixes something 
one only owns in part, with an unowned thing and somehow 
" A.Kernohan "Capitalism and Self-Ownership" in E.Frankel 
Paul, F.D.Miller, J.Paul and J.Ahrens (Ed.) "Capitalism" 
(Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp.66-67 
" Fee simple: an estate of freehold; an estate of inheritance, 
implying an absolute inheritance, clear of any condition, 
limitation or restriction to particular heirs. 
A.Kernohan "Capitalism and Self-Ownership" op. cit, p.67 
appropriates it. To take an analogy: A owns a hammer and B 
owns the nails. B denies A access to the nails. As a 
result, A still owns the hammer, but may be said to have some 
sort of "reduced" ownership, or more precisely, has merely 
an interest which iis less than ownership in the sense that 
one possible use of the hammer is ruled out. 
To take another analogy: A cannot use the hammer at all, 
that is, is denied all use of the hammer and no longer has 
the right to use, manage, to the income etc. As a result, 
we would say A has sufficient reduction in his capacity to 
use the hammer. But rather than concluding that A's type of 
ownership has changed, that A no longer owns the hammer, 
rather we say that A has some interest which is less than 
ownership. Similarly, if a thing only has one use, and that 
use is legally denied it may also be said that one's capacity 
is reduced and hence no longer can it be said that one owns 
it. Some productive powers may be said to be like this, that 
is, are so specialised; for example, skill at computer 
programming cannot be exercised without access to a computer. 
But this is not to say anything about the concept of property 
itself as it relates to specific objects of ownership such 
as the hammer or the nails; rather, it concerns the 
requirements externally imposed which suggest that if, in the 
above case the skill cannot be used, its possessor may no 
longer have ownership, but only holds some lesser interest. 
What conclusion can be drawn in relation to position that 
property entails the rights to possess, use and to dispose 
of a thing, in light of the above discussion? It is evident, 
that wideranging restrictions do exist regarding one's 
property. For example, we may argue that even employers 
"own" the positions they create, yet are faced with 
regulations governing working hours, work conditions and even 
anti-discrimination legislation in their employment of 
others. The restrictions which apply to the rights of an 
owner create doubt over whether those jobs, for example, can 
be exclusively possessed, used and disposed of, and hence can 
be called the employer's property. 
J.J. Thomson, for example, argues that private employers have 
a right to employ whomever they please (although it is not 
clear whether she means by this a constitutional - in the 
American sense - and/or a moral right). The principle is 
that no perfect stranger has a right to be given a benefit 
which is yours to dispose of. Drawing the analogy with other 
objects which may be said to be one's own, for example, the 
orchardist having extra apples (they're mine: I grew them, 
on my own land, from my own trees), or extra money, or extra 
tickets to a series of lectures and am prepared to give them 
away, Thomson argues that one would not have to give them to 
the first or let them draw straws. ̂^ The argument is: one 
can give them to whom one likes and on any ground one pleases 
(so long as no one's rights have been violated, that no-one 
has been treated unjustly or harmed). The question of need 
of the recipient is a separate issue. If one is the rightful 
owner of some entity/ then one has the right of giving it to 
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whomever one pleases. Of course, an applicant may 
complain, for example, that he has been denied a position 
because of his colour and may feel angry and unjustly 
treated, but no right has been violated (provided that there 
is no prior agreement or understanding between the employer 
and the applicant). However, if the employer advertises "only 
merit counts" or "only minorities need apply", and then 
proceeds to hire his incompetent nephew or a person from a 
non-minority, then we may say that the employer is a 
thief. ̂^ What matters is not the contents of a preference, 
or its relevance or irrelevance in utility terms, or its 
"fairness", but rather only whether or not it is the 
employer's preference. 
Of course, one may claim that moral consideration should be 
brought into play; for example, one may question whether a 
J.J.Thomson "Preferential Hiring" reprinted in K.Kipnis 
(Ed.) "Philosophical Issues in Law: Cases and Material" 
(Prentiss-Hall, 1977) p.249-250 
Ibid. 
M. Silver "Foundation of Economic Justice" op. cit. p. 70 
person who is the owner of a whole community's water supply 
should be permitted to give it to whomever he pleases./^ 
Particular social rules, including si)ecific laws may be 
applied with particular social considerations in mind. For 
example, we may have a social policy to combat racism, but 
I am concerned here with the application of the idea which 
suggests that the fact that an object is one's property 
entails that one has a particular set of rights with respect 
to that object. In other words, I am concerned with the 
application of the concept of property. The fact that the 
particular society is attempting to combat racism by 
utilising legislative power may not be intended to hinder a 
person's use of his property or deny that something is one's 
property. However, by the enactment and enforcement of the 
legislation limits the effects or results of the owner's use 
and, hence, also the actual use by the owner. 
5. Property and the Common Interest. 
The implications, then, for the concept of property is that 
normative questions arise as a consequence of trying to apply 
the idea of property - is property only applied or permitted 
See for example G.Ezorsky "It's Mine" in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 3, 1974 reprinted in K.Kipnis (Ed.) 
"Philosophical Issues in Law: Cases and Materials" 
op.cit, p.262 
in the context of social utility, or based on natural rights 
to property; or if we have first or original aquisition of 
something, is it merely based on the empirical observation 
of the first occupant, based on entitlement due to our 
labour, by divine ordination, some sort of historical 
accident, might makes right, or just unmitigated force? 
It appears that with the rise of the welfare State, as Reich 
has put it, a "new property" has arisen, whereby the rights 
that are held, such as the rights to income, to services, 
etc. are rights against the government rather than rights 
against other individuals or groups exercised in a civil 
society/® That is, this "new property" differs from what 
has gone before because it comes from government. It differs 
in the sense that property (what Reich calls "old property") 
is characterised by individual rights, whereas the "new" may 
be said to characterise "privileges"^' adhering in 
government grants. This then recognises that the welfare 
State has altered the status of the individual. 
Personal rights appear to be giving way to a "common 
interest", requiring us to be motivated by "social 
See P.G.Stillman "Property, Freedom and Individuality in 
Hegel's and Marx's Political Thought" in J.R.Pennock and 
J.W.Chapman (Eds.) NOMOS XXII "Property" op,cit, 
'' J.Brigham "Property and the Politics of Entitlement" op. 
cit. 75 
responsibility". That is, we may be seeing the emergence of 
the public interest State in which property is increasingly 
composed of what Reich calls "government largesse". In this 
sense, the bureaucratic State increasingly regulates and 
dispenses wealth at its discretion and the government 
provides public "assistance", such as health benefits, 
unemployment insurance and licences to practice professions. 
Although it may be a misnomer to suggest that all property 
has always been government largesse^^ the law does allow 
some objects to be owned and not others. Further, the State 
via its particular laws prevents those without property from 
helping themselves to what is designated as "other people's 
property". Police and other designated authorities protect 
individuals' property, yet the State often interferes with 
the freedom to those without adequate property to aquire what 
they need or desire. And whether or not these welfare 
payments, subsidies to industries, trade barriers and the 
like can be equated with property - the State is certainly 
a major source of wealth dispensing these. The State in 
effect controls these, and does so, arguably, at the expense 
of private property. 
Reich, I think, is correct in so far as property and the 
control one necessarily has over one's wealth entails a 
degree of personal autonomy, and whether or not one extends 
'' See V.Held "Riqhts and Goods" op. cit. p. 168 
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the concept of property to include the dispensed government 
bounties (as does Reich as a solution to government 
encrouchment on individual liberty), it is certainly clear 
that precisely because so much of the control (by regulation) 
has been absorbed by the State, that we can see how little 
regard is given to individual control and hence individual 
liberty. 
Of the ongoing social criticism of property, one of the 
strongest and newest challenges to non-State ownership of 
things comes in the area of environmental policy. A whole new 
body of regulatory law designed to protect the environment 
has further restricted the traditional privileges of owners 
of resources to use them to their advantage^'; and while the 
concept of property is not usually directly involved in the 
debate over these regulations, their existence suggests a 
further weakening of the practical powers of the property 
holder. That is, in the case of environmental legislation, 
neither one's right of use, nor the power of the State to 
regulate that right is usually questioned, but what is feared 
is that the quantum of State regulation may ultimately reduce 
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the right of use to "meaninglessness". In fact, an 
'' See C.Donahue "The Future of the Concept of Property 
Predicted From Its Past" in J.R.Pennock and J.W Chapman 
(Eds.) NOMOS XXII "Property" op. cit. p.29 
C.Donahue "The Concept of Property Predicted From Its Past" 
Ibid. p.30 
influential evironmental lawyer in the U.S., F.Bosselman, 
recently argued that these regulations were to be invalid 
"only if they fail to bear a reasonable relationship to a 
70 valid public purpose." 
In many respects the objections to one's use for particular 
purposes, or the particular consequences of such actions, are 
central to some arguments against the particular rights which 
are held by an owner with respect to a thing. For example, 
some conservationists'^ have argued that owners do not hold 
the right to destroy. However, it may be better that such 
conservationists just say outright that they disapprove of 
particular behaviour, or indeed that they do not believe in 
property. Further, I would emphasise that restrictions as a 
result of particular objections are already being enforced 
on such a scale that an owner of property is once again in 
a position which appears virtually indistinguishable from 
stewardship. For example, there is a growing consensus that 
various aspects of the natural environment should be owned 
in common, managed through some sort of collective choice if 
they are to be developed, used, and conserved efficiently. 
J.Brigham "Property and the Politics of Entitlement" (Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1990) p.113 
See for example R.E.Goodin "Property Rights and 
Preservationist Duties" (Paper prepared for "Philosophy in 
New Zealand": the 1990 Conference of the Australasian 
Association of Philosophy, New Zealand Division). 
In the past, many natural resources have been thought of as 
unregulated common property, that is, unregulated, in the 
sense of no collective choice and enforcement having been 
used to control and regulate usage. Arguably the high seas 
have been treated as such de jure. But phrases such as 
"evironmental protection" may be misleading in that it 
suggests that the environment itself, far from being some 
vast impersonal force, enjoys a recognised status as a holder 
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of rights. But we should not be misled. Many claims about 
the environment appear to be translatable into the claims of 
some individuals to be protected in their person and property 
against the wrongful acts of others. ̂^ There is no doubt 
that ordinary cases of pollution discharge, such as into 
rivers and underground waters, constitute infliction of harm 
or the destruction of another's individual property, so that 
those things which are unowned are often placed on par with 
those that are owned when it comes to protection from 
possible destruction by pollution. Looking at environmental 
policy, two strategies regarding property appear to be 
possible. One is to impose regulation on all unregulated 
common property, the other is to convert it into private 
property. It appears that, in practice, the first alternative 
Some philosophers in recent years have asked: "What are our 
obligations, if any, to nature?" V.Held "Rights and Goods" 
op. cit. p.238 
R.A.Epstein "A Theory of Environmental Protection: The Case 
of Superfund" (Law and Economics Workshop Series, 
University of Toronto, 1981.) p. 18 
is being implemented. 
6. Conclusion: Property or Stewardship? 
The freedom to possess, use and dispose of one's property are 
now potential objects of regulation and redistribution, while 
we become stewards over what we still consider as our 
"property". Even those who argue that private property may 
in fact protect the environment — that property rights offer 
the best incentive for protecting many components of the 
natural environment — also appeal to the notion of 
stewardship. That is, that private property assures 
accountability and makes good stewardship pay. For example, 
Shaw'^ argues that a person who owns property will reap the 
rewards of good stewardship and bear the consequences of bad 
stewardship, and that in a system of private property 
individuals who believe that, for example, the forests will 
be valuable in the future, have a strong incentive to protect 
them. 
Further, this tradition of stewardship does appear to be 
important in Western thought - that man has responsibilities 
J.S.Shaw and J.Hospers "Private Property and the 
Environment" in The Freeman January, 1989 
7 5 
toward nature as a rational conservationist, and that one 
generation is not to take advantage of its decendants by 
consuming its wealth. As Rawls has argued, a just saving 
principle requires one generation to save for the "welfare 
of future generations"/^ 
As Schwartzenbach has claimed, stewardship appears to 
underlie not only the thought of many political theorists, 
but much of ordinary everyday practice as well - both the 
conception of private property and stewardship seem to be 
7 7 
central to the "Western type of ownership", revealing that 
7 8 
our "practices emerge as far richer than our theories". 
For example, there appears to be an idea of stewardship of 
our bodies that is very much alive today even if the 
surrounding theological justification has been dispensed with 
- I cannot legally cut off my hand and sell it, nor can I 
sell myself into slavery. 
This idea of stewardship is contrary to, and may be 
contrasted with. Honoré's claim that our conception of 
property is of a "western type of ownership" which entails 
J.Passmore op. cit, p. 39 
'' C.Kukathas and P.Pettit "Rawls - A Theory of Justice and Its 
Critics" (Polity Pess, Cambridge, 1991) p.51 
S.Schwartzenbach "Locke's Two Conceptions of Property" in 
Social Theory and Practice Vol.14, 1988. p.141. 
'' Ibid. p. 160 
the exclusive, permanent and transmissible use of the thing 
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I own. Stewardship may also be contrasted with the idea 
that property is absolute which entails the rights to 
possess, use and dispose of that thing which an individual 
possesses. That is, these rights become secondary to 
considerations such as obligations to "future generations". 
This notion of future persons does appear to becoming 
stronger; advocating that we have a moral obligation not to 
leave our successors in an impoverished world, that is, in 
a world with exhausted resources and polluted waters and 
land. Although this may be a desirable notion, it is 
questionable whether indeed we can have such obligations, 
that is, it is arguably at least true that we can only have 
obligations to those with corresponding rights, but (future) 
persons can only have rights until they actually exist. 
(Although some do suggest that we have obligations not to 60 ourselves or to future generations, but to nature itself. ) 
In considering stewardship, we may take as an analogy a 
simple case, and consider a steward of a club to indicate the 
fundamental differences between stewardship and genuine 
ownership. A steward of a club is the custodian of another's 
A.M.Honoré "Property, Title and Redistribution" in C.Wellman 
(Ed.) "Equality and Freedom: Past, Present and Future" 
(Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1977) p.Ill 
See for example J.S.Shaw and J.Hospers "Private Property and 
the Environment" op,cit. 
property and holds it for the benefit of the owner and 
returns the thing, say a bag, in good order. This, of course, 
is a contractual relationship, against a background of clear 
property rights. But can we think of stewardship outside of 
this idea? That is, can we conceive of stewardship only 
against the background of ownership (even allowing, that for 
nature at large, God is the owner), or is it conceivable to 
have a no-owner idea of stewardship? Can we think of the 
ultimate future inheritors as the owners, so that the only 
true owner is the last generation on Earth, with all the 
previous generations having the stewardly obligation to hand 
the world on in good order and condition? The issue of 
consideration for "future generations" is often brought up 
in this context - t h a t certain actions and behaviour on our 
part now will benefit others in the future. The concept of 
stewardship holds that the current title-bearer to a 
particular thing, say, to a particular piece of land, does 
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not "really" own it. He is, instead, a custodian whose 
task it is to hand on the land in at least as good a 
condition as he found it to the next generation. 
This is a common sentiment among dwellers in rural areas. Few 
farmers, for example, are in fact motivated by profits alone 
and considerations other than maximisation of lifetime 
P.Hollowell "Landed Property: Challenge and Response" in 
P.Hollowell (Ed.) "Property and Social Relations" op.cit 
p.87 
profits are part of the general culture in farming and 
landowning communities, either consciously or 
subconsciously.'^ Their activities reflect a shared sense of 
stewardship which may well be so strong as to dictate courses 
of action. The stewardship concept encourages landowners to 
think and act in the long-term "interests of the land" and 
not just the family or community it currently supports — the 
landowner's vision is to improve his heritage for his heirs 
in the broadest sense. That is, even in traditional 
conservative thinking there remains a "vestage of the feudal 
idea of property"/^ in which the possessor is not so much 
the individual but the family line, and in which the current 
owner acts partly as trustee, with responsibilities not just 
to decendants but also to the less fortunate. Consider for 
example the question of whether a landed family should be 
permitted to demolish their country mansion, which is of 
great architectural and historical interest, and sell the 
site to an industrialist who intends to build a safe, but 
ugly chemical plant. As Wolff points out, when we reflect on 
policy judgements "modern conservatives should be pulled in 
both directions"'^ 
P.Hollowell ibid p.79 
Ibid p. 80 
J.Wolff "Robert Nozick - Property, Justice and the Minimal 
State" (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991) p.137 
Stewardship can be seen to be connected with the notion of 
possessing something that is not wholly earned by us and 
bestowed on us by another (a lender) for his benefit. It j.s 
something which may be rejected. In some cases, the use of 
it may be a gift. Further, "owning" such gift-property may 
be said to be fundamentally a form of guardianship — implicit 
with the acceptance of an authentic gift is appropriate uses 
of it, and these uses are, at least in part, determined by 
the intention of the donor. 
On close inspection of the concepts of property and of 
stewardship, we find that they are quite distinct. My 
ownership of a thing entails that I have exclusive use and 
possession of that thing, and that my plans for it or 
enjoyment or disposal of it are paramount. They are only 
limited by considerations, whether moral and/or legal, of 
preventing harm to others. Stewardship, on the other hand, 
entails that my private use, enjoyment, disposal of the thing 
become secondary to fulfilling some previously assigned role 
which is determined by others, and it is my obligation to 
ensure its return to the owner in as complete and good a 
condition as when the period of stewardship commenced. 
Of course, it may be said that this is merely a verbal 
S.Schwartzenbach "Locke's Two Conceptions of Property" in 
Social Theory and Practice Vol.14, 1988. p.146 
distinction, but if we inspect current practices closely, we 
discover that the notion of stewardship underlies much of 
social policy considerations and how these affect our use, 
disposal, etc. of property, even our bodies. Certainly it 
appears that a person's private use, plans, enjoyment and 
disposal of what one owns are treated as secondary to 
government policy. It may be argued that Locke also held the 
view that one's own life, limb and labour was a form of 
inalienable stewardship.'^ That is, for Locke we owe a duty 
to God to preserve ourselves as life, limb and natural 
freedom are gifts from God. Further, we can square the 
insistence that our lives are our property and the insistence 
that we are God's property legalistically by saying that we 
have no freehold on our life and liberty, only a life tenancy 
which is inviolable against other men, but not against 
God.'^ 
I am not suggesting that indeed God is the true owner of the 
things that we commonly call our our own, nor is the State, 
(although it may appear to) but merely wish to point out that 
in practice, what amounts to the stewardly way of thinking 
is certainly alive. In medical ethics, for example, or in 
the law, our relation to our bodies and body parts is treated 
'' S. Schwartzenbach ibid p. 161 
A.Ryan "Property and Political Theory" (Basil Blackwell, 
1984) p.29 
in such a manner, and this is clear from examples such as the 
States' treatment of suicide and euthanasia. (Although the 
law of course is changing and may be said to be fluid in 
relation to permitting one to end one's own life.) In 
business ethics consideration is also given not only to what 
can or should be sold, but for what purpose. In both 
instances, the priority of social responsibility for what we 
"own" appears to be paramount in practice - our practices 
regarding what we consider to be our.own is far more steward-
like than any theory of the concept of owning property could 
possibly allow. For example, in the case of euthanasia, 
opposition is often on utilitarian grounds in that allowing 
for the option to end one's life may promote or create 
pressure on some to end the life. Further, fear is often 
expressed that care for, and specialised research on, the 
terminally ill will end. 
Of course it may be argued that in contemporary political 
theory stewardship is an issue which is rarely discussed as 
such — that discussions of ownership usually centre on the 
particular legal rights individuals hold in relation to a 
thing — it can nevertheless be shown that in practice 
stewardship appears to be a viable description of the manner 
in which social policy considerations are applied to the 
things we purportedly own. 
Although it may be argued that stewardship is connected with 
the notion of possessing something originally obtained as a 
gift, some unearned value bestowed upon us by another (a 
donor) for our benefit, if we consider that an individual's 
rights, including those which are held in respect of 
property, are some sort of "gift", but one which carries with 
it responsibilities, one may argue that as a gift, it must 
be given by someone. However, we do not need to appeal to 
a theological position to explain how certain items may be 
seen as gift-property entrusted to us as stewards. For 
example, it can be seen that individuals hold fundamental 
rights which may be considered as "gifts" from a reasonable 
community. One does not "earn" the honour of being born into 
a particular society, hold a passport for that particular 
country or hold certain constitutional rights.'' Further, 
if the gifts are authentic, I cannot always do whatever I 
like with them — this is an implicit notion of stewardship. 
Such "gift-property" is fundamentally a £orm of guardianship; 
so that as Rawls would have it, nothing is "mine absolutely" 
89 but only "mine given the rules". 
This can be equated with my previous delineation between a 
general right to property, a right to particular property and 
" S.Swartzenbach op.cit. p.162 
" J.Wolff "Robert Nozick - Property, Justice and the Minimal 
State" op.cit. p, 141 
property rights. That is, under a general right to property 
— what I have called the "capacity" for property — there is 
a general right which is a consequence of one's citizenship 
within a particular society, being of a certain age and 
mental capacity, etc. This general right is not earned and 
may merely be interpreted as a gift from society. To give 
another example, it is often said that parents' rights over 
their children are trusts, which they must always exercise 
90 for the sake of the child. 
The historical position, according to Macpherson, was that 
property as an interpersonal relationship of rights and 
obligations vis-a-vis the things of the world gave way to the 
capitalistic concept of property as an exclusionary 
relationship between the individual and the thing. In other 
words, the foundation of property is really, historically 
speaking, stewardship. The depth of this alleged contrast is, 
however, open to question. Some of its roots are to be found 
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in the medieval concept of ownership. That is, lands and 
possessions were static and passed from one generation to the 
next. Whereas in our society many possessions may pass 
through the hands of one man - in that time it was more 
common for many men to succeed in possession of one dominion 
E.S.Anderson "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, op,cit. p.75 
C.B.Macpherson "Property - Mainstream and Critical 
Posi tions" op.cit. p.7 
of land without its substantially changing. Owners were 
looked upon as stewards, keeping possession secure and intact 
so that the next may take charge of that thing in the same 
condition as it was tendered to the one before him. 
Although we may quesion Macpherson's historical analysis, it 
is certainly the case that present restrictions suggest a 
form of stewardship of the things we purportedly own. The 
extent of this regulation has rendered the relationship 
between ownership and control weak; while in law, economics 
and politics, property remains a central issue over which 
there is much debate, challenging the very concept to achieve 
particular ends, while some writers have suggested that 
-property rights have declined in importance to the point that 
they regard them as marginal and even inimical to human 
interests. 
Generally, however, it appears that we no longer have control 
over most things (except for the most trivial of things) and 
as we have seen, it appears that much of the control that is 
entailed by property is vested in the State. Yet the concept 
of property remains central to the question of government, 
and many basic issues of the legitimate scope of government, 
indeed the desirable nature of government continue to be 
fought out over the issue of property. However, priority of 
the individual's property rights no longer appears to serve 
as a clear boundary between the legitimate spheres of the 
State and the individual. The rights of possession, use and 
disposal, entailing individual control over a thing, provide 
a conceptual boundary between the State and the individual -
the liberal idea since Locke is in essence that the 
government cannot simply take one's property. But if the 
rights of property are reduced to only whatever the State 
all ows, then the long-standing conception of limited 
government as resting on the apolitical boundaries of law, 
and property in particular may, as Nedelsky has argued, have 
to be replaced.'^ 
Yet, as I have attempted to show, property does entail 
particular rights - a core set which entails control. Thèse 
are absolute, and barring the requirement to prevent harm to 
others, they give us the freedom to act without the need for 
further justification. Freedom without coherent property 
rights is a contradictory concept - the two are not 
separable. I am not free unless I have control of my person 
(my body) and that which I have aquired as property without 
infringing on, or harming others. When one's action is 
hampered by arbitrary controls, and when aquisitions are 
subjected nonconsensually to a fragmentation of one's 
control, then freedom is diminished, leading to conflict and 
See J.Nedelsky "Property and the American Conception of 
Limited Government" (Legal Theory Workshop Series, 
University of Toronto, 1984) p.27 
contradiction - a non-system, not so much a bundle of rights, 
but as what one critic.has called a "bundle of absurdities". 
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